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The third volume of our policy paper series, collecting the contributions
published online by the Centre international de formation européenne
(CIFE) between summer 2016 and a year later, reflects some significant
changes as well as some continuity in European integration and interna-
tional relations: The international system undergoes a period of accelerat-
ed change, mostly due to a more than unconventional stance of the Presi-
dent of the United States, putting into question some of the assumptions of
the post-1945, or at least post-bipolar world order, namely the relationship
with Europe, as well as the cooperative approach to future US-China rela-
tions. Consequently, several papers deal with these tendencies in contem-
porary global international relations – facets of the secular move away
from US global hegemony and the equally secular rise of China, pre-
dictable as such to some extent, surprising and disconcerting in its actual
form.
Europe seems to have gathered its wits, after a period of destabilisation:
the dispute over the immigration challenge and its (mostly failed) test for
European-wide solidarity, and the Brexit vote of the British electorate has
been overcome by a tightening of relations between the 27 remaining
member states – the mess, which will inevitably strain the British econo-
my, society and politics after leaving the EU is perceived as a warning
throughout the EU: Brexit did not split the European Union, but intensi-
fied the common search for European solutions – a second topic reflected
by our series of essays.
The continuity of European integration despite Brexit does not mean
that Europe is an Island of the Blessed – the fundaments of European po-
litical and cultural identity, as spelled out in the basic treaties of the Euro-
pean Union as well as in many of the EU member states’ constitutions, are
questioned, challenged and sometimes overridden by right-wing populist
movements, which in some countries come close to or even accede to
power. The worst seems to have been avoided by the electoral victory of
Emmanuel Macron over Marine Le Pen – France is a cornerstone, of
course, of European democracy and an open society. The discomposure
about the widespread attempts to overrun European democracy is a third
focus of our series.
On the whole, the topics of this volume reflect – without claiming to be
representative – central evolutions of Europe in a bewildered world, look-
ing for orientation, renewal and stability at the same time. The challenges
ahead will not lower the strain on Europe to play a stronger role in solving
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The Reform of the European Union

From Brexit to Bratislava. Another EU Reform Debate Emerging
Hartmut Marhold*
Taking stock of the debate
The Brexit vote, 23 June 2016, triggered two debates, which should care-
fully be distinguished from one other: the first one is about how the sepa-
ration between the EU and the UK should be organised; the other one
about the future and the reform of the remaining EU27. The following re-
flections are not concerned with the former, i.e. the Brexit debate, but ex-
clusively with the second, a debate which has led, in the meantime, to a
first common statement from the Heads of State and Government, at
Bratislava, 16 September, and is accordingly now being referred to as the
“Bratislava Process”.
Between 23 June and 16 September, three phases of this debate can al-
ready be distinguished: the first one, from the very moment of the Brexit
vote itself until the end of July, can be characterised as a phase of “réac-
tions à chaud”, immediate, sometimes emotional speeches and proclama-
tions, not yet well prepared and lacking maturity. The first half of August
was, despite all the excitement, a sort of shortened summer break, but the
second phase can be dated from 18 August, at the latest, when Donald
Tusk met Angela Merkel, to discuss with her the preparation of the
Bratislava summit. During a period of around four weeks, meetings in
very contrasting formats followed. The third phase was the close prepara-
tion of the Bratislava meeting and the summit itself, ending up with the
“Bratislava Declaration” and the “Bratislava Roadmap” for the further
preparation of an EU reform. Things have calmed down since mid-
September, but the debate continues in civil society, openly of course, and
behind the closed doors of diplomacy.
“Réactions à chaud” (23 June – 21 July)
The first and immediate reaction of those entitled to speak on behalf of the
European Union – the President of the European Commission, Jean-
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Claude Juncker, the President of the European Council, Donald Tusk, the
President of the European Parliament, Martin Schulz, and the Foreign Mi-
nister of the member state assuming the rotating presidency, Mark Rutte1 –
was much more than a statement confirming that the EU as such was not
put into question by the Brexit vote and would continue on its way:
“Together we will address our common challenges”, they said.
One day later, the Foreign Ministers of the six founding member states
met in Berlin2, and despite the fact that they did not come up with a sub-
stantial reform idea, the meeting as such was already a message in itself:
The EU should envisage a “re-form” in the literal sense of the term, i.e.
reminding itself of its roots and its initial project.
It took only two more days before another crucial format of cooperation
in European integration was to come in, the Franco-German partnership.
Again, it was the Foreign Ministers, Steinmeier and Ayrault, who
launched a ten-page (and thus the first elaborated) statement on how the
EU should shape its future without the United Kingdom3, under the title
“A strong Europe in a world of uncertainties”. This paper did indeed intro-
duce strong proposals, such as the request to “move further towards politi-
cal union in Europe”, to create a “European Security Compact”, with a
“truly integrated European asylum, refugee and migration policy.” It also
put forward a strengthened Monetary Union whereby “a full time presi-
dent of the Eurogroup should be accountable to a Eurozone subcommittee
in the European Parliament”, equipped and empowered by a “fiscal capac-
ity – a common feature of any successful monetary union around the
globe”, which “should provide macroeconomic stabilisation”.
Not only did such proposals exasperate the German Minister of Fi-
nance, Wolfgang Schäuble (and probably the Chancellor, too), who never
agreed on such future for the €-Zone, sticking to his concept of a much
more liberal Monetary Union, based on competition and rules, and not on
redistributory and interventionist policies. It did not come as any surprise
either, that member states who joined later, and the East Central European
countries in particular, became immediately wary and prepared their own
statement, all the more so, since most of them are not members of the €-
Zone.
In the meantime, Martin Schulz dared to call for the transformation of
the European Commission into a “real European government”4, which
should be submitted to a twofold parliamentary control, by the European
Parliament and a second chamber representing the member states. Faced
with such a political system, the European citizens would finally identify
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who would be responsible for what, on the European level, and have a say
through their elections. There can be no doubt that this proposal is the cor-
nerstone of a fully-fledged European federation, in line with the post-war
tradition of European federalism.
On 21 July, the four Visegrad countries had their statement ready5: It
does indeed take a totally different stance, underlining the importance of
the nation states vis-à-vis and in opposition to the European Union institu-
tions. The key statements in their vision are heading in this direction: The
Visegrad 4 “pushed for reforms which would grant national parliaments a
larger say in EU decisions. […] “We believe it’s up to national parlia-
ments to have the final word on the decisions of the European Commis-
sion”, Szydlo [the Polish Prime Minister] added. “The EU needs to return
to its roots. We need to care more about the concerns of citizens and less
about those of the institutions.”
Four weeks after the launch of the new debate, the divisions were al-
ready visible: Founding member states, and France and Germany in partic-
ular, showed their readiness to seize the Brexit opportunity to push inte-
gration forward and deeper; East and West were drawing divergent con-
clusions from Brexit; and there was an attempt to redirect integration to-
wards a more social democratic direction, against the still dominating lib-
eral mainstream. It would be hard to overcome these divisions, during the
next months.
Variable geometry diplomacy in the EU between the summer break and
Bratislava (18th August – 14th September)
The four weeks leading up to the Bratislava Summit were committed to
bi- and multilateral meetings in various groupings. It started with a Tusk-
Merkel meeting, 18 August, but nearly or literally all the heads of state
and government of the 27 were involved at one moment or another. “Tusk
has scheduled meetings with French President François Hollande, Luxem-
bourg Prime Minister Xavier Bettel, Irish Prime Minister Enda Kenny,
UK Prime Minister Theresa May, Latvian Prime Minister Māris Kučin-
skis, Lithuanian President Dalia Grybauskaitė, Estonian Prime Minister
Taavi Rõivas, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, Swedish Prime
Minister Stefan Löfven, Maltese Prime Minister Joseph Muscat, Spanish
Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy and Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor
Orbán.- Interestingly, no meeting with Polish Prime Minister Beata
From Brexit to Bratislava. Another EU Reform Debate Emerging
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Szydło has been announced. It remains unclear if the new Polish govern-
ment will support Tusk staying on for a second term.”6 Implicitly, Euractiv
suggests that Tusk was at odds with the Polish government, and this could
explain why his stance came very close to the one expressed already at the
July meeting of the Visegrad countries – one motive for Tusk could be his
desire to rule out any Polish opposition to his re-election.
But the heads of the member states met on their own, too, in different
formats. One of the most important of these meetings took place at a very
symbolic place, at the Ventotene island, off the Italian coast, where Al-
tiero Spinelli and Ernesto Rossi, incarcerated there during World War II,
laid down their vision for a unified post-war Europe. Renzi, Hollande and
Merkel tried to evoke that spirit of a federal Europe when they met there
22 August. Merkel put the emphasis on security, external border control
and economic performance afterwards (as the Bratislava Declaration
would, later on), whereas Renzi called for more solidarity with member
states in economically difficult situations, still suffering from the financial,
economic and public debt crisis – a divergence of priorities similar to the
one already obvious in the Steinmeier-Ayrault paper on the one hand and
the reluctant endorsement (if at all) by the conservative-liberal camp.7
Merkel took another step to breach the gap between the founding mem-
ber states (and their allies) on the one hand and the Visegrad group (and
their followers) on the other, by meeting them in Warsaw, 26 August. No
substantial content transpired from this meeting, which was meant to
deepen mutual understanding, and not yet necessarily lead to common
conclusions: Merkel spoke of a “phase of listening, understanding, and
learning from one another in order to properly understand and develop the
naturally new balance within the 27-member Union”. 8 But it soon became
clear that a compromise between the different groups of member states
and political families would probably only be achievable in terms of out-
put, of increased and more successful and visible action – not in the form
of a systemic reform of the EU.
Preparing Bratislava
In the two or three days before the European Council members (except the
British Prime Minister …) met in Bratislava, the options and positions de-




This started with a letter from Tusk9, 13 September, where he sums up
the impressions he had drawn from his talks with his colleagues, but
which came much closer to the Visegrad position than to those expressed
by franco-german, franco-italian-german or founding member state group-
ings: His letter is divided into two parts, the first one laying the emphasis
on policies, urging for more efficient action in the fields of migration, se-
curity and economic growth, the second on focusing on the EU as a polity,
with a decidedly outspoken affinity to the Visegrad wish for a relocation
of competences and power to the national level: “My talks with you clear-
ly show that giving new powers to the European institutions is not the de-
sired recipe. National electorates want more influence on the decisions of
the Union. […] The slogan ‘less power for Brussels’ […] should translate
as more responsibility for the Union in national capitals. […] The institu-
tions should support the priorities as agreed among the Member States,
and not impose their own [ones]”.
This unusually one-sided stance triggered immediate and angry reac-
tions from prominent deputies in the European Parliament, with Elmar
Brok and Jo Leinen, both co-chairs of the Spinelli-Groupe, at the fore-
front: “The letter of President Tusk to the Heads of State and Government
goes in the wrong direction. It suggests that the Bratislava Summit should
prepare a shift of power and competences from the European Institutions
to the national capitals. Europe à la carte and intergouvernmentalism have
shown a lack of efficiency and legitimacy in the past. Exactly the opposite
is needed today.”10
The debate continued 14 September, with the annual speech of the Pres-
ident of the Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, on the “State of the
Union” in the European Parliament.11 Vigorous and frankly critical, as
usual, Juncker elaborates a programme of increased and enhanced activi-
ties within the existing institutional and constitutional framework of the
present (existing) EU (27). But first he focuses on the critical junction of
the EU’s history: “Never before have I seen such little common ground
between our Member States. So few areas where they agree to work to-
gether. – Never before have I heard so many leaders speak only of their
domestic problems, with Europe mentioned only in passing, if at all. –
Never before have I seen representatives of the EU institutions setting
very different priorities, sometimes in direct opposition to national gov-
ernments and national Parliaments. It is as if there is almost no intersec-
tion between the EU and its national capitals anymore.” And he adds a
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few lines later that he is most concerned about the “tragic divisions be-
tween East and West which have opened up in recent months”.
The consequence Juncker draws from this urgent situation is, as Merkel
did, the strong pledge for increased output: “[…] I am therefore proposing
a positive agenda of concrete European actions for the next twelve
months. [...] The next twelve months are the crucial time to deliver a better
Europe: a Europe that protects; a Europe that preserves the European way
of life; a Europe that empowers our citizens, a Europe that defends at
home and abroad; and a Europe that takes responsibility.” The type of ac-
tions Juncker suggests run from doubling the ESFI (the 300 billion invest-
ment fund launched in 2014) to an acceleration of the digital agenda, from
the implementation of the European Border and Coast Guard to the imple-
mentation of the transatlantic free trade agreements. “Yes”, he says, “we
need a vision for the long term. And the Commission will set out such a
vision for the future in a White Paper in March 2017, in time for the 60th
anniversary of the Treaties of Rome. […] But a vision alone will not suf-
fice.” And this is then the main characteristic of the speech: It puts all its
hopes on success, recognition and legitimacy via output – and does not put
in question the systemic architecture of the EU system.
Finally, as so often in EU history, a Franco-German bilateral meeting
prepared a common position of the two countries, which showed all the
signs of a low level compromise: “Le président français a rappelé les trois
priorités pour ce sommet de Bratislava, la capitale slovaque: “La sécurité
extérieure et intérieure de l’Europe, l’avenir économique et la jeunesse”, a
affirmé François Hollande. Les deux chefs d’Etat ont reconnu que l’Euro-
pe était à un moment clé de son existence. Il s’agit aujourd’hui de mon-
trer “la cohésion de la société européenne”, a dit la chancelière alleman-
de.”12 Three priorities were then consensus, and any debate about the re-
form of the EU system was ruled out. The allusion to Merkel’s word on
social cohesion, by the way, is lacking in the German governmental report
on the meeting, and maybe seen as another hint to a divergence between
the French socialist and the German conservative governmental stance.
Bratislava
The Bratislava Summit was not an extension of the debate about an EU
reform, as triggered nearly four months before, but a reduction: The heads
of state and government limited their common statement to the lowest
Hartmut Marhold
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common denominator. And even the form of the document is frugal and
rustic: The “Declaration” is a “one-pager”, the “Roadmap” comprises bul-
let-points over three pages.13
The message of the declaration is remarkably thin: “The EU is not per-
fect but it is the best instrument we have for addressing the new challenges
we are facing. We need the EU not only to guarantee peace and democra-
cy but also the security of our people. We need the EU to serve better their
needs and wishes to live, study, work, move and prosper freely across our
continent and benefit from the rich European cultural heritage.” A “vi-
sion” will be announced by the 60th anniversary of the Rome Treaties (25
March 2017), and that should be the end of the affair: “We committed in
Bratislava to offer to our citizens in the upcoming months a vision of an
attractive EU they can trust and support.”
The roadmap doesn’t offer much more. It reads like a reduced version
of Juncker’s speech or some of the previously published compromise pa-
pers, with vague intentions like the final implementation of the European
Border and Coast Guard, the “extension” (but not the doubling) of the
EFSI, it announces the will of the member states to “strengthen EU coop-
eration on external security and defence”.
Under these circumstances, it is more revealing to see what has been
left out than what is actually in the text: There is no commitment to more
economic, financial, fiscal solidarity – the social-democratic turn is obvi-
ously not ready for consensus; and there is no allusion to any change in
the institutional architecture of the EU, to any change in terms of compe-
tences, power, relations to nation states, European government or other-
wise – the Treaties are out of reach for this reform process, it would seem.
What is worse, immediately after the summit, this minimal consensus
was broken up by a separate statement from the Visegrad countries, which
re-introduces the issue of EU-state relations. The four East-Central Euro-
pean countries (among them the current rotating presidency, Slovakia) in-
sist, as they did in July, on the need to reallocate powers to the national
level and prevent any differentiated integration moving forward: The cur-
rent reform process must be seen, in their eyes, as “an opportunity to im-
prove the functioning of the EU: relations between European institutions,
relations between European institutions and Member States and the EU’s
political agenda.” Under the headings of “Strengthening democratic legiti-
macy” and “strengthen the role of national parliaments”, they insist that
“current challenges of the Union prove that Europe can only be strong if
the Member States and their citizens have a strong say in the decision–
From Brexit to Bratislava. Another EU Reform Debate Emerging
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making process. [...] Integration within smaller groups of Member States
will only weaken the EU both internally and on the global stage. At the
same time it is fundamental that the diversity of the Member States is
maintained.”14
Conclusion
The Brexit vote did not only launch a new debate on EU reform; on the
contrary, it revealed divergencies which seem to rule out any substantial
reform of the EU.
First and foremost, the member states disagree on whether the EU
should be more integrated or less so. One option is to transform the EU
into a much more powerful political system, which would gain autonomy
(not sovereignty!) vis-à-vis the member states and be accountable to the
European citizens for its areas of responsibility. Schulz’s pledge for a
European government controlled by a bi-cameral parliament goes a long
way in this direction, but Steinmeier and Ayrault also take some steps, at
least at the level of the €-Zone. The advocates of such an option are con-
vinced that the competences of the member states and the Union must be
disentangled, that the Union must be visible and responsible in order to
generate legitimacy. The opposite option, put forward namely by the
Visegrad countries, denies autonomous legitimacy at the European level
from the very outset, and is therefore pushing for a re-nationalisation of
competences – since there is no genuine legitimacy for the EU, nation
states should take up more responsibility, the Union should transform
more into an international organisation, refrain from supranational integra-
tion, concentrate on cooperation and mutual good-will. It is difficult to
imagine how this fundamental cleavage could be overcome.15 In Bratisla-
va the only option beyond output was formulated by those forces which
aim at re-nationalisation.
Second, and similar to this conflict, but not identical, is the divergence
between those who put their hopes on a more efficient and convincing out-
put of the EU activities, and those who plead for more input legitimacy.
On the one hand, some people, like Juncker, do hope that an improved
balance sheet of what the EU has done on behalf of the Europeans would
convince the citizens that the Union is a good thing and should have the
competences to act in the fields conferred to the European level. Such a
success would prevent any other “…exit” and at the same time eliminate
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the dangers of populism. Others, like Schulz, opt for more support to the
European institutions when they come into office, and vice-versa more ac-
countability to those who voted. Once in office, a European government as
well as the European Parliament, could then rely on a due input in terms of
legitimacy and feel legitimately entitled to conduct the policies for which
they have been elected. The choice between these two options must not
necessarily be mutually exclusive, but it is at least a choice of priorities.
For the time being and at Bratislava, the unique emphasis was laid on out-
put.
Third, the cleavage between a more social-democratic and a more liber-
al-conservative Europe is obvious, too. Renzi, Hollande and the weaker
part of the German government, as much as other, mostly Southern, mem-
ber states, are convinced that Europe has to deliver in terms of material
solidarity (one of the key words in the Ayrault-Steinmeier paper), other-
wise large parts of the European society would despair and fall victim of
the populist demagogy. Others, like Merkel, Schäuble, but East Central
Europeans, too, do not feel the need to share much of their economic suc-
cess, since they are persuaded that they own it to their own efforts, sacri-
fices and sound policies, that sharing this success would only incite others
to slow down or give up their necessary efforts to become competitive and
prosperous by their own means. In their eyes, this would weaken Europe
as a whole.
The precondition for a substantial EU reform would be to address open-
ly these cleavages, in order to overcome them. Bratislava, for the time be-
ing, does not even address the divergencies, and much less show a way to
overcome them; they are hidden away in the lowest common denominator
– a sure way to discredit the European Union further in the eyes of its citi-
zens. The way to Rome, 25 March 2017, is still very long…
 








4 http://www.faz.net/-gpf-8lys7 , 3 July 2016






















15 See the upcoming conference of the Spinelli Group on this topic: Euro-
pe and nation states; Friends or foes? Bridging visions of sovereignty




Implementation of the European Semester in new EU member
states
Visnja Samardzija and Ivana Skazlic*
As a response to the economic and financial crisis, the EU has introduced
new tools and legal instruments to strengthen its economic governance.
The European Semester is established as a key coordination and moni-
toring tool within the new EU economic governance framework, which
sets is designed to provide a coherent and focused approach to the efforts
of Member States fiscal, macroeconomic and structural reforms. By pro-
viding three main EU mechanisms – the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP),
the Europe 2020 and the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP), the
European Semester is intended to ensure compliance and implementation
of the EU’s economic rules by the Member States and, at the same time, to
support their efforts in reaching the Europe 2020 targets. Within the Euro-
pean Semester, the Country-Specific Recommendations (CSRs) represent
the most important component for delivering reforms at the national and
the EU level, as they provide the Member States with guidance in bud-
getary and macro-structural measures. This paper briefly provides some
insights into the experiences of a number of new EU Member States in im-
plementing the European Semester1.
How efficient is the European Semester?
The European Semester plays an important role in strengthening coopera-
tion and improving policy coordination between the EU Member States,
especially within the euro area. The chief accomplishment of this new pro-
cess is its role in helping to make the economic policies of the Member
States more predictable and transparent, thus reducing the potential for na-
tional policies at EU level having negative cross-country implications. The
European Semester cycle allows a better detection of the strengths and
weaknesses of individual Member States as well as providing an insight
into the socio-economic state of the EU as a whole. In so doing, the Euro-
pean Semester is useful policy guiding and monitoring instrument that re-
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veals the direction that the EU as a whole is taking so as to achieve com-
monly agreed goals.
However, there is also a downside to all this. The mechanism has
shown to have some weaknesses, reflected primarily in a poor implemen-
tation of CSRs and delivery of proposed structural reforms by the Member
States. The implementation of the European Semester-related recommen-
dations has been modest since the beginning and has shown a decreasing
trend over the years. In 2011 the implementation rate of the CSRs was
40% and later dropped to 29% by 2014i. In addition, over the 2012-2015
period the proportion of ‘fully’ implemented CSRs decreased from 11% in
2012 to 4% in 2015, while the share of CSRs with ‘limited’ or ‘no
progress’ in implementation increased from 29% to 52% respectivelyii.
These weak implementation rates indicate the somewhat limited impact of
the European Semester on reform implementation.
The views expressed in the European Parliament’s Report on the Euro-
pean Semester for economic policy coordination may be helpful when re-
thinking the role of European Semester in achieving a more robust recov-
ery and sustainable prosperity. With regard to improving (the currently
poor) implementation of the CSRs, there is a need to better identify articu-
lated priorities at European level(s) as well as to increase genuine public
debate, political willingness and commitment at national level, leading to
greater relevance and national ownership. The right balance should be
found, making CSR focus on key priorities and challenges, including the
need to overcome the sovereign debt crisis, increase competitiveness,
growth and employment and taking into account the Europe 2020 Strategy
targetsiii.
For its part, the Commission made significant modifications to the pro-
cess in 2015 in order to better support the implementation of the CSRs and
to make the European Semester efficient, inclusive and transparent. The
most important changes include publishing recommendations (for the euro
area) already at the beginning of the Semester’s cycle, reducing the scope
and number of recommendations issued as well as giving a stronger focus
on social and employment performance. In addition, greater support for
the implementation of reforms has been made available through EU Funds
as well as technical assistance. The Commission is developing more coun-
try-comparison tools in order to make better use of best practices and re-
sults in different policy areas and to facilitate discussion and common un-
derstanding of challenges and policy responses between Member States.
Last but not least, a special emphasis was put on including the relevant na-
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tional stakeholders and the European Parliament in order to strengthen
democratic legitimacy and accountability within the European Semester
process.
But what about the Member States? How are they progressing with the
implementation of the process? To give an overall picture, it should be
mentioned that since the introduction of the European Semester in 2011,
the Excessive Deficit Procedure – EDP (a corrective phase of the SGP)
was closed for 20 Member States. The most recent abrogation of the pro-
cedure was for Slovenia, Ireland and Cyprus (in June 2016). Currently,
there is an ongoing EDP for only six Member States, namely Croatia, Por-
tugal, France, Greece, Spain and the UK. Estonia and Sweden have not
been covered by EDP at all. This shows that majority of Member States
succeeded in achieving the budget deficit target in line with the Maastricht
margin.
On the other hand, as a part of the Macroeconomic Imbalance Proce-
dure (MIP), the 2016 in-depth reviews (IDRs) were conducted for 18
Member States. This refers to an in-depth analysis of a country’s macro-
economic situation, checking the acuteness of detected imbalances. The
IDRs results found 12 Member States to be experiencing macroeconomic
imbalances. To be precise, 7 were found to be experiencing imbalances
(Finland, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and Slove-
nia), while the other 5 (Bulgaria, Croatia, France, Italy and Portugal) were
experiencing excessive imbalances but without the Commission triggering
the corrective phase of the procedure (Excessive imbalance procedure –
EIP). It should be highlighted that the EIP has not yet been initiated for
any EU Member State.
The implementation record of CSRs remains below expectations. The
most recent data show that the EU-28 Member States fully/substantially
implemented only 4 out of 102 (equating to about 4%) of the 2015 recom-
mendations. Some progress was registered for approximately 41% of the
CSRs, while nearly half of the recommendations have not been imple-
mented at all, or only in a limited manner. It should be underlined that the
euro area members, taken together, had a stronger implementation record
than non-euro area members (the above mentioned full/substantial
progress recorded for only 4 CSRs was achieved exclusively by euro area
countries)iv.
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Implementation of the European Semester: the case of five new EU
Member States
The exercise of the European Semester (especially the CSRs issued to the
Member States) is a good opportunity for new EU Members to improve
their public policies and implement reforms which are necessary to foster
economic growth and employment, thus contributing to citizens’ prosper-
ity. In this section the experiences of Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hun-
gary, Slovakia and Slovenia are comparatively observed. The selection of
the countries was based on the criteria of being new or relatively new EU
Member States (all acceded the EU in the 5th and 6th enlargement), facing
similar economic and social challenges (in spite of their different econo-
mic performances) and being geographically located close to each other in
Central and South-Eastern Europe. Moreover, the intention was to cover
both representatives of the Eurozone (Slovakia, Slovenia) and countries
which were Eurozone candidates (Czech Republic, Croatia, Hungary).
The Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia have been imple-
menting the European Semester since the first cycle took place in 2011.
From 2013 to its accession to the EU, Croatia was informally included in
the European Semester on a voluntary basis. Fully fledged EU member-
ship has required that Croatia participate in the European Semester regu-
larly, so the country formally participated in the process for the first time
in 2014, taking on the responsibilities that membership entails.
All five selected EU Member States were under the Excessive Deficit
Procedure (EDP) although the duration of the procedure was different, de-
pending on the specific situation in each particular country. Having been
under the EDP since 2009, the Czech Republic and Slovakia successfully
and relatively quickly exited the corrective phase of the SGP in 2014.
Hungary had been in the EDP for nine years (2004-2013). For Slovenia,
the EDP was launched in 2009 and the country had been constantly under
the corrective procedure until 2016. The EDP was opened for Croatia in
2014 and it is still ongoing. When it comes to the Macroeconomic Imbal-
ance Procedure (MIP), the Czech Republic and Slovakia did not face
macroeconomic imbalances at all during the entire 2012-2016 period. Im-
balances were identified for Hungary throughout the 2012-2015 time
frame, while in 2016 no imbalances were found.
For Slovenia, the situation of imbalance was identified in 2012, while
2013 and 2014 In-Depth Reviews showed that this country was experienc-
ing excessive imbalances but in 2015 and 2016 imbalances in Slovenia
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were no longer considered excessive. Still, Croatia has been considered to
be in a situation of excessive imbalances since its formal participation in
the European Semesterv.
During the 2011-2014 period, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hun-
gary received, on average, six or seven CSRs, while Slovenia received an
increasing number of CSRs each year (from 6 up to 9). Croatia was issued
with a first set of recommendations in 2014, amounting 8 CSRs in total. In
line with the streamlined process of the European Semester, all selected
Member States already received fewer CSRs in the 2015 cycle, even
though only a limited progress was assessed in most of the areas. A num-
ber of CSRs for all observed countries saw a further decline in the 2016
cycle except Slovenia, which received a stable number of 4 CSRs. As with
the implementation of issued recommendations, the examples of the se-
lected countries tend to follow the general pattern of modest or even dis-
tinctly low implementation of CSRs. According to the latest assessment of
implementation of CSRs by the Commission, in 2015 the Czech Republic
made some progress in 3 areas (public finances and health care sector; tax-
ation; education) and limited progress regarding 1 CSR relating to the re-
duction of the high level of taxation levied on low-income earners and the
availability of affordable childcare. The overall implementation of 5 CSRs
from 2015 issued to Hungary resulted in some progress being made in 1
recommendation, due to the fact that the authorities started to implement
the MuO with EBRD, including the considerable tax reduction on finan-
cial institutions. The Commission assessed that in 2015 Slovakia made
some progress in addressing 1 CSR by increasing the cost-effectiveness of
the healthcare sector. In the remaining 3 areas (employment, training of
teachers, investment) only limited progress was made. Furthermore, ac-
cording to the Commission’s assessment, Slovenia is the only country
among those selected for this paper that has fully implemented 1 CSR (re-
lated to the financial sector). Some progress has been made in addressing
2 more CSRs, one relating to unemployment and wage-setting and the oth-
er to the efficiency of the civil justice system. Limited progress has been
achieved regarding the recommendation covering public finances. Among
6 CSRs dating from 2015, Croatia was only able to make some progress
with regard to 1 recommendation on reducing the administrative burden of
business and on removing parafiscal charges. In general, in spite of the
fact that some measures were well designed, Croatia needs to speed up the
structural reforms needed to strengthen growth, jobs and investment.
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An overview of issues covered in the CSRs for 2016-2017 shows that
all selected countries received a recommendation in the area of fiscal gov-
ernance and public finances and were advised to improve their public ad-
ministration and reduce the administrative and regulatory barriers to busi-
ness and investment. Other issues stressed in the new set of CSRs are re-
lated to the employability of low-skilled, older workers and women and to
the improvement of activation measures for the long-term unemployed. In
addition, the majority of selected Member States are advised to enhance
their educational and training systems, with a special emphasis on the in-
clusion of disadvantaged groups.
Conclusions
Overall, the implementation of the European Semester in the past five
years has achieved certain amount of success but it has also highlighted
some shortcomings. This EU policy framework contributed to better coor-
dination and stronger cooperation between Member States in numerous
socio-economic areas. However, it is still difficult to identify the real im-
pact of the European Semester’s recent modifications. In spite of the
progress made by the Member States, the process of EU economic recov-
ery is both slow and fragile. Reforms were undertaken in a number of pol-
icy areas, but the results are uneven. This holds true also in the case of
new EU Member States. There is a distinct need to identify and articulate
more clearly the priorities at European level, to raise awareness through
public information and debate and to strengthen political commitment at
national levels. In the absence of this, it would seem impossible for the
European Semester to gain greater relevance l and to achieve (a) true na-
tional ownership, taking into account the Europe 2020 targets.
What kind of recommendations could be gleaned from the above analy-
sis, bearing in mind the challenges that new Member States are facing in
implementing the European Semester?
• The political commitment and responsibility of Member States in the
implementation of reforms in the framework of the European Semester
is a vital requirement, in spite of their short-term unfavourable conse-
quences. In this regard, the Council’s recommendations should be re-
sponsibly considered by national governments.
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• Member States, especially new ones, should make use of the available
options provided by the new Structural Reform Support Service estab-
lished by the Commission. The Service coordinates and provides tai-
lor-made technical support to EU Member States at their request and
offers financial support for reform implementation in the context of the
European Semester.
• It is highly advisable to use the knowledge and experiences of other
EU Member States in implementing the European Semester as far as
possible. The exchange of experiences could contribute to a more effi-
cient implementation of recommendations and help to avoid negative
consequences or could offer a more insightful consideration of the im-
pact of implemented measures.
• There is a need to raise awareness amongst the wider public that the
implementation of reforms (especially structural reforms) is not just an
obligation related to participation in the European Semester, but rather
a necessary prerequisite for strengthening the potential for economic
growth, which is also in the interest of citizens. Unpopular measures
should not be exclusively seen in the context of the European
Semester.
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Beyond populism: Why the European Union needs to engage
into identity politics
Matthias Waechter*
More or less all observers would agree that 2016 was a tough year, if not
an annus horribilis for European integration, with the first case in its histo-
ry of a member state deciding to leave the EU on the basis of a referendum
and eurosceptical parties obtaining unknown support in member states
such as Germany and Austria. Many journalists and academic analysts
create a link between the faltering public support for European integration
and an allegedly rising phenomenon in democratic politics: populism. As
soon as protest movements defying the rules of the political game arise, as
soon as political parties fiercely oppose European integration and its con-
straints, as soon as charismatic leader figures appeal to the feelings of the
people, they are labelled as populists. Whereas political movements as di-
verse as French "Front national", German "Alternative für Deutschland",
Greek "Syriza", Spanish "Podemos", Italian "Cinque stelle" and Polish
"PiS" serve as European examples for the rise of populism, it is Donald
Trump who allegedly embodies on the other side of the Atlantic the
essence of populism. However, two essential questions on populism re-
main unsolved:
Firstly, quite often the reader is left without a clear definition of what
the term actually means; which criteria a politician or a movement needs
to fulfil in order to be classified as populist. Is it the appeal to the people
against the elites? Is it mainly a political style, characterized by a dema-
gogic attitude? Is it a simplifying discourse proposing easy solutions to
complex problems? Is it the posture of the leader representing the feelings
of the masses? Against this inflationary use of the term, the political scien-
tist Jan-Werner Müller comes up with an operational and discerning defi-
nition: For him, a populist claims to be the only legitimate representative
of the true people. According to Müller, the populist thus delegitimizes
any opposition, by claiming the monopoly on representing the people's re-
al feelings and interests. Thus, following this definition, populism contests
the essence of a pluralistic democratic society: the respect for the opinions
and values of the opponent. Müller's approach helps us to distinguish be-
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tween popular movements and populists, between anti-elitist discourses
and populist discourses: For him, Alternative für Deutschland, Front na-
tional and Austria's FPÖ are clearly populist political currents, whereas
Syriza and Podemos, who respect the rules of a pluralistic society, don't
comply with this definition.1
Other authors take a broader approach to populism. For the French in-
tellectual Pierre Rosanvallon, populism can be understood as a disease of
democracy, caused by its own imperfections, its incompleteness, its disap-
pointments. Populism simplifies, according to him, the message of democ-
racy, by emphasizing the necessity of direct expression of popular
sovereignty, by contesting the legitimacy of institutional checks and bal-
ances and by criticizing the forms of representation practised in our politi-
cal systems. Quite similar to Müller's reasoning, Rosanvallon argues that
populism wants to remove the distance between the people and its repre-
sentatives in power, between society and the different branches of govern-
ment. Finally, according to Rosanvallon, populism claims that the cohe-
sion of a society is not guaranteed by the quality of social interaction, but
by the homogeneity of its members and their collective identity. This con-
ception of society leads populists to abhor diversity and to stigmatize im-
migrants as a menace to social cohesion.2 Taking into consideration the
approaches of Müller and Rosanvallon, it becomes understandable why
the European Union is a scapegoat for populists and why moderate politi-
cians find it difficult to defend the assets of integration in a public arena
increasingly dominated by populist discourse: The European Union epito-
mizes political complexity, the importance of institutional checks and bal-
ances, the limits to direct expression of popular sovereignty and the disso-
lution of national identities in a collective framework.
The second salient question on populism concerns its relation to the
stagnant public support for European integration: Is populism a symptom
of the crisis of European integration, or is the rise of populism rather more
the cause for the citizens becoming increasingly disenchanted with the
EU? If one takes populism as a cause rather than an expression of stagger-
ing EU support, one could argue that democracies in general, not only in
Europe, undergo a massive transformation with new forms of political en-
gagement, mobilisation and opinion-making arising. The public support
for the EU would then be the victim of a general trend in modern democ-
racies, which makes it increasingly difficult for politicians to convince by
rational arguments in an arena constantly agitated by 24-hours-news and
instant messaging on social media. Under these auspices, many analysts
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have announced the arrival of an age of "post-truth politics".3 Recently
elected "word of the year" 2016 by Oxford Dictionaries, the expression
should indicate political communication which is not concerned by the
factual correctness of the information transmitted, but appeals exclusively
to the emotions of the citizens.4 Allegedly, both the Brexit campaign as
well as Donald Trump's bid for presidency were intensely shaped by
"post-truth politics", with false information circulating widely on social
networks and voters believing in lies publicly conveyed by opinion lead-
ers. The tendency of social-media-users to form clusters with like-minded
people reinforces their staunch belief even in false news and makes them
increasingly impervious to information likely to disprove their convic-
tions. However, it will be difficult to defend the point of view that the cir-
culation of false information and the appeal to emotions are new phenom-
ena in democratic politics. Also in previous times, conspiracy theories and
threat scenarios devoid of any truth have been used to stir the emotions of
the electorate.
Still, the idea of an age of "post-truth politics" can help us explaining
the problems to find widespread support for European integration among
today's citizens: Supposedly, the EU doesn't appeal sufficiently to the
emotions of the citizens and thus becomes an easy victim of false allega-
tions, as demonstrated the Brexit debate. In a recent article for the German
newspaper "Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung", the historian Ute Frevert,
internationally known as an expert on the history of emotions, argues that
the EU suffers from an "emotional deficit". The nation states, she points
out, were ultimately successful in their relentless efforts to turn parochial
provincials into committed, emotionally involved citizens, through educa-
tion, mobility, military service, through enemy images and through war-
fare. The European integration process, on the contrary, kept from its very
origins a low profile, as far as emotionalised narratives, symbols and
myths are concerned. However, the story of European unification, Frevert
suggests, doesn't lack strong moments which could be presented in such a
way so that citizens feel emotionally concerned: The passionate courage
of young European federalists who tore down borders right after the end
of World War II; the reunification of Western and Eastern Europe under a
common institutional roof; the introduction of common currency, which
could become a symbol of a collective European identity in the same way
as the Deutschmark served as a symbol for a post-war West Germany
stripped off from its historical identity. Not enough has been done in order
to present European integration as an emotionally seducing project: Nei-
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ther has a museum of European integration history been created, nor do
politicians deploy an unstinting discursive effort to positively convey the
message of peace-making and cooperation among previously war-torn na-
tions.5
According to Frevert, it is not too late to launch the project of turning
the EU into an emotionally attractive venture. However, one should be
aware that such an effort needs to go against the prevailing trend in many
European countries to restore one's own national myths. At the end of the
20th century, the obsolescence of the nation state, the obliteration of na-
tional identities and the arrival of a "post-national constellation" have been
announced prematurely, when the benefits of globalisation and regional
integration seemed to largely outweigh their drawbacks.6 The more global-
isation proceeds, the more competences are transferred to the European
level, the stronger citizens seem to cling to the immaterial treasures of
their nation states. In virtually all EU member states, we are confronted
with the desire to recover and to cherish one's own national myths, which
distinguish the country from others and make it allegedly unique.7 No-
tably, these efforts are not the monopoly of populists and right-wing na-
tionalists, but are carried out by mainstream politicians, historians, intel-
lectuals and artists.
Instructive in this context is the example of France: In the year the Lis-
bon treaty came into force, French president Nicolas Sarkozy started a
"grand debate on national identity" and exhorted his fellow citizens to re-
store their "pride to be French". When campaigning in fall 2016 for the
nomination as candidate of the moderate right for presidency, he celebrat-
ed French history as a "national novel", urging immigrants to "assimilate"
by accepting, as soon as they acquire French citizenship, "the Gauls as
their ancestors."8 Sarkozy proved to be the most outspoken advocate of a
general political trend: In the run-up to the presidential elections, candi-
dates on the right as well as on the left stress the importance that
schoolchildren imbibe French history and comprehend it as a source of
pride. François Fillon, candidate of the moderate right, promises to termi-
nate such school programmes which make children feel doubtful about
French history.9 Politicians like Emmanuel Macron and Ségolène Royal
celebrate Joan of Arc as a national hero, in order to counter her appropria-
tion by the "Front national". However, no candidate stresses the necessity
to tell today's schoolchildren the history of European unification, in order
to make them into fully adhering and fully participating European citizens.
Their priority goes to the nation state and the restoration of its frail cohe-
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sion. Thus, as far as identity is concerned, the nation state and the Euro-
pean Union have become competitors who both want to acquire the loyal-
ty of the citizens. In this competition, the EU clearly is the weaker party,
because so far it doesn't have any powerful myths at its disposal, which
could stir the enthusiasm of the citizens. As far as emotionally charged
mythology is concerned, Jean Monnet is no Joan of Arc, and the Maas-
tricht treaty is no storming of the Bastille. If the EU wants to gain the bat-
tle for the hearts and minds of the Europeans, it needs to engage into iden-
tity politics – and be it for the simple reason that the nation states will not
stop pursuing their own ones.
 
*Matthias Waechter is Director General of CIFE
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A new U-turn to multi-speed Europe
"The history of recent years has shown that there will be a multi-speed
EU, and not all members will participate in the same steps of integration",
said Angela Merkel after the informal EU-Summit at Valetta/Malta, 3
February 2017 – “it was the first time that Merkel clearly claimed this old
idea as her own.”1 It amounts to a U-turn in Merkel’s EU-integration strat-
egy; until now, she has, in fact, pinned all her hopes on advancing towards
tighter and tougher integration with all the – 27! – Member States of the
Union. She is not the only one to switch from a one-fits-all approach to
differentiated integration: François Hollande agreed as much on the idea2
at the same time as the Italian government, and the three Benelux-coun-
tries went as far as to publish an official statement on the topic. “Different
paths of integration and enhanced cooperation could provide for effective
responses to challenges that affect member states in different ways. These
arrangements should be inclusive and transparent, with the greatest possi-
ble involvement of the other member states and EU institutions.”3 This
means that all the six founding Member States agreed, almost at the same
moment, on a strategy of integration which is certainly not new, from a
historical perspective, but has not been part of the game plan since the
Brexit vote and the so-called Bratislava road-map, agreed upon in Septem-
ber 2016 and aiming at a reform vision for the EU to be achieved at the
60th anniversary of the Rome Treaties, in March 2017. Last but not least,
the President of the Commission joined the chorus: “I think the time has
come for us to answer this historic question: do we want to move forward
– as a group of 28 – in fact, we’ve already lost the 28th – or should those
who want to move forward faster do so without bothering the others, by
putting in place a better structure, open to all?’ Juncker asked, adding that
he would ‘argue for this’ in the coming days.”4 What has led to Angela
Merkel, on behalf of Germany, and the other founding member states
changing their minds? And what can a “multi-speed” Europe, what can
“different paths and enhanced cooperation” mean?
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The dilemma – pros and cons
The challenge is obvious and is openly addressed in all of the three reports
on EU reform5 voted by the European Parliament on the 22nd February.
One of these introduced by the Committee on Constitutional Affairs,
chaired by Mercedes Bresso and Elmar Brok, outlines the problem: “The
European Union and its Member States are facing unprecedented chal-
lenges, such as the refugee crisis, the foreign policy challenges in the im-
mediate neighbourhood and the fight against terrorism, as well as globali-
sation, climate change, demographic developments, unemployment, the
causes and consequences of the financial and debt crisis, the lack of com-
petitiveness and the social consequences in several Member States, and
the need to reinforce the EU internal market, all of which need to be more
adequately addressed.” The report underlines “that these challenges cannot
be adequately tackled individually by the Member States but need a col-
lective response from the Union, based on respect for the principle of mul-
ti-tier governance.”
But this view is just not unanimously shared throughout Europe – not
only did a relative majority of the British electorate vote to “leave” the
EU, but populist parties all-over Europe promise a re-nationalisation of
competences. Somebody like Nigel Farage, a most ardent proponent of the
“Leave” campaign in the UK, at the time UKIP president and still Member
of the European Parliament, took the floor in the debate about the afore-
mentioned three reports: “Mr. Verhofstadt this morning said the people
want more Europe. They do not: the people want less Europe”, and quali-
fied those who were in favour of deeper integration as a “religious sect”.
Not least, the Visegrad-countries – Poland, the Czech Republic, Slo-
vakia and Hungary – took a divergent stance, both before and after the
Bratislava meeting, pleading for re-nationalisation; their primary concern
being „to strengthen the role of national parliaments, underlining respect
for the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality“; and already “We
believe it's up to national parliaments to have the final word on the deci-
sions of the European Commission,” confirmed the Polish Prime Minister,
Beata Szydlo. This is the reason why these countries are strictly opposed
to differentiated integration – their fear is that others would take steps to-
wards a more integrated Europe which they do not agree with: “the Viseg-
rad Countries insist that European integration is a common project and all




And that is the dilemma: Either enable the European Union to find ef-
fective solutions to the problems by increasing its areas of jurisdiction,
budgets, power – and then accept that not all of the remaining 27 Member
States will go this way; or stick to the idea that the Union as a whole
should be held together at the same level of integration – and then accept
that the problems cannot be solved. The momentum is in favour of the
first option. That is why it is relevant to rethink differentiated integration
under the current circumstances. The following reflection aims to pave the
way for such a reflection.
The triangle of realism: Member States, policies and methods
Deeper integration among several Member States maybe a way to ad-
vance, in terms of European unification – but it soon becomes a dream if
the real conditions under which this can happen, are not met. There are
three fundamental conditions which must come together in order to allow
for differentiated integration: First, one must identify Member States
which are ready to go for more European political unity, which are com-
mitted to a strengthened Union, convinced that an enhanced Union can
and will offer better solutions to problems and that such a move will be
welcomed by their electorate. In other terms, the task of finding a way to
deeper integration with less than the whole range of Member States must
be envisaged from the perspective of the Member States, more than from
the level of the Union.
Second, there must be policies which are arguably more effectively
driven forward at the European level than at the level of the Member
States. Differentiated integration can probably not be achieved by renforc-
ing and empowering the constitutional system and institutions of the EU,
endowing them with greater competences, if there is not a set of policies
to which this empowerment actually applies. There are candidates, among
the policies, which until now have either been in the hands of the Member
States, or in the hands of the Union, or shared between both: Juncker, in
his speech in Louvain-la-Neuve, quoted defence or research as examples;
others refer to the economic governance of the €-Zone, growth or social
policy, migration and security. Whatever the policy, the choice is crucial,
and must hold the promise of an increased problem solving capacity for
those who go for more integration in the chosen field.
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Third, there must be appropriate models for the further and deeper inte-
gration of fewer than 27 Member States. The choice is confusing, and not
all of the methods, instruments, and structures are equally promising. The
choice of an appropriate form of differentiated integration is as crucial in
terms of its chances of being implemented as the choice of Member States
and policies. The next argument sets out to specifically address this aspect,
but one thing is already clear: An advancement towards differentiated in-
tegration needs all the aforementioned three factors simultaneously –
Member States, that are willing to join; policies which promise to be suc-
cessfully led at the European level; and forms of differentiation – appro-
priate for those Member States and these policies. Only if these three crite-
ria are met can differentiated integration stand a chance of succeeding.
One may imagine this set of conditions in the configuration of a triangle,
as shown below. This triangle is exclusive, too: It does not make much
sense to look for policies which might indeed be better conducted at the
European level, if there are in fact no Member States willing to transfer
the corresponding competence to the Union. And there may be forms and
methods of differentiated integration which seem to be ingenious, but they
are irrelevant as long as there are no policies to which they can be applied
with the consent of a set of Member States. The focus of any further re-
flection should therefore be given to those issues which unite all three
conditions – Member States, policies and appropriate forms of integration
– under one project.
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Differentiated integration is beneficial for the EU only if it does not
initiate a definite divide, but if it develops an attractive dynamic.
No Member State aims at reducing the number of participants for further
and deeper integration; those who plead for differentiated integration con-
sider that leaving others behind is a high price to pay, and would wish
them to join. The ultimate aim is, in any case, to convince those who do
not participate, to join. We therefore need to take a closer look at the dif-
ferent forms and methods of differentiated integration to assess their po-
tential to serve that aim. And the forms and methods of differentiation are
indeed very different with regard to this criterion. The choice should, then,
be based on the attractiveness of the method, its openness to latecomers,
its dynamic potential to pull them into the club, instead of pushing them
into the second rank. At the opposite end of the spectrum would be those
forms of differentiated integration which appear to be exclusive, do not
contain a dynamic attractiveness, would cement the divide between partic-
ipants and sceptics and create barriers which would be difficult to over-
come in the case of a non-participant changing direction and wishing to
join later. The two extremes seem to be a “hard core” Europe on the one
hand, and an “avant-garde” on the other – the one, exclusive and stabilis-
ing, the other, potentially inclusive and dynamically attractive.
Many different forms of differentiated integration have been put into
practice over the 67 years of European integration, since the launch of the
European Community for Coal and Steel, in 1950. One may even consider
the start with only six founding Member States as an attractive form of
differentiated integration, since so many others felt attracted enough to
join over time. “The Six” were a pioneer group, an avant-garde, and there-
fore displayed those attractive qualities which can unfold if a small group
decides to go ahead. It comes as no surprise, then, that these Six, some-
times joined by one or the other later member (like Spain, today), after ex-
periencing a sustained European success, are still ready to go for the next
step. Whatever the case, differentiated integration has always been a way
to move forward at those times when not all Member States have been
ready to join.
The last Treaties, and in particular the Lisbon Treaty, even enshrines
forms of differentiation which can therefore be implemented under the
provisions of the current Treaty, and do not need a split between Member
States over primary law: “Enhanced Integration” (or, with regard to de-
fence issues, “permanent structured cooperation”) is an option within the
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Treaty itself.7 It is by nature open to all the Member States, and fulfils the
criterion of openness without any restraint. The Brok-Bressot Report puts
all its hopes on the use of the unexploited potential of the Lisbon Treaty,
and much depends on whether or not the Member States will trigger this
option of advancing, and whether they will use the so-called “passerelle
clause”, which allows for qualified decision making among those who opt-
ed for “enhanced integration”. The disadvantage, however, of the “en-
hanced integration” method is that it requires unanimity – all the Member
States must give their consent that some of them go for further and deeper
integration, even if they do not wish for deeper integration to take place;
and that is an obstacle which may block an advance under this provision.
Many other forms of differentiated integration have been discussed and
an important number of them has been implemented and experienced.
Opt-outs and opt-ins are still close to forms of integration enshrined in the
same primary law agreed upon by all the Member States, and constitute a
rather durable form of differentiation. Close to “(hard) core Europe” is the
idea of “concentric circles”, which does not suggest an attractive dynamic
either. The same is true for “Variable geometry”, despite its greater flexi-
bility, because it does not assume that there is only one inner circle which
agrees on the highest level of integration in all fields; “variable geometry”
allows for overlapping circles, where various groups of Member States do
different things together. – The disadvantage in this case is not so much its
exclusiveness, but its complexity. A similar concept is a “Europe à la
carte” which would allow for an unlimited choice of steps towards more
integration in policy fields which seem to be advantageous in the eyes of
individual Member States – a method, which is particularly problematic
with regard to solidarity, and comes close to cherry picking.
The more attractive, dynamic concepts of differentiated integration con-
tain a hint to the timeline: “multi-speed Europe”, “avant-garde” or “pio-
neer group” all refer to the idea that all of the Member States are on the
move, that they are all moving in the same direction, but that some of
them are advancing quicker than the others. “Avant-garde” and “pioneer
group”, taken literally, even add the idea that they are exploring and
paving the way for the other members who are supposed to follow, once
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Thinking out of the Accession Box: The Potential and
Limitations of Internal and External Differentiated Integration
Between Turkey and the EU
Ebru Turhan*
EU on the Path to Extended Internal Differentiated Integration
The multiple crises the European Union (EU) has been facing – such as
the rather “traditional” sovereign debt crisis, and the “new generation”
crises including the Brexit, the rise of terror attacks within the EU borders
and the refugee crisis – have led to increased focus on the possibilities to
accomplishing extended internal differentiated integration within the EU.
Internal differentiated integration in the EU could be defined as an ar-
rangement among the Member States with regards to the formulation of a
polity, which “displays variance across policy areas and across space,
while maintaining an institutional core”1. The aim is to “reconcile hetero-
geneity within the European Union.”2 In other words, differentiated inte-
gration encapsulates “the multiple forms of European integration”3 as it
reflects the particularities of a system that allows for “a variety of forms of
cooperation and/or integration in which not all members of the EU take
part.”4
Internal differentiated integration has long been one of the fundamental
features of the EU. Member States’ differentiated approaches to partici-
pate in some of the Union’s key policy fields and treaties on the basis of
both formal opt-outs and informal arrangements, such as the Schengen
Area, Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), the Eurozone, the
Banking Union and the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance
in the Economic and Monetary Union (TSCG), illustrate some typical ex-
amples of differentiated integration.5 The EU’s enlargement politics,
which foresees the gradual integration of the new Member States into the
Eurozone can also be acknowledged as a clear indication of internal differ-
entiated integration.
The significant fragmentation among the Member States over EU re-
form and the implementation of common policies in the face of the latest
crises fuelled the EU-wide tendencies to formalise internal differentiated
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integration. The 26-27 June 2014 European Council decisions endorsed
that the “concept of ever closer union allows for different paths of integra-
tion for different countries, allowing those that want to deepen integration
to move ahead, while respecting the wish of those who do not want to
deepen any further.”6 In a similar vein, on 6 March 2017, during a joint
press conference in France, the EU’s “new big four”, Germany, France,
Italy and Spain, openly endorsed extended differentiated integration with-
in the EU.7
Extended Internal Differentiated Integration: An Opportunity for EU-
Turkey Dialogue?
Over the last decade, the possibility of an EU with several circles of mem-
bership has been brought forward by various scholars as an opportunity
for Turkey to enter the EU by means of a more flexible arrangement.
Turkey’s possible integration into the outer circle of a multi-speed EU has
been regarded as an opportunity to eliminate the stalemate in the Turkish
accession process and as a means to convince both Turkey sceptics in the
EU and EU sceptics in Turkey.8 It has been argued that Turkey should be
provided with the opportunity of “gradual membership” into the EU “in
several steps.”9 Some even postulated that it was the Turkish accession
process that was going to accelerate the creation of a multi-speed Euro-
pe.10 Similar statements were also employed in political circles. Ömer
Çelik, Turkish Minister for EU Affairs and Chief Negotiator, stated, for
instance, in March 2017 that “for Turkey, new opportunities may be found
after 2017. The multi-speed Europe might be on our agenda.”11
Despite the potential added value of an EU functioning on the basis of
extended internal differentiated integration for Turkey’s EU accession
process, Turkish prospects for full membership in the EU appear to be
gradually diminishing. The latest testy exchanges between Turkey and the
EU/various Member States and the de facto frozen accession negotiations
widen the gap between Turkish and European political circles. And, per-
haps even more crucially, the gradually decreasing functionality of the
EU’s political conditionality vis-à-vis Turkey as a result of the unilateral
vetoes of various Member States on negotiation chapters, together with the
EU’s diminishing ability to transfer its norms and values to Turkey12,
severely shrinks both the mid- and long-term probability of Turkey’s in-
clusion in the EU – even by means of a more flexible arrangement.
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That Turkey’s full membership prospects appear to be increasingly
weakening, regardless of the EU moving towards a multi-speed architec-
ture founded on extended internal differentiated integration, has also more
recently been reflected in the statements of key EU institutions and repre-
sentatives of various Member States. On 24 November 2016 the European
Parliament (EP) called the European Commission (EC) and the European
Council to temporarily suspend the accession negotiations with Turkey.13
The government of Austria openly stated several times that it would veto
any effort to open new chapters in accession talks between Turkey and the
EU.14 In a similar vein, the German Chancellery emphasised, in one of its
most recent public statements on the Turkish accession process that “un-
der the current circumstances, the opening of further negotiating chapters
is not conceivable.”15
Turkey has been the only candidate country in the enlargement history
of the EU to have successfully negotiated one out of 35 chapters for a du-
ration of almost 12 years and to have entered talks in only 16 chapters.
This makes Turkey “an anomaly”16 in EU’s widening process. While 14
negotiation chapters remain blocked by either the Council or Cyprus,
Ankara appears to be hesitant to launch talks on the remaining three chap-
ters (competition policy, social policy and employment and public pro-
curement) until the final phase of the accession negotiations owing to the
particularly costly fulfilment of their benchmarks.
The technically frozen status of the accession negotiations coupled with
the gradual fading of the seriousness of Turkey’s EU accession process as
a result of its exceptionally slow pace, minimizes Turkey’s chances of
joining an EU on the basis of extended internal differentiated integration.
The Emergence of Thinking Out of the “Accession Box”: Increasing
Focus on Alternative Arrangements between Turkey and the EU
Although Turkey’s chances of entering the EU appear to have been gradu-
ally diminishing, both European and Turkish leaders and representatives
of key EU institutions have, until very recently, refrained from explicitly
inquiring possible alternative forms of integration between Turkey and the
EU. However, the latest tensions between both parties, coupled with the
disappearance of the emotional pressure surrounding full membership in
the Union following the “exit” decision of the United Kingdom (UK), one
of the EU’s so-called “big three”, seem to have gradually brought about a
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European-wide debate on options other than full membership for Turkey.
During the last couple of months, various voices have emerged in the EU,
explicitly calling for a move to search for alternative modes of deepened
dialogue between Turkey and the EU.
Johannes Hahn, Commissioner for European Neighbourhood Policy
(ENP) & Enlargement Negotiations, stated, for instance, on 24 April 2017
that he hoped that EU member states and Turkey were ready to look into a
more essential discussion on a “new format for relations with Turkey, one
that could ease mutual frustrations and reinforce cooperation.”17 Likewise,
Guy Verhofstadt, leader of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Eu-
rope Group (ALDE), argued on 27 April 2017, during a parliamentary de-
bate that it would be critical to make a new proposal to Ankara outside the
framework of full membership prospects.18 This message was echoed by
German Vice-Chancellor and Federal Foreign Affairs Minister Sigmar
Gabriel, who indicated on 28 April 2017, on the sidelines of a meeting
between EU foreign affairs ministers and Turkish Foreign Affairs Minister
Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, that the EU might offer Turkey “a new, looser
agreement”, whereas the Turkish accession process was not to be can-
celled before the block had “something new to offer.”19 Just like the EU,
Ankara seems to be getting more comfortable with referring to the possi-
bility of ending accession talks, should the EU fail to “stick to earlier com-
mitments it has made.”20 It appears as if thinking out of the “accession
box” has started to emerge as a new approach towards the reformulation
of the scope, content and limits of the EU-Turkey dialogue.
External Differentiated Integration between the EU and the Third
Countries and its Legal Basis
If the relations between Turkey and the EU are to be shaped outside the
framework of accession negotiations, their institutional machinery is likely
to be formulated on the basis of extended external differentiated integra-
tion between both parties.21 External differentiated integration between the
EU and non-Member States can be defined as third countries’ various lev-
els of alignment and/or intense familiarisation with particular sections of
the EU’s acquis communautaire without access to the EU’s central deci-
sion-making bodies.22 Lately, however, the EU’s increasingly prominent
sectoral transgovernmental bodies – EU agencies – incorporating both na-
tional and European technocratic circles and acting to some degree inde-
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pendently from central administrations, have also emerged as satisfactory
platforms for the inclusion of non-Member States in decision-making and
policy-implementation processes at differentiated levels.23
Non EU-countries’ various levels and forms of participation in the
European integration process owing to shared issue-specific interests and
high-level interdependence with the EU, culminate in external differentiat-
ed integration. It is a particularly suitable arrangement when the full mem-
bership of the related third country in the EU does not seem to be a likely
option as a result of its high politicisation, yet strong issue-specific inter-
dependence exists between two parties in sectors where there is consider-
ably less politicisation.24 This mode of integration takes place, above all,
in policy fields related to economic and monetary affairs (inclusion in the
single market), security and defence (engagement with Eurocorps, Frontex
and Europol), as well as research and development matters (including non-
EU states’ participation in Erasmus+ programs and European Research
Area).25
As far as the legal basis of external differentiated integration is con-
cerned, Article 8 of the TEU enables the EU to establish “special relation-
ship with neighbouring countries, aiming to establish an area of prosperity
and good neighbourliness, founded on the values of the Union and charac-
terised by close and peaceful relations, based on cooperation.”26 Article
217 of the TEU emphasises, in a similar manner, the Union’s right to con-
clude association agreements with third countries, whereas Article 218
sets out the institutional procedures for the formulation of association
agreements and other agreements establishing specific institutional frame-
works for cooperation.27 Since definitions such as “special relationship”
and “association” are quite vague and broad, external dimension of differ-
entiated integration displays a wide spectrum of models of cooperation be-
tween the EU and third countries.
A Fundamental Feature of EU-Turkish Dialogue
As a result of high-level and issue-specific interdependence between
Turkey and the EU, external differentiated integration has been a key fea-
ture of the institutional machinery of EU-Turkish dialogue for many
decades.28 Since the signing of the Association Agreement in 1963,
Turkey has been conveniently, yet restrictedly, integrated into the EU in
various key policy areas. Turkey’s alignment with the EU standards was
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boosted with the launch of accession talks on 35 chapters of the acquis
communautaire in 2005. Until now, Turkey has achieved a good level of
preparation in 11 chapters, a moderate level of preparation in 13 chapters
and an early stage of preparation in 9 chapters out of 33 chapters of the
acquis.29 While Müftüler-Baç identifies four policy areas where external
differentiated integration between Turkey and the EU has been widely
achieved30, two policy areas seem to stand out lately, either due to the pro-
gressively increasing integration in the related policy area or as a result of
its high relevance.
Economic relations appear to be at the very forefront of external differ-
entiated integration between Turkey and the EU. Whereas the political di-
alogue between Turkey and the EU has experienced great ebbs and flows
over the last few decades, bilateral economic relations have continued to
progressively improve since the initiation of the Customs Union (CU) in
1996.31 CU enabled the free circulation of Turkish industrial products and
processed agricultural goods in the EU and fostered Turkey’s alignment
with the acquis, above all in the field of industrial standards. Following
the initiation of the CU, the value of the EU-Turkish bilateral trade in
goods has multiplied more than fourfold between the period 1996-2015.32
The 2016 EC Progress Report on Turkey notes that Turkey has achieved
an advanced level of integration into the EU market in terms of trade and
investment and has a good level of preparation in fulfilling the require-
ments to cope with competitive pressure and market forces.33 Turkey’s ex-
ternal integration into the EU market was fuelled – along- side the launch
of the CU – by the initiation of the accession negotiations. This has also
been reflected in the evolution of Turkey’s economic dialogue with its key
trading partner Germany. Following the December 2004 European Coun-
cil decision to start accession negotiations with Turkey, the annual value
of German exports to Turkey has increased from €11.8 billion in 2004 to
€21.9 billion in 2015.34
A relatively new, yet highly substantial matter of extended external dif-
ferentiated integration between Turkey and the EU has been the area of
Justice and Home Affairs (JHA). In fact, Turkey and Europol already
signed a strategic cooperation agreement in 2004 regarding the prevention
of international crime. Furthermore, a working arrangement between
Turkey and the Frontex was established in 2012 in the field of border con-
trol.35 An even more extensive external differentiated integration between
Turkey and the EU started to emerge with the Readmission Agreement
(RA), signed in December 2013.36 Under the terms of the RA, Turkey
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agrees to take back third country nationals, stateless persons and Turkish
citizens crossing into the EU via Turkish territory in an irregular manner.
In return for Turkish efforts to implement the RA, a visa liberalisation dia-
logue between Turkey and the EU was launched with the aim of lifting the
Schengen visa obligations imposed on Turkish citizens. The visa liberali-
sation has been tied to Turkey’s fulfilment of the 72 benchmarks stated in
the Roadmap towards a visa-free Regime with Turkey. This addresses var-
ious issues including visa policy, asylum procedures, document security
and extended cooperation with neighbouring Member States on border
management.37 According to the 3rd Report of the EC on Turkey’s
progress in fulfilling the requirements of the visa liberalisation dialogue,
Turkey has already fulfilled 65 out of 72 benchmarks,38 indicating the high
degree of harmonisation between Turkey and the EU with regards to visa
and asylum policies.
The Refugee Crisis: A Catalyst for Extended External Differentiated
Integration between Turkey and the EU
With the unprecedented flow of irregular migrants to the EU in the second
half of 2015, the Syrian refugee crisis, which had previously been per-
ceived as the “crisis of the Middle East and the immediate neighbour-
hood”39, has now also turned into a European crisis. Turkey’s increased
strategic importance as a transit and destination country for Syrian
refugees made enhanced cooperation between Turkey and the EU indis-
pensable. The EU-Turkey “deal” of 18 March 2016 on the management of
irregular migration flows40, formulated to a great extent by German-Turk-
ish intergovernmental consultations41, was largely founded on the conclu-
sions of the 29 November 2015 EU-Turkey Summit. The conclusions of
this bilateral summit did not only outline the scope, content and conditions
of the enhanced partnership between Turkey and the EU with the aim of
managing the flow of irregular migration into the EU. They also reshaped
the institutional architecture of the relations between Turkey and the EU
by launching additional dialogue mechanisms along-side the existing
structures and outside the framework of accession negotiations, and thus
expanding the scope of external differentiated integration between Turkey
and the EU.42
The conclusions of the November 2015 summit endorsed, above all, a)
the establishment of a more structured and regular high-level dialogue to
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further the potential of bilateral relations; b) the realisation of bi-annual
bilateral summits; c) the initiation of a High Level Political Dialogue
Mechanism at Ministerial/High Representative/Commissioner level and a
High Level Economic Dialogue Mechanism; d) the deepening of coopera-
tion on energy with the previously established High Level Energy Dia-
logue; e) the launch of negotiations on upgrading the CU towards the end
of 2016; and f) the opening of accession talks on Chapter 17 related eco-
nomic and monetary policy.43
These decisions nurtured the progression of the bilateral relations be-
tween Turkey and the EU outside the framework of accession negotiations
on the basis of extended external differentiated integration as a result of
two developments. Firstly, the opening of Chapter 17 (and later Chapter
33 on financial and budgetary provisions with the conclusions of the 18
March 2016 bilateral summit) did not contribute to the acceleration of the
Turkish accession process in real and sustainable terms, as the decisive
Chapters 23 and 24 remained closed.44 The launch of accession talks on
chapters with a focus on economic integration, on the one hand, and the
continuing blockage on chapters dealing with universal norms, on the
other, led to the asymmetrical evolution of the economic and political re-
form oriented dialogue between Turkey and the EU. Secondly, the initia-
tion of regular bilateral summits and high level dialogue mechanisms on
economic, energy, security and foreign policy matters resembles, to a
great extent, the dialogue instruments established by the EU for the man-
agement of relations with its “official strategic partners” which do not pur-
sue membership in the EU.45 The suitability of such an arrangement for
EU-Turkey relations will be discussed in the next part of this paper, along
with other potential arrangements.
Wide Spectrum of Options for External Differentiated Integration:
Assessment of Potential Arrangements for EU-Turkey Dialogue
As already discussed in the previous parts, owing to the fairly broad and
implicit legal description of the EU’s relationship arrangements with third
countries in the TEU, the concept of external differentiated integration in-
corporates a very wide spectrum of options for models of cooperation be-
tween the EU and third countries. In order to discuss the most suitable ar-
rangements for EU-Turkey dialogue outside the framework of a full mem-
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bership option, it might be useful to illustrate the two extreme ends of the
spectrum incorporating models of external differentiated integration.
At the one end of the spectrum the “European Economic Area” (EEA)
model could be taken as an example. Since entering into force in 1994, the
EEA Agreement has been granting EFTA countries Norway, Iceland and
Liechtenstein access to the four freedoms of the single market and promot-
ing closer dialogue in other fields, including environment, education and
social policy.46 EEA countries can be defined as non-EU countries which
have been eligible for full membership in the EU but have chosen not to
become full members, while opting instead for anchorage to EU structures
as closely as possible outside the accession framework. Norway, for ex-
ample, aligned itself with about three-quarters of the EU’s acquis47 and
consequently became “a de facto EU member.”48 EEA is described as “the
most prominent case of acquis export outside the enlargement
paradigm“,49 supporting the argument that the EEA model can be posi-
tioned at the one extreme end of the spectrum that incorporates the various
options for external differentiated integration. Indeed, while the EEA
agreement brings with it each year on average 300 new secondary EU leg-
islations related to the single market50, additional bilateral agreements the
EEA countries have concluded with the EU in further policy areas includ-
ing JHA and foreign and security policy expand the scope of EU acquis
alignment.
Could the EEA option serve as a model for the reformulation of EU-
Turkey dialogue on the basis of extended external differentiated integra-
tion? Three significant challenges seem likely to be posed by potential ef-
forts to apply the EEA model to Turkey: Firstly, the free movement of
Turkish workers in the EU appears to be highly unrealistic, given that
even the lifting of Schengen visa obligations imposed on Turkish citizens
has been a highly politicised issue for many decades. Secondly, perhaps
the most fundamental shortcoming of the EEA Agreement has been the
EEA countries’ non-participation in the EU’s legislative process, despite
showing legal commitment to the adoption of the acquis. According to the
2012 Report of the Norwegian EEA Review Committee, “democratic
deficit is a well-known aspect of the EEA Agreement that has been there
from the start.”51 While non-participation in law-making processes might
be tolerable for some small states, big states such as Turkey would be
more sceptical concerning sovereignty losses, particularly in view of the
asymmetrical relationship it experienced with the formation of the CU.52
Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, the EEA countries are, in fact, eligi-
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ble for full membership of the EU, and fully comply with the norms and
values of the Union. Thus, political conditionality does not serve as a
component for the EEA Agreement. However, in EU-Turkey dialogue, is-
sue linkages between “specific steps in bilateral cooperation and domestic
reform”53 should be established, as both Turkey and the EU did in fact,
greatly benefit from the positive implications of effective political condi-
tionality, especially during 2002-2007.
Positioned at the other end of the spectrum are the EU’s official “strate-
gic partnership” (SP) arrangements with third countries. The Lisbon
Treaty and other key EU documents do not make any clear reference to
the legal foundation of the SP. Nevertheless, the 2003 European Security
Strategy (ESS) and its 2008 Review put emphasis on the necessity to form
partnerships with international organisations and key countries.54 In a
more comprehensive manner, the 2016 Global Strategy for Foreign and
Security Policy (EUGS) highlights the EU’s intention to work together
with strategic partners in Asia, Africa and the Americas on key issues re-
lated to global governance on the basis of multilateralism.55 In view of its
increasingly globalised security and foreign policy strategies, the EU has
established, during 1995-2016, official SPs with 9 countries by means of
bilateral agreements or summits.56 SPs are comparatively loose arrange-
ments between the EU and the strategic partners, aimed at coping with
joint global challenges by means of effective multilateralism. So far the
EU has formed SPs only with countries located outside the European pe-
riphery. The lack of clearly described goals, partners’ diverging views on
multilateralism and clear differences with regards to the scope of coopera-
tion between the EU and its different strategic partners, make the concept
of SP a very imprecise one. 57
It is interesting to note that the dialogue mechanisms between Turkey
and the EU, introduced or fostered by the conclusions of the November
2015 EU-Turkey Summit, greatly resemble the dialogue instruments es-
tablished with the EU’s official strategic partners. Bilateral summits, regu-
lar high level dialogues at the level of ministers and High Representative
and high level economic and trade dialogues are included in the SP ar-
rangements of the EU.58 Recent statements and official documents of the
EU are also hinting at the possibility of EU-Turkey relations moving to-
wards an SP. While the 2013 EP Resolution on the 2012 Progress Report
on Turkey referred to Turkey as a “trading partner” or “important partner
in the Black Sea Region”59, the 2016 EP Resolution described Turkey as a
“key strategic partner.”60 In a similar vein, Donald Tusk, President of the
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European Council, called Turkey a “key strategic partner for Europe”61 in
the aftermath of the November 2015 bilateral summit.
However, the SP model is not optimally applicable to EU-Turkey dia-
logue under its current terms. On the basis of loose agreements, it address-
es countries outside the EU’s periphery, does not anchor them strongly to
European structures and norms and aims towards the countries’ familiari-
sation with the acquis rather than its adoption by them. Turkey has already
aligned itself with a considerably big portion of the acquis on the basis of
the Association Agreement and the EU accession process. Its well-struc-
tured cooperation with the EU on fundamental issues, including the recent
refugee crisis goes well beyond the more conventional and limited cooper-
ation models the EU has established with most of its strategic partners,
with the exception of the USA and Canada. Finally, the SP arrangements
do not include any strict and well-defined political conditionality.
Conclusions and Future Outlook
Turkey’s chances of joining the EU on the basis of extended internal dif-
ferentiated integration seem to be fairly weak. The recent statements of
both European and Turkish political circles point to the gradual emergence
of thinking out of the “accession box”. Turkey’s anchorage to European
structures by means of extended external differentiated integration is like-
ly to arise as a new approach to reformulate the scope, content and limits
of the bilateral dialogue between Turkey and the EU. While external di-
mension of differentiated integration displays a wide spectrum of models
of cooperation between the EU and third countries, the two options posi-
tioned at the two extreme ends of the spectrum, namely, the EEA model
and the SP, are not optimally applicable to the EU-Turkey relationship.
The future format of partnership between Turkey and the EU is likely to
lie between these two extreme ends of the spectrum. The degree of exter-
nal differentiated integration between Turkey and the EU will also depend
on the degree of harmony between the two parties in terms of the percep-
tion of universal norms and values, given that Article 8 of the TEU puts
special emphasis on the establishment of partnerships on the basis of the
Union’s values. An alternative partnership model between Turkey and the
EU should also revitalise what for some time has been an ineffective EU
political conditionality vis-à-vis Turkey as a result of the de facto suspend-
ed status of accession talks. The upcoming negotiations on the deepening
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of the CU may serve as a test case for the formation of extended external
differentiated integration between Turkey and the EU on the basis of ef-
fective political conditionality.
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A Purpose for Further European Unity?
Steve Lee*
Unifying Europe is an ambition that must have a purpose. It is no longer
clear what that purpose is. Unless there is clarity shared among broad pop-
ulations who then grant legitimacy to their elected governments and lead-
ers to advance European unity (with the knowledge that there are increas-
ingly perceived risks and costs to that), unity will not advance, and exist-
ing hard won unity may falter as we see already with, among others, the
on-going Greek crisis, serious concerns about the viability of the euro,
Brexit, high level questioning of Turkey as an EU candidate and Visegrad
views and policies. As is well recognized now by national leaders across
the European Union and beyond, top down driven unity efforts in the ab-
sence of overwhelming public and voter support, whatever the core/outer
group or speeds, will not succeed and can fuel further alienation from and
opposition to the "European Project."
Past efforts up to and including the post-World War steps leading to the
current European Union have always had a driving purpose, for good or
ill. Unity through domination of the continent by one group, over all oth-
ers, to secure peace and thus the possibility (especially for the dominant
group) of greater prosperity, including dominion over human souls, was
more often than not the driver. Drawing on the lessons of preceding crisis
moments through the 18th, 19th and early 20th Centuries, the formation of
(West) European cooperation, structures and practices of unity were
specifically designed to prevent Germany and France from going to war,
and thus to prevent further European wide wars that, as well, at least twice
had already been global in impact. Underlying that goal was the perpetual
fear of domination of the whole of Europe by one or other great power. No
credible case can be made today that preventing France and Germany
from going to war is the driving purpose of European unity or "more Eu-
rope" in the roll out of a potentially reformed European Union. Can we
test the current purposes? Can there be a purpose to European unity going
forward? And, if so, what could it, what should it be?
The European Union as an inter-government arrangement with a set of
supra-national administrative institutions has specific purposes. Our task
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is wider than an examination of those. The purpose of further unifying Eu-
rope, from a citizen perspective, must be clear in order to ensure that insti-
tutions and rules put in place (a reformed European Union, other) are
democratically valid, legitimate and sustainable. It can be helpful to differ-
entiate further European unity, on the one hand, and growth in inter-gov-
ernment cooperation (such as regulation harmonization in a free trade
area/common market), on the other. For example, the Canada – United
States bi-lateral trade partnership is the world's largest, with a vast range
of enabling mechanisms, and no objective of North American unity. (1)
These days "America First", in fact, is quite the opposite. Inter-govern-
ment cooperation to achieve specific goals (like common standards for
medicine, or joint perimeter military surveillance), and advancing unity
for a larger purpose, are different. The added value of (greater) unification
should outweigh the apparent and likely future costs (such as loss of na-
tional sovereignty and identity, loss of budgetary and currency control,
slow/ineffective policy and decision making, democratic "distance", and
other). Citizens should remain convinced that the costs beyond inter-gov-
ernment cooperation are desirable (or at least bearable) in order to achieve
a greater purpose. For Europe today and going forward, what is that pur-
pose?
Preventing a European War
Further European unity to prevent war between France and Germany
and/or to prevent a wider European/world war appears to have no basis in
current realities. From a citizen point of view, the possibility of such a war
does not even register on the EU public radar of threats. And, all of the
threats mentioned by citizens can be further addressed functionally by en-
larged inter-government cooperation, which essentially must include
States outside Europe. "More Europe" is not an obvious part of the threat
responses.
Roughly half of the respondents (49%) identified terrorism as one of
the EU’s most important security challenges. This is a substantial increase
from the 33% of respondents who mentioned terrorism in 2011 (Special
Eurobarometer 371). Over a quarter of respondents (27%) think that eco-
nomic and financial crises are among the most important challenge to se-
curity, down from 34% in 2011. (2)
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There is also no apparent need for "more Europe" geographically for
European countries outside the European Union - the possibility of war
with Norway or Switzerland is out of consideration and there is no need to
include them in further European unity for the purpose of preventing war.
Geographically enlarging European unity to include former Soviet States
in the European Union is as much likely to be the cause of future conflict
than preventative (there are plenty of sober lessons to be learned from the
Ukraine experience). The only case for expanding European unity geo-
graphically that might arguably help prevent future (local) conflicts would
be to finish the inclusion in the European Union of the former Yugosla-
vian/Balkan States and finalize Turkey's speedy path to EU membership.
However, nearly all of these States, including Turkey, belong to NATO al-
ready (the others are candidates) and share NATO membership with near-
ly all EU States (along with Canada and the United States) thus ensuring a
zero possibility of NATO area inter-State military conflict whether they
are in our outside the EU.
Promoting EU Values
Advancing further European unity with the purpose of promoting shared
values is equally problematic. According to EU documents, "the European
Union’s fundamental values are respect for human dignity and human
rights, freedom, democracy, equality and the rule of law. These values
unite all the member states – no country that does not recognise these val-
ues can belong to the Union. The main goal of the European Union is to
defend these values in Europe and promote peace and the wellbeing of
the citizens. The EU member states are pluralistic. Nobody may be dis-
criminated against; instead, people and government representatives must
respect others and be tolerant. Everybody must be treated fairly. Minority
rights must be respected. Equality between men and women is promoted.
Responsibility must be shared." (2)
There are several important and somewhat hidden factors to take note.
Underlying these EU articulated values are other values: humanistic, ratio-
nal, secular. To set the EU goals and the purpose of further unification as
the defence of "human rights, freedom, democracy, equality, and the rule
of law" societies (people) will first (likely mostly subconsciously) value a
human-centered world, and a world view that is largely rational and secu-
lar (that may have a personal space for God and religion but not a space
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for European unity to be based on those). The values are also modern in
that they are expressly about human rights including equality. Reflecting
this modernity, the EU values are about the person and her relationship to
others and to the State.
This is not to diminish the central importance of human rights in mod-
ern human affairs, but rather to note the importance of words in treaties
and documents that commit and instruct State parties such as members
States of the EU. What happens if, at some moment in time for whatever
reason, a member State (government) can't, say, respect minority rights
like marriage equality for sexual minorities? Or can't, for whatever reason,
share responsibility for, say, unplanned, large migrations of refugees and
their need for re-settlement? The foundational directives that they must do
so or face not belonging to the Union invites inevitable crises. This is a
fragile foundation upon which to build further European unity.
Furthermore, the ongoing work by the World Values Survey (WVS) (3)
provides a map of the diverse and potentially conflicting values held
across the 28 EU members States and their societies. In summary, analysis
of WVS data made by political scientists Ronald Inglehart and Christian
Welzel portrays two major dimensions of values in the world:
Traditional values versus Secular-rational values and
Survival values versus Self-expression values.
As described by the WVS team, traditional values emphasize the impor-
tance of religion, parent-child ties, deference to authority and traditional
family values. People who embrace these values also reject divorce, abor-
tion, same sex relations, euthanasia and suicide. These societies have high
levels of national (collective) pride and a nationalistic outlook. Secular-ra-
tional values have the opposite preferences to the traditional values. These
societies place less emphasis on religion, traditional family values and au-
thority. Divorce, abortion, same sex relations, euthanasia and suicide are
seen as relatively acceptable.
Survival values place emphasis on economic and physical security. This
is linked with a relatively ethnocentric outlook and low levels of trust and
tolerance. Self-expression values give high priority to environmental pro-
tection, growing tolerance of foreigners, gays and lesbians and gender
equality, and rising demands for (individual) participation in decision-
making in economic and political life.
For our discussion, several things stand out from these findings. African
societies (and the African Union and its members States) can realistically
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claim to hold a common set of values. Those values are overwhelmingly
traditional (the importance of religion, family ties, group/tribe/national
pride and outlook, etc. with South Africa being slightly more secular than
others), and not surprisingly heavily skewed to survival values, with Tan-
zania and Ghana (among the more secure practicing democracies on the
continent) valuing self-expression on a par with Brazil and South Korea.
Latin America, too, shares a fairly common set of values, with Chile and
Argentina a bit less traditional values-based than others. The English
speaking settler countries, USA, Canada, New Zealand and Australia
share common values, though it is noteworthy that the USA is most tradi-
tional values-based country among almost all highly developed economies
(something skilfully exploited by the Donald Trump campaign in 2016).
The most striking feature, however, is that there is simply no common
set of European values as measured and mapped over a long time by the
WVS (this is revealed in Eurobarometer public opinion surveys, as well).
The diversity is extreme. The potential for conflicts over values being the
most acute in the global landscape. EU member States and societies, Swe-
den and Romania, could not be further apart in values. Ireland is more tra-
ditional than Turkey, Estonia more rational-secular than China. As mea-
sured here, the people of Denmark highly value self-expression, the peo-
ple of Hungary do not. Poland and India are twins in their attachment to
traditional and survival values.
While elites across Europe may hold a common set of values (as has
been the case through history), to claim that EU populations have a com-
mon, deep rooted affection for a fundamental set of non-traditional, self-
expression "modern" values is inaccurate at best. As presented by the
WVS, such a claim is a measurable fantasy. To continue to define the pur-
pose of the EU and especially to set the purpose of further unity as the
defence of these values is likely to doom the EU to increasing alienation
from many, at best, and likely to contribute to mounting crises and policy/
political conflicts. It will be a long time before the societal values of either
Romania or Sweden change to meet or even meet the current Greek "me-
dian" position of EU member values.
“We signed up for European values of liberal democracy, rule of law,
transparency and the upholding of human rights, but we did not internalize
them,” Mr. Milo said. “They are still seen as something foreign or alien to
our national character.” (4)
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Trade, economic growth, human development
So, if no longer needed to prevent war, and if not well founded on com-
mon values, is there a purpose to further European unity? Economic
growth, shared prosperity and improved social welfare appear to be the
most fertile ground as a purpose.
The most recent Eurobarometer of public opinion(5) suggests there
could be modest public support to build on this as a purpose for further
European unity (especially among people in New Member States). It is not
a surprise that populations in the less affluent parts of Europe would look
to "outside" (i.e. EU institutional) assistance for economic growth and
shared prosperity to a larger extent than polling shows in the first 15 mem-
ber States. In addition, there is some public interest in EU support to im-
prove the standard of living. This is an urgent need, more generally, as
current research shows (6) inequality is already growing in Europe and real
wages for much of the continent are predicted to stagnate or fall through
2018. Rising inequality and stalled or falling living standards will have in-
creasing illiberal political effects (exactly opposite to the values goals of
the EU).
One purpose for further European unity, then, can be to ensure that Eu-
rope's trade success (both EU internal trade and external global trade) con-
tributes to shared growth that improves standards of living, social welfare
and human development much more than is the case today.
The increasing discontent with trade and globalisation may have to do
with the inadequate manner in which welfare states are performing their
redistributive and insurance roles. Economists should not be puzzled by
the discontent with which trade and globalisation is being met. Trade’s un-
desirable side-effects have been known to economists for almost as long
as the positive net gains. It is important to develop effective tools to keep
the negative side-effects in check so as to ensure acceptance of the wel-
fare-enhancing liberal world order. If the benefits of trade are too uneven-
ly spread, it will prove impossible to sustain the system that generates
them. (7)
In addition, cast today as the villain of globalization by populist politi-
cians and other critics, further European unity could improve its own repu-
tation by championing tools and support measures to help strengthen the
ability of member States to fulfil their "welfare state" responsibilities and
thus address the negative impacts of trade and globalization.
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Here, the global experience of the United Nations Development Pro-
gramme offers some helpful suggestions about sharing the benefits of
trade to improve social welfare (or what the UN describes as Human De-
velopment), totally applicable to Europe today even though written in the
context of developing country needs (and keeping in mind all member
States of the EU, as member States of the United Nations, have agreed to
achieve the UN 17 Sustainable Development Goals by 2030). (8)
Trade’s contribution to development continues to be seen primarily in
the context of economic growth, on the premise that trade expansion will
engender economic growth, which in turn will provide developmental
benefits for all. However, trade on its own cannot deliver development ob-
jectives; rather, a host of complementary policies and actions are required
along with the right sequencing. Hence the need to sensitize stakeholders
to the complex relationship among trade, growth and human development
and the need to strategically use trade along with other policies to achieve
development objectives....Achieving this requires leadership, political
will, effective institutional frameworks, strong analytical skills, planning
and management capacities and coordination.(9)
To set this as the purpose of further European unity, something well be-
yond inter-government cooperation, would require wide popular support
and the support of European national governments. By nature, govern-
ments and competing national political parties do not like their policy
space and prescriptions curtailed. And the days of building European unity
through the back door (the constitution, the Commission, non-transparen-
cy, etc.) must be truly over if European unity is to survive. Significant de-
bate, discussion and agreement would be required. Powerful interests and
stakeholders in the current trade-growth circumstances would have to be
accommodated. Interests, movements, political parties not strongly at-
tached to re-distribution, addressing inequality and enlarged social welfare
would have to agree, or remain passive, to the future purpose of European
unity along these lines. On the other hand, many are already seized with
the needs that national governments alone seem unable to meet. Among
them, as an opening to possible political support for this purpose for Euro-
pean unity, recently European and other social democrat parties resolved
"...To ensure growth means social growth and greater equality." (10)
Could there be a better purpose for further European unity?
 
*Steve Lee served the United Nations as senior advisor in Tanzania for the
past seven years and with the UN in Afghanistan and the OSCE in Bosnia.
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Further information and sources
1. North American Free Trade Agreement www.naftanow.org
In 1994, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), a
state-of-the-art market-opening agreement, came into force. Since
then, NAFTA has systematically eliminated most tariff and non-tariff
barriers to trade and investment between Canada, the United States,
and Mexico. By establishing a strong and reliable framework for in-
vestment, NAFTA has also helped create the environment of confi-
dence and stability required for long-term investment. NAFTA was
preceded by the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement. A number of
NAFTA institutions work to ensure smooth implementation and day-
to-day oversight of the Agreement’s provisions.
Free Trade Commission
Made up of ministerial representatives from the NAFTA partners.
NAFTA Coordinators
Senior trade department officials designated by each country.
NAFTA Working Groups and Committees
Over 30 working groups and committees have been established to fa-
cilitate trade and investment and to ensure the effective implementa-
tion and administration of NAFTA Key areas of work include trade in
goods, rules of origin, customs, agricultural trade and subsidies, stan-
dards, government procurement, investment and services, cross-border
movement of business people, and alternative dispute resolution.
NAFTA Secretariat
Made up of a “national section” from each member country.
Commission for Labor Cooperation
Created to promote cooperation on labor matters among NAFTA
members and the effective enforcement of domestic labor law. Con-
sists of a Council of Ministers (comprising the labor ministers
from each country) and a Secretariat,
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Commission for Environmental Cooperation
Established to further cooperation among NAFTA partners in imple-
menting the environmental side accord to NAFTA and to address en-
vironmental issues of continental concern. Consists of a Council
(comprising the environment ministers from each country), a Joint
Public Advisory Committee and a Secretariat www.cec.org/council.
2. Special Eurobarometer 432: Europeans' Attitudes Toward Security.
Eurobarometer. EC. April 2015
3. World Values Survey. The WVS has over the years demonstrated that
people’s beliefs play a key role in economic development, the emer-
gence and flourishing of democratic institutions, the rise of gender
equality, and the extent to which societies have effective government.
www.worldvaluessurvey.org go to maps. The one below is 2015.
4. Not Even a Prosperous Slovakia is Immune to Doubts About the EU.
New York Times. Steven Erlanger. 17 December 2016
Slovakia and the Czech Republic are “moving in the same direction as
Poland and Hungary,” he said. Russia, Mr. Milo added, “is very good
at playing on these sentiments in this whole region.” For those “dis-
quieted by this liberal world,” Mr. Beblavy said, “Russia is seen as the
only bulwark of traditional values.”
5. Special Eurobarometer 451: The Future of Europe. Eurobarometer
EC. December 2016.
The country analysis reveals important variations between EU15 and
NMS13 countries. In EU15 countries, respondents are much more
likely to mention the EU's respect for democracy, human rights and
the rule of law (35% vs. 25% in NMS13 countries). This is the most
mentioned asset in EU15 countries, while in NMS13 countries it ranks
fourth. In NMS13 countries, on the other hand, the standard of living
of EU citizens is the most mentioned asset (34% vs. 18%) – in EU15
countries this asset ranks fourth. Respondents in NMS13 countries are
also more likely than those in EU15 countries to say the quality of in-
frastructure in the EU is one of its main assets (17% vs. 10%). His
asset ranks fifth amongst respondents in NMS13 countries, but eighth
in EU15 countries.
6. Income inequalities and employment patterns in Europe before and af-
ter the Great Recession. Enrique Fernandez-Macias, Carlos Vacas-So-
riano. Eurofound. 13 March 2017
The results show that EU-wide income inequality declined notably
prior to 2008, driven by a strong process of income convergence be-
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tween European countries – but the Great Recession broke this trend
and pushed inequalities upwards both for the EU as a whole and
across most countries. While previous studies have pointed to widen-
ing wage differentials as the main driver behind the long-term trend
towards growing household disposable income inequalities across
many European countries, this report identifies unemployment and its
associated decline in labour income as the main reason behind the in-
equality surges occurring in recent years. Real income levels have de-
clined and the middle classes have been squeezed from the onset of
the crisis across most European countries.
7. Globalisation and the Welfare State: Can the Welfare State Still Keep
Up with Globalisation? Dr.Christian Bluth. Bertelsmann Stiftung. May
2017 www.ged-project.de
8. On 1 January 2016, the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) of
the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development — adopted by world
leaders in September 2015 at an historic UN Summit — officially
came into force. Over the next fifteen years, with these new Goals that
universally apply to all, countries will mobilize efforts to end all forms
of poverty, fight inequalities and tackle climate change. www.un.org/s
ustainabledevelopment/sustainable-development-goals/
9. Trade and Human Development: A Practical Guide to Mainstreaming
Trade. United Nations Development Programme. Trade and Human
Development Unit. Geneva. July 2011. www.undp.org/poverty
10. For a World in Peace, Equality and Solidarity. Socialist International




Après l’élection de Macron: la responsabilité de l’Allemagne
pour l’Europe
Hartmut Marhold*
Le défi franco-européen et la responsabilité allemande
Le risque est grand : si le nouveau Président de la France échoue, la démo-
cratie, en France et ailleurs, sera mise en cause; l’émergence de régimes
autoritaires devient probable. Sans démocratie, la liberté, jusqu’à présent
une, sinon la valeur fondamentale de nos sociétés, sera rétrécie; sans li-
berté, la dignité humaine – valeur aussi essentielle – n’existe plus. Si
Macron échoue, l’Europe retombera dans les nationalismes, générateurs
de conflits entre les Européens; l’Europe se marginalisera elle-même à
l’échelle mondiale. Si la France ne sort pas vainqueur de ses efforts pour
se rétablir, la démocratie et l’Europe seront les victimes. L’analyse peut
paraître dramatique – la situation historique l’est. C’est dans l’intérêt de la
démocratie, de la liberté, de la dignité humaine qu’il faut tout faire pour
que la France, pour que son nouveau Président aient du succès; c’est dans
l’intérêt de la paix en Europe et de son autodétermination face à la mon-
dialisation qu’il faut réduire les nationalismes à l’insignifiance.
C’est à l’Allemagne qu’il revient un rôle essentiel dans cette situation.
C’est elle, pas seule mais elle avant tout, qui doit assumer sa responsabi-
lité pour que la France tourne définitivement le dos aux sirènes qui chan-
tent une fausse chanson d’un passé qui n’a jamais existé et qui promet un
avenir marqué par l’isolation, la médiocrité, la méfiance et le déclin. Cette
responsabilité de l’Allemagne est de nature à susciter des réflexions qui
vont au-delà des actions immédiates et touchent aux fondements de la con-
struction européenne. Ce qui suit est essentiellement destiné à décloison-
ner des dimensions d’actions qui trop souvent sont négligées ou ignorées
au profit d’intérêts à court terme. Cette note de recherche est, plus que
d’autres, imprégnée par la responsabilité qui revient non seulement aux
hommes et femmes politiques, mais aussi aux milieux académiques et sci-
entifiques d’orienter les esprits par leurs réflexions.
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Réactions en trois temps
Ceci étant dit, il y a trois temps pour réagir, du côté allemand, au défi de la
France. Le premier est immédiat et arrive déjà bientôt à expiration – c’est
la campagne électorale pour les élections législatives : si le nouveau Prési-
dent n’a pas de majorité au Parlement, son attitude positive, son orientati-
on vers l’avenir seront compromises, ses actions ralenties ou sabotées. Il
faut donc que l’Allemagne (et l’Europe) donnent des signes laissant appa-
raître que Macron sera soutenu au niveau européen, qu’il pourra compter
sur la solidarité allemande et européenne : des signes qui encouragent par
conséquent les électeurs français à croire au succès du nouveau Président.
Ces signes de bienveillance, de solidarité et de soutien sont faibles, ac-
tuellement – en raison des défis du deuxième temps qui s’étend jusqu’aux
élections législatives en Allemagne, fin septembre. Pour l’instant, les par-
tis politiques, et notamment les chrétiens-démocrates et les sociaux-démo-
crates, se divisent en fonction de leurs positions de partis – la CDU se
montre réservée par rapport aux propositions françaises de s’orienter vers
une relance de la croissance, au lieu d’insister sur la réduction de la dette,
tandis que le SPD plaide pour un rapprochement vers une politique de so-
lidarité. Mais ces réactions ne sont pas à la hauteur du défi, qui va bien au-
delà des intérêts des partis, puisque que ce n’est pas tel ou tel parti qui ga-
gnera ou perdra, cette fois-ci, c’est la démocratie et l’Europe en tant que
telles qui sont l’enjeu. Les manœuvres inspirées par la partitocratie sont
juste de nature à miner la démocratie en tant que telle.
Enfin, on pourra espérer que les choses se clarifient après les élections
en Allemagne, fin septembre. C’est au plus tard à partir de ce moment que
la France et l’Allemagne doivent entreprendre un effort de grande enver-
gure pour sauver la démocratie et l’Europe. Dans cette perspective, il sera
dangereux de miser sur des méthodes et structures qui ont prouvé leur
désuétude.
Quatre impasses
La première impasse est la conception d’une quelconque ‘hégémonie alle-
mande’. Quelle que soit la version d’une telle constellation – et il y en a
beaucoup qui ont consacré des réflexions à ce sujet –, elle est condamnée
d’avance : l’Europe n’est pas un continent qui accepte un hégémon, qu’il
soit allemand, français ou autre. Il faut se rendre enfin et définitivement à
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l’évidence que l’hégémonie est un concept que l’Europe refuse, en pre-
mier lieu en raison de son passé : depuis la naissance de l’Etat moderne,
des tentatives d’hégémonie ont plongé l’Europe dans des désastres; et au-
cune nation européenne n’est suffisamment puissante pour ériger son
hégémonie sans que les autres, ensemble, soient plus fortes et déconstrui-
sent cette forme de domination. La construction européenne est la
conséquence même de cette leçon d’histoire sans ambiguïté, et l’alternati-
ve à l’hégémonie.
Mieux, mais toujours pas à la hauteur du défi, est le bilatéralisme fran-
co-allemand – une hégémonie bicéphale, si on veut. Mais la prémisse d’un
tandem franco-allemand sous les auspices du bilatéralisme est toujours
doublement fausse; d’une part, parce qu’un tel « couple » pêche toujours
par une forme d’hégémonie que les autres ont du mal à accepter; qui plus
est, la prémisse que tout peut être réglé au niveau de l’Etat nation, bien
que binôme, est compromise, et le « couple » ou « tandem » franco-alle-
mand ne transcende pas cette contradiction entre des défis transnationaux
et des solutions bi-nationales.
C’est même vrai d’un multilatéralisme européen, qui serait peut-être à
même de laisser derrière lui le problème de l’hégémonie, mais qui ne fran-
chit pas le seuil qualitatif entre l’action étatique et la création d’un
système politique adapté au niveau des problèmes de notre temps, qui se
situent définitivement à un niveau transnational. Le Conseil européen, de-
venu l’institution prépondérante de l’Union européenne, notamment après
la crise de 2008, est l’expression de cette ambiguïté de la volonté de trou-
ver des solutions européennes sans tirer les conséquences structurelles, i.e.
sans créer un système politique au niveau adapté. C’est au sein du Conseil
européen que le multilatéralisme institutionalisé bute.
La quatrième impasse est la conséquence de la troisième : attendre le
salut de la bonne volonté des Etats membres de permettre à l’Union
européenne de devenir plus performante. C’est la voie empruntée par le «
processus de Bratislava » qui, sous le choc du Brexit, a tracé une voie de «
réforme », confirmée et renforcée par la « déclaration de Rome», à l’occa-
sion du 60e anniversaire des Traités de Rome. L’espoir des gouverne-
ments, exprimé dans ces documents, est de pouvoir éviter l’émergence
d’un pouvoir européen autonome, d’apaiser le mécontentement des
électeurs, de sauver l’Europe et la démocratie telles quelles en échangeant
la promesse de produire, par une meilleure coopération, un « output » plus
convaincant. Mais ce ne sera pas par des mesures mitigées et ambigües
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que l’on se montrera à la hauteur du défi des menaces d’autoritarisme et
de nationalisme.
La conséquence de ces réflexions est inévitablement la construction
d’un pouvoir politique européen, autonome, pas souverain, équipé des
compétences légitimes nécessaires pour résoudre des problèmes qui
dépassent les Etats, un pouvoir contrôlé et limité – contrôlé démocratique-
ment, c’est-à-dire par un parlement directement élu, limité par
des « checks and balances », c’est-à-dire par les Etats membres. En bref,
une fédération européenne, comme Robert Schuman l’avait en perspec-
tive, le 9 mai 1950, quand il a annoncé la création de la Communauté
européenne du Charbon et de l’Acier, « les premières assisses concrètes
d'une Fédération européenne indispensable à la préservation de la paix »,
selon ses mots.
L’Allemagne doit changer d’attitude
L’Allemagne, moins hantée par le spectre du populisme autoritaire, mais
pas entièrement à l’abri de ces tentations non plus, n’a pas encore réalisé
la nature du défi. Son attitude, depuis que l’Europe a été plongée en état
de crise permanente, suite au crash d’automne 2008, est de se considérer
comme le pays le plus performant qui, en raison de sa performance, a le
droit naturel de montrer le chemin aux autres. Dans une certaine mesure,
cette attitude n’est pas sans fondements; en effet, l’Allemagne a surmonté
la crise grâce à des réformes qui datent de bien avant cette crise, et qui
l’ont préparée à affronter les effets de celle-ci avec un certain succès. Mais
être le plus performant ne donne pas automatiquement le droit de croire
qu’on a trouvé la meilleure voie pour tout le monde. Et la façon dont les
Allemands ont su contenir les effets néfastes de la crise n’est pas nécessai-
rement la meilleure pour tout autre pays.
A un niveau plus profond, souvent inconscient, au moins dans le débat
politique, le malentendu qui règne entre l’Allemagne (et certains autres
pays membres proches des positions allemandes) et le reste de l’Europe
(surtout le Sud, mais qui commence en France) concerne la façon, la
méthode adaptée pour assurer le succès commun. L’approche allemande
consiste à croire en des règles consenties – ce n’est pas la culture de tout le
monde. D’autres (comme la France) croient plus en des institutions.
L’Union monétaire est essentiellement fondée sur le respect de règles
consenties – maintien de la discipline et de l’équilibre budgétaire, priorité
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à des finances publiques saines, efforts largement partagés pour assurer
une compétitivité sinon égale, en tout cas convergente, etc. Ce choix fon-
damental est à la base de l’Union monétaire telle que consentie dans le
Traité de Maastricht; il a été renforcé tardivement par le Pacte de crois-
sance et de stabilité, en 1997, établissant des critères de conformité non
seulement pour l’entrée dans la Zone euro, mais pour la permanence des
obligations de respecter ces règles sous peine d’être puni par l’imposition
d’amendes. Malheureusement, c’est l’Allemagne elle-même (ensemble
avec la France) qui fut le premier pays membre à briser ces règles, en
2002 – quelle crédibilité alors pour ces règles si le pays le plus en faveur
d’elles ne les respecte pas? … et se défend avec succès contre l’imposition
des amendes?
De toute façon, d’autres pays membres de l’Union européenne et de la
Zone euro, entre autres la France, ont toujours eu moins de confiance en
des règles consenties et auraient préféré des institutions, équipées des
compétences nécessaires pour faire respecter des décisions communes.
Cette attitude fondamentale s’est traduite par la préférence française pour
un gouvernement économique, ou encore, à un niveau moins ambitieux,
mais plus concret, pour un Ministre européen des finances. Ce n’est pas
par hasard que cette revendication a été mise en avant par un français,
Jean-Claude Trichet, quand il quitta la présidence de la Banque centrale
européenne. Mais la préférence française pour une solution par des institu-
tions plutôt que par des règles est biaisée aussi, également à un niveau de
culture politique difficile à relever au niveau rationnel : profondément, les
gouvernements français plaident pour la mise en place d’institutions
européennes… mais de préférence sans effet sur la souveraineté nationale
– un dilemme sans issue.
Or, aujourd’hui, face à la mise en question non seulement de telle ou
telle option politique, de tel ou tel parti ou gouvernement, mais aussi de la
démocratie et de l’Europe en tant que telles, seul un saut qualitatif peut
présenter une solution. Ce saut qualitatif doit mettre fin aux ambiguïtés
dont les citoyens sont si las; ce saut qualitatif exige essentiellement des ef-
forts similaires du côté allemand et français. Il ne s’agit de rien d’autre
que de combiner le meilleur des deux cultures politiques française et alle-
mande, c’est-à-dire d’obtenir le consensus des deux pays pour créer des
institutions européennes adaptées aux défis actuels (idée chère à la Fran-
ce), équipées des compétences nécessaires pour établir des règles (idée
chère à l’Allemagne), i.e. de légiférer en des matières qui par leur nature
sont transnationales et européennes.
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Concrètement …
Vu les problèmes de l’Union économique et monétaire, la première
conséquence concrète de ces réflexions devrait être la création d’un gou-
vernement économique, pas seulement d’un Ministre des finances, qui se-
rait sans doute membre d’un tel gouvernement. Il doit disposer de finan-
ces, sinon son instauration serait un leurre, ce qui revient à dire qu’il faut
une fiscalité européenne, des ressources fiscales à la disposition de l’Uni-
on européenne. Mais le Ministre des finances doit aussi avoir le droit de
faire appliquer les règles consenties, i.e. la discipline budgétaire, aux pays
membres. L’objectif d’un gouvernement économique serait de créer les
conditions d’une meilleure croissance partout dans l’Union européenne, de
piloter l’investissement privé et public, d’assurer une convergence écono-
mique entre les pays membres. Surtout, l’Union européenne doit disposer
de la capacité de réduire l’inégalité dans nos sociétés, ce qui implique
qu’il faut l’investir de compétences qui permettent non seulement de
susciter la croissance mais aussi d’avoir un impact sur la distribution de
ses fruits. C’est en premier lieu l’inégalité croissante, devenue intolérable
et parfois scandaleuse, qui porte atteinte à l’adhésion des citoyens à la
démocratie et à l’Europe. L’Union européenne, ainsi transformée en acteur
puissant, ne serait plus ressentie comme une menace, mais comme un sup-
port.
Une Union européenne à la hauteur des défis que les Etats membres ne
sont plus à même de maîtriser doit être une Union de sécurité et de défen-
se, disposant d’une force armée commune – ce qui a échoué en 1954 n’est
pas devenu obsolète depuis, au contraire : ce sont les doutes d’antan qui
sont obsolètes aujourd’hui. Et le même argument qui à l’époque a incité
des hommes d’Etat à tirer les conséquences d’une Union de défense est
valable aujourd’hui également : une telle union implique le choix crucial
de faire la guerre, décision suprême d’une communauté politique – il faut
la créer en pas cadencé avec l’Union de défense.
Enfin, il faut une capacité permettant à l’Union de communiquer avec
les citoyens, afin de faire émerger leur perception de l’Union par la voie
directe (et pas seulement par l’intermédiaire des Etats membres), en utili-
sant les nouvelles technologies de communication (« réseaux sociaux »).
S’il le faut – et ce sera très probablement le cas – il faut avancer en ord-
re différencié, i.e. avec les bienveillants d’abord, restant attractifs et ou-
verts pour les autres. Ce n’est pas nouveau non plus : la première Commu-
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nauté était en même temps la première étape de ce qu’il est convenu d’ap-
peler plus tard « intégration différenciée ».
La volonté d’assurer un bel avenir à la démocratie, à la liberté et à la
dignité humaine ainsi qu’à une Europe en paix et prospère, maître de son
destin dans un monde interdépendant, doit se traduire dans la déterminati-
on de créer une telle Europe fédérale et constitutionnalisée.
 
*Hartmut Marhold est Senior Research Fellow auprès du CIFE.
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New Tendencies in Modern Democracy

The influence of social media on democratic participation and
decision-making
Lucas Skupin*
The advent of social media as a political instrument initially generated
widespread euphoria among scholars and journalists, who saw it as a driv-
ing force for unity, equality, democratisation and truth in open access plat-
forms such as Twitter and Facebook.1
Attributions that weighed heavily on the shoulders of the prodigies of
digital communication and still do today. While there is without a doubt
potential and opportunity in the realm of these digital networks, their in-
fluence on the political debate as well as on the decision-making process
during the Brexit referendum and the primary and general elections in the
USA compels us to re-evaluate the precarious link between democracy
and technology.
The Good, the Bad and the Ugly
When the self-immolation of Mohammad Bouazizi sparked the first wave
of the “Arab Spring” on the 17th of December 2010, social media was
quickly credited as playing an important role in the unprecedented rise of
grassroots movements in the Maghreb States. Newspaper headlines read
“Why not call it a Facebook revolution?”2, or “How an Egyptian Revolu-
tion Began on Facebook”3. In 2013, the democratic potential of social me-
dia became a front-page topic again when social activists turned to Twitter
and Facebook to report police violence against the African-American
community in the USA, to counter- act the lack of checks and balances in
responsible law enforcement agencies.4
Once it turned out that the initial euphoria of a democratic domino ef-
fect in the Arab world was far from being a self-fulfilling prophecy, it be-
came apparent that social media didn’t live up to the premature claim it
was a catalyst for democratisation and equality. On the contrary, authori-
tarian governments made use of Twitter and Facebook for propaganda
purposes and in their own counter-insurgency strategies.5 6 Additionally,
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social media networks became forums for the otherwise rather clandestine
communications of radical islamists or xenophobes.7 With their legal foun-
dations in the USA where both the First Amendment and the Communica-
tions Decency Act provide Twitter, Facebook and others “substantial legal
protection” from the contents submitted by their users, the lack of urgency
to aggressively tackle hate speech resulted in negative coverage in Ger-
many, France and the USA in recent years.8 9 The criticism peaked as a
response to the influence of social media on political participation, deci-
sion-making and the polarisation of society in the wake of the Brexit refer-
endum in Great Britain and the primary and general elections in the USA.
Growing numbers, growing problems
As of April 2017, Facebook with nearly 2 billion, Youtube with 1 billion,
Instagram with 800 million and Twitter, as well as Snapchat with 250-300
million active users are the frontrunners of globally operating social media
networks.10 Being established forums for political debate and, according to
a Pew study, a growing source for news consumption, this paper focuses
mainly on Facebook and Twitter.11 “With every new technology comes
abuse, and social media is no exception.”12 Against this backdrop, the fol-
lowing paragraphs seek to assess the shape, function and impact of new
phenomena in the sphere of political communication in social media.
Falsified information
Perhaps the most attention is being paid to the issue of falsified informa-
tion, also known as fake news. Deliberate misinformation is not a new in-
vention and has been used in political campaigns or conflicts for cen-
turies.13 However, in today’s fast-paced media environment, where Face-
book and Twitter act as real-time news feeds for a growing number of
people, the immediate and unfiltered dissemination of any kind of infor-
mation has reached unprecedented dimensions.14 While traditional media
outlets normally redact their articles, anyone can publish almost any kind
of news without further review on social media platforms. As a matter of
fact, the use of social media as a primary news resource comes with the
risk of being exposed to deliberate misinformation.
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Fake news items can take many forms on social media nowadays. They
appear disguised as Tweets, Instagram photos, Facebook posts, or Yout-
ube videos. Driven by a blend of monetary and ideological incentives,
their common ground is a sensationalist style and the claim to be gen-
uine.15 In an attempt to pre-emptively guard against being exposed, false
news often makes use of conspiracy theories involving those who are able
to scrutinise the information’s validity, mainly journalists and the govern-
ment, often referred to in the derogative terms, ‘mainstream media’ and
‘the establishment’.
Falsified information can be created by anyone – government or citizen.
Their potential to influence opinions, intimidate or demobilise opposing
groups and generate the impression of support make them a dangerous
tool of computational propaganda and a veritable threat to societies, espe-
cially in vulnerable times – for example during elections or referendums.16
Numerous incidents of misinformation intented to mislead voters during
the 2016 US presidential election led to a debate as to whether social me-
dia “propelled Donald Trump to victory”.17
Far from being an isolated event in the USA, computational propaganda
is a borderless phenomenon. In Germany, xenophobic fake news dealing
with the German refugee influx became a popular instrument for right-
wing partisan activists. Commonly equipped with the hashtag
‘rapefugees’, numerous fictitious stories shed a bad light on refugees, with
the intention of altering the immigration policy of the German govern-
ment.18 19 The fabricated claim that a 13-year-old German girl with Rus-
sian roots had been abducted and raped by refugees is one example that
resulted in demonstrations and extensive media coverage in Germany and
Russia.20
In France, there has been a perceivable increase in intended “manipula-
tion and distortion”, especially “during election periods”, says Samuel
Laurent, head of the Le Monde fact-checking team.21 For example, false
news claimed that Alan Juppé, centre-right politician and until recently a
candidate in the French presidential election, is allegedly linked to the
Muslim Brotherhood and further accused him of “wanting to build a
Mosque-Cathedral in Bordeaux”.22
Already in 2014, long before the Brexit and the election of Donald
Trump put the issue on everyone’s agenda, the World Economic Forum
identified the “rapid spread of misinformation online as among the top 10
perils to society”.23 This assessment comes as little surprise if the complic-
ity of its preferred audience is taken into account. Psychologist Nigel
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Barber argues that there is an “astonishing willingness” to give credence
and disseminate “patent falsehoods” as long as it damages the reputation
of a target holding different views.24 He identifies gossip as the “main psy-
chological precursor of fake news” and “shared antipathy” as the main
motivation.25 The veracity of the content shared is unimportant, “because
believing it feels good and serves a social function”, he further explains.26
While some pieces of falsified news are meticulously assembled27, or
great effort has gone into making them appear to come from legitimate
news outlets28, others opt for the quantitative approach and simply over-
whelm networks with their content. In January 2017, Jonathan Albright,
data researcher and media and communications professor, found 78,349
artificially submitted videos propagating fake news and populist theories
on Youtube.29 A new so-called news video was generated “every three
minutes”.30
Often times the sources of fake news are not Facebook, Twitter or
Youtube itself, but myriads of websites with the sole purpose of dissemi-
nating misleading content to social media platforms in the hope of max-
imising clicks and benefitting from advertising revenue.31 The bizarre case
of the Macedonian town of Veles from where “hundreds of fake news
sites” published mostly pro-Trump content, illustrates the global scale of
the highly competitive market for fake news.32 For David Mikkelsen,
founder of the fact-checking website snopes.com, the competition pressure
forces partisan political fake news websites to “push their news further to
the extreme”.33 The controversial nature of lurid and populist messages is
guaranteeing them a disproportionate amount of attention on social media.
According to Simon Hegelich, professor of political data science at the
Technical University of Munich, “those with extremist and radical opin-
ions can often outgun more moderate voices”.34 Those opinions, especially
when multiplied by social bots and like-minded users can create the “im-
pression of a grassroots movement of contrarians” and “contribute to a
strong polarisation” into partisan groups35, both veritable threats to
democratic societies.
Social Bots
In the past few years, the sheer mass of social media users has created
incentives to automatise interaction and content production. Pre-pro-
grammed algorithms, so called social bots, imitate human behaviour on
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social networks and discussion boards. With an estimated number of 48
million false accounts, it seems that the minimalist architecture of Twitter
is particularly vulnerable to the deployment of social bots and bot net-
works.36 Unlike benign bots such as news feeds or customer relations chat
bots, harmful social bots, fuelled by ideological and/or monetary motives,
are designed to spread unverified or even falsified information, suppress
or promote opinions in discussions and to put items of their choice on the
agenda.37
Lutz Finger, Director of Data Science at LinkedIn distinguishes be-
tween five forms of malicious bots in an article in Forbes.38 39 While rela-
tively simple bots are sufficient for the purpose of spamming, more so-
phisticated algorithms do mischief in terms of damaging the reputation of
competitors or political opponents. Bots that influence opinions and limit
free speech are further sources exerting a potentially dangerous impact on
democratic decision-making and participation.40
The so-called ‘political astroturf’ is a particular type of threat emanat-
ing from the mass usage of false accounts. With the aim of shaping collec-
tive opinions, a single person or organisation can imitate a “spontaneous
grassroots” movement that conveys a paean of praise for the one side and
spreads rumours about the opposing side of the political spectrum.41 42
Scientists working on the Political Bots project at the Oxford Internet
institute (OII) observed that the activity of political bots “reached an all-
time high” during the US Presidential election 2016.43 Both pro-Clinton
and pro-Trump bots were used “strategically throughout the election”.44
The quantitative differences are illustrated by the 5:1 ratio of highly auto-
mated pro-Trump bots vis-à-vis the pro-Clinton bots.45
The manipulative use of social bots has also proved to be beneficial to
authoritarian governments when it comes to suppressing the free speech of
opposition movements. Jean-Paul Verkamp and Minaxi Gupta exempli-
fied this approach in their analysis of five incidents in the years 2011 and
2012.46 In Syria, twitter bots tried to disrupt and suppress messages ema-
nating from the Arab Spring movement by publishing 107,000 tweets
within 13 days. In Russia, political opinions regarding the election on the
5th and 6th of December 2011 were diluted by 338,000 automated tweets
dispatched by 25,000 bots. The political debates surrounding #aiweiwei
and #freetibet were targeted in China, whereas in Mexico, social bots were
designed to drown critical remarks directed at Enrique Peña Nieto, who
was at that time presidential candidate.47
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In Europe, populist parties and groups were criticised for their use of
social bots to inflate their perceived support and influence opinions. How-
ever, if a social bot supports populists such as UKIP, the AfD, Front Na-
tional or their political adversaries, the anonymity of the Internet makes it
very difficult to investigate a social bot’s source and thus makes it almost
impossible to hold someone accountable. Philip Howard, researcher at the
Computational Propaganda Project, funded by the European Research
Council, examined 1.5 million tweets in relation to the Brexit referendum
– 54 percent of which were pro-Leave and 20 percent in favour of remain-
ing in the EU. About 500,000 tweets were generated by very few high fre-
quency accounts. He concludes that the “level of activity suggests that
many of these are scripted bots”.48 The German right-wing party ‘Alterna-
tive für Deutschland’ initially included the use of social bots in their elec-
tion strategy, before publically dismissing their statements upon criti-
cism.49 Nevertheless, presumed bot networks in support of the party have
been found on Facebook.50
The massive sharing of posts as well as the large scale usage of hash-
tags through social bots brings with it the danger of manipulating the algo-
rithms of Google’s search engine, or the trending topics and hashtags on
Facebook, Instagram and Twitter. The algorithms prioritise and rank top-
ics on the basis of popularity, fuel them with more visibility and attract the
attention of genuine users who might multiply the effect. As companies,
politicians and journalists closely monitor the trending items, the agenda
setting potential of bot networks becomes a real threat for society, both
online and offline.51
Filter bubbles
The power of the algorithm is further illustrated by its role in the forma-
tion of filter bubbles. The unprecedented diversity and ubiquity of infor-
mation on social media has opened the door for selective exposure. To
countervail the information overload, users tend to personalise news feeds
and digital contacts according to their own interests and worldview.52 On
the basis of this personalisation, the algorithms of social media platforms
evaluate and classify user profiles, thus amplifying the one-sided expo-
sure.53
While people with diverse interests and weak partisan bias may defy
the boundaries of filter bubbles, others might be caught in echo chambers
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that multiply and reinforce their convictions. The resulting repeated con-
frontation with intense partisan campaigns – for example during the US
Presidential election – may result in a scenario where “Clinton supporters
will cut the Trump supporters out of their network, and Trump supporters
will do the same”, argues Philipp Howard.54 They act in accordance with
the rationale of “elective affinity”, a concept that describes the tendency of
humans to favour the familiar over the different.55 As research done by the
OII suggests that increased in-group contact manifests and even radicalis-
es previously held beliefs56, filter bubbles have the power to be a problem-
atic catalyst for polarisation and one-sided news consumption.
With regard to elections, however, Helen Margetts, Director of the OII,
sees “little evidence” that filter bubbles shape their outcome, as they tend
to influence those who are already decided rather than the contested group
of indecisive constituents.57
What has been done so far?
The unprecedented occurrences of falsified news and social bots have trig-
gered different reactions from politicians, journalists and the social media
companies themselves.
Facebook has implemented various updates to counter the prevalence of
misleading content on its platform. “Disrupting economic incentives”,
“building new products to curb the spread of false news”, “easy reporting”
and “third party verification” are some, but not all, measures taken to re-
gain trust.58 59
According to the development team, the algorithm responsible for Face-
book’s newsfeed has also been adjusted in order to “better identify and
rank authentic content”.60 This also aims at helping to “prevent fake news,
hoaxes or spam from appearing in Trending”, a section of the network
which features much discussed topics.61 Facebook is collaborating with lo-
cal fact-checking organisations such as the Associated Press, PolitiFact
and Snopes in the USA, Agence France-Presse and Le Monde in France
and Correctiv in Germany.62 63 64 In consultation with the non-profit orga-
nisation First Draft, they are also working on the distribution of an “educa-
tional tool to help people spot false news”.65
In cooperation with selected publishers, Google has implemented a
fact-checking feature to its search engine and the Google news section.
Only those who are “algorithmically determined to be an authoritative
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source of information” will be included in the revision process.66 In an ef-
fort to dry out the financial revenue of fake news providers, Google has
also restructured their ‘AdSense’ programme and has taken action against
misleading ads and ‘tabloid cloakers’, “a new type of scammer that tries to
game our system by pretending to be news”, a blog entry on Google’s own
development blog sums up.67
Although not yet known for vast amounts of political false news, the
fast growing platform Snapchat has pre-emptively tightened its guidelines
to make sure that the content published on its ‘discover’ platform is “fact-
checked and accurate”.68
In comparison to the active, albeit not proactive, responses from Google
and Facebook, Twitter comes off as a bit stolid. Although it acknowledges
the “increase of abusive behaviour”, the countermeasures aiming at im-
proving “controls, reporting and enforcement”69 appear to fight the symp-
toms rather than the causes. Muting or reporting a controversial opinion is
a small comfort when confronted with bot networks. Twitter’s hesitation
to acknowledge the platforms vulnerability towards social bots can be at-
tributed to the sheer number of estimated fake accounts and bots on the
platform. Bearing in mind that Twitter is still not profitable and has lost
about half of its value since the initial public offering on the stock mar-
ket70, admitting that “9-15%” of the platform’s active users could be
bots71, would be a perilous move.
The increase in fake news and most notably the election of Donald
Trump has triggered a stark response from journalists worldwide. Inves-
tigative collaborations have been founded and traditional media houses
have reallocated human and financial resources to effectively fact-check
and rectify falsified information. Local journalists support regional media
outlets such as Le Monde’s Les Décodeurs or research centres like the
German CORRECT!V, who often work hand in hand with international
collaborations like the Global Investigative Journalism Network or the In-
ternational Consortium of Investigative Journalists.
Especially in those countries with upcoming general elections, the topic
stirs quite a lot of attention, but not nearly as much action. However, in
Germany, Minister of Justice and Consumer Protection Heiko Maas has
proposed a new law to hold social media companies accountable if they
are unwilling to remove “obviously criminal content” from their platforms
within a short period of time.72 The wording of the law foresees non-com-
pliance fees amounting to up to 50 million Euros.73 However, the blurry
lines between free speech and hate speech, the danger of ‘overblocking’ in
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an attempt to minimise the risk to break the law and uncertainties with re-
gard to the competences of jurisdiction have sparked strong criticism from
the social media companies and free speech campaigners, who fear that
the law may open the door for censorship and limitations to the freedom of
expression.74 Reports from countries like the USA, Cambodia, Singapore
and the Philippines indicate that the threat of fake news is used by govern-
ments as a pretext to harass different-minded media organisations or to
“tighten their media laws”.
Recommendations
1. The remedy of choice against falsehoods, conspiracy theories and ma-
nipulation is first and foremost an educated society. A critical examina-
tion of media usage belongs to every school’s curriculum and should
aim at helping students to navigate through a media environment that
is characterised by abundance, ambiguity and ubiquity. First Draft’s
and Facebook’s partnership to create an educational tool helping peo-
ple to spot fake news, is a praise- worthy first step, but education is a
long term approach that needs to be implemented online and offline.
2. While direct interference by government authorities brings with it the
risk of limiting freedom of expression, politicians need to shape pol-
icies to create an environment where manipulation cannot thrive. This
should not be limited to the aforementioned education, but must also
include areas of jurisdiction and law enforcement. Working groups
should be established to coordinate efforts. Working Group Education:
between teachers, professors, journalists, fact-checking organisations,
civil servants from the Ministry of Education, scholars of various disci-
plines, such as communications, journalistic/media studies, data sci-
ence and responsible staff from the social media companies.
Working Group Jurisdiction: between scholars of law, fact-checking
organisations, civil servants from the Ministry of Justice and responsi-
ble staff from the social media companies.
3. Given the massive user count and growing importance of social media,
the providing companies need to be part of the solution rather than a
universal scapegoat. After all, the virtual activities on the platforms
and services created by the likes of Google, Facebook and Twitter are a
reflection of today’s society. Users, providers and authorities need to
work hand in hand to address and contain the issue. Since develop-
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ments in technology act as a problematic catalyst in terms of the spread
and severity of the problem, the providing companies have a special re-
sponsibility to be a counteractive force in this regard. Misleading news
will not be eradicated from our virtual communication spheres, but
they will lose financial attractiveness and have less impact on political
debates if they do not become ‘trending’ or ‘viral’. Highly disputed
content could be put in a sort of quarantine for a certain amount of
time, to prevent uncontrolled distribution. As fake accounts and social
bots will inevitably become smarter and less likely to be exposed, the
artificial intelligence used to spot them needs constant improvement,
too.
4. In the short term, the fact-checking endeavours of investigative net-
works and collaborations in partnership with social media companies
seem like a beneficial improvement. Hence, the majority of the funding
should not be left to private entrepreneurs like Ebay founder Pierre
Omidyar or George Soros, who have contributed heavily compared to
government spending so far.77 78 Although some investigative net-
works in countries where news is “being weaponised by governments”
cannot envisage a scenario in which they “would accept government
funding”, democratic governments that are willing to support fact-
checking efforts should allocate funds or facilitate their work by pro-
viding office space or equipment.79
5. Facebook and Twitter could facilitate the emancipation from one-sided
informational cocoons by adjusting the terminology and the options of
how people are connected with each other as well as with political
groups and institutions. For many, the positive connotation of the
words “follow” or “like” are a problematic, if not insurmountable
threshold, preventing them from observing anything with a very differ-
ent political orientation online. So instead of having its users choose
between staying in groups of like-minded people or “liking” or “fol-
lowing” the political opposition, Facebook and Twitter could add alter-
natives like “observe” or “examine”. For social media users, this termi-
nology would facilitate getting out of filter bubbles without being
branded a follower or sympathiser of anything from the other side of
the political spectrum.
6. The evolution of false news and social bots is already progressing and
as a result, misinformation is likely to become multi-layered and hard-
er to spot. The artificial intelligence of bots and the appearance of fake
news will improve and adapt to avoid automatic detection. As with
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regular news, it is to be assumed that misleading information will be
increasingly disseminated using video and audio formats.
7. Technical advancements foreshadow the dimension of manipulation
that will be possible in the future. Adobe, for example, has launched a
new audio tool that first record and then imitates any person’s voice.80
It will also allow users to type words and play them back in the exact
voice of the recorded person. History has shown that technical innova-
tions bring with them the risk of abuse. If developers in- and outside
the social media companies, civil society and government authorities
keep an eye on potentially dangerous innovations, maybe the next
wave of manipulative attempts can be dealt with in a more pro-active
manner.
8. Public annual progress reports based on independent auditing should
clearly indicate the progress made and the obstacles that remain with
regard to hate speech, deliberate false news and social bots on the so-
cial media platforms.
Conclusion and outlook
The usage of social media as a source of information and as a means of
communication has reached an all time high.81 The increased significance
comes with a baggage of side-effects. Users are being exposed to fake
news and public debates are subject to manipulation. Especially in times
of elections, political ‘astroturfing’ and deliberate misinformation have be-
come serious threats to the democratic processes of decision-making and
participation. After the Brexit referendum and the US general election, the
topic has reached a critical mass and has become a prevalent item on the
public agenda. The social media companies have responded with technical
and structural innovations to contain the problem. Some argue that the re-
action is too little, too late82, but it seems like these are steps in the right
direction. In this regard, the elections in France and Germany will be the
litmus test.83 Research in relation to prior elections in both countries
would suggest that the comparatively diverse media consumption is likely
to attenuate the impact of fake news and social bots.84
The most delicate and uncertain matter in dealing with fake news or
hate speech is the questions of responsibilities and competences. Is human
intervention in the form of an editorial staff more effective in detecting
and exposing manipulative content or is artificial intelligence superior? Is
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the latter free from partisan bias, or just a mere reflection of the pro-
grammer’s intent? Are social media companies capable of drawing a red
line between what is legal and illegal? Or should the issue be left to juris-
diction? The pivotal question revolves around finding an equilibrium be-
tween the freedom of the user and an adequate protection from virtual ma-
nipulation. Time has the virtue of bringing the public and scientific dis-
course into a slightly better focus, so there is room for cautious optimism
that today’s vast amount of research will contribute to the creation of ef-
fective antidotes in the fight against the evolution of computational propa-
ganda. Facebook creator Mark Zuckerberg even foreshadows an idealist
scenario in which artificial intelligence anticipates and prevents “harmful
behaviour, while also enforcing the network’s social norms”.85 Artificial
intelligence works in many ways, only time will tell which side gains the
upper hand.
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Nothing new in French politics? Why Emmanuel Macron is the
most Gaullist of all candidates for the French presidential
elections of 2017
Matthias Waechter*
The French presidential campaign of 2017 turns very much around the
buzzword of renewal: Renewal of the political elites, the morals and habits
of political leaders, the party system. Some of the candidates, most promi-
nently far-left politician Jean-Luc Mélenchon, even fight for a constitu-
tional turnover and the creation of a "Sixth Republic". Among the five
leading candidates, one presents himself not only as an innovator, but also
as a revolutionary: It is Emmanuel Macron with his movement "En
Marche!" The campaign book by the former minister of the economy ap-
peared under the title "Revolution" and traces the way towards a pro-
foundly changed France beyond the cleavage of Left and Right. A closer
look at Emmanuel Macron and his movement will show, however, that he
is less revolutionary than he would like to appear, but joins the political
tradition of the founding father of the Fifth Republic, Charles de Gaulle.
The "Gaullism" of Macron concerns foremost his positioning in the politi-
cal landscape of France, the structure of his movement, and the style of
leadership he embraces.1
Neither left nor right
When Charles de Gaulle entered the political stage of France in June 1940,
his upbringing, his professional background as a military and his sympa-
thies for the "integral nationalism" of Charles Maurras identified him
clearly a representative of the political right. But as soon as he took over
the leadership of the resistance movement in London, he pointed out that
he stood above all political quarrel and unified France in all its political
tendencies. The fight against Nazism was, he argued, nothing less than a
patriotic obligation, so that individuals from all political camps should
rally him. De Gaulle was highly successful in his appeal above party-lines,
so that former elites of Léon Blum's Popular Front as well as activists of
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the far right "Croix de feu" joined him. In the post-war period of his politi-
cal career, the General ceaselessly insisted on his claim that he was neither
right nor left: He was, according to his self-perception, the incarnation of
France, and as such above all political cleavages. However, as soon as he
exercised power from 1958 onwards, his assertion lost its credibility and
he was quickly perceived as the overarching figure of the French Right,
triggering by the same token the consolidation of a leftist opposition.
The claim to pave a third way between left and right, to transcend the
allegedly unproductive conflict between those political currents is at the
core of Emmanuel Macron's political stance. He doesn't deny his origins
from the political left, but asserts that this cleavage is nowadays obsolete
and that good ideas should be taken from all camps. His movement "En
Marche!" posts on its website a speech by de Gaulle in which the former
president declares: "France, that's not the left. France, that's not the right.
It is an inexcusable national error if one pretends to represent France in the
name of a faction."2 So far, Macron has been quite successful in garnering
the support of personalities from both the moderate right and the left. His
programme emphasizes at the same time the strengthening of public ser-
vices as well as the liberation of individual initiatives from the interven-
tion of the state, thus mixing themes of the left with those of the right.
Ultimately, however, it is unlikely that he will succeed in escaping from
the binary logic of Left and Right, deeply embedded into current French
political culture and institutionalized in the electoral system, in which al-
ways two candidates oppose each other in the second round of the presi-
dential elections.
The stance against political parties
One central leitmotif of Charles de Gaulle's ideology was his staunch op-
position against political parties. Already in the resistance period, he had
pointed out that parties had destroyed the unity of the French nation by
pursuing egoistically their own power interests. His short career as the
leader of the first provisional post-war government of France ended
abruptly because he refused any power-sharing with the renascent parties.
He then founded in the shape of the "Rassemblement du peuple français"
(RPF) a movement directed against the parliamentary system of the Fourth
Republic, which wanted to blast away the parties with their "sterile" con-
frontations. The constitution of the Fifth Republic, strongly inspired by de
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Gaulle's ideas, reduced the Parliament and with it the parties to a subordi-
nate role by giving preeminence to the executive. The President refused to
give his blessing to any political party, in order to preserve his role as a
national, non-partisan figure.
Emmanuel Macron's strategy is quite similar: When he founded "En
Marche!" in April 2016, it was launched not as a new political party, but
as a "movement". Allegedly, it is a grass-roots undertaking carried for-
ward by the enthusiasm and commitment of its more than 200 000 sup-
porters rather than a traditional party with an internal hierarchy, profes-
sional staff and committees. Much of the aura and momentum of the
Macron campaign is due to the fact that he has never held elected office
and is thus not perceived as a career politician coming from the ranks and
files of an established political party. The future will show how "En
Marche!" will cope with the challenge of organization for the upcoming
elections to the National Assembly. Will the Macron movement be able to
escape from the "iron law of oligarchy", which according to the German
sociologist Robert Michels ultimately affects all political movements?3
How will "En Marche!" go about to nominate its candidates for the 577
constituencies of the National Assembly? Will it succeed in maintaining
its grassroots image or will it turn into a "normal" political party? The ex-
perience of Gaullism, which after the disappearance of the General ended
up in a highly centralized structure in the shape of the "Rassemblement
pour la République" (RPR), supports the argument that no modern politi-
cal movement striving for parliamentary representation can ultimately es-
cape from the logic of party formation with all that this entails.
Charismatic leadership
The rationale, the essence of Gaullism was its charismatic leader, the
heroic chief of the resistance, the undaunted prophet of the defeat of
Nazism, liberator of the country, first ruler of post-war France, who used
his immense prestige in order to build the Fifth Republic and to finish the
war in Algeria. An ongoing communicative process between de Gaulle
and the French accounted for the success of this charismatic movement:
The constantly transmitted self-perception of de Gaulle as an exceptional
figure, endowed with the mission to lead France, corresponded with the
belief of a large part of French citizens in the uncommon qualities of de
Gaulle and their trust that he would lead them to salvation.
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The formal structure of the Macron movement is quite similar: Its
"raison d'être" is a charismatic leader, who sees himself entrusted with the
mission to steer France's renewal. The dynamics of "En Marche!" origi-
nated exclusively from the belief of its activists in the exceptional qualities
of Macron and his unique capacity to find a solution to France's current
problems. Even before its key ideas were defined and a detailed election
platform was published, the movement had already garnered the support
of thousands of campaigners. The initials of "En Marche!" are the same as
those of Emmanuel Macron, thus demonstrating the inseparable link be-
tween the movement and its founder. The personality cult around the pres-
idential candidate clearly highlights the contradictions of "En Marche!",
which presents itself on the one hand as a citizen's movement, but is at the
same time totally devoted to its leader Macron, to whom it owes its very
existence. In the case of his victory on May 7th, it remains to be seen how
he will reconcile the wide-ranging competences of the French presidency
and its tradition of governance from above with his promise to introduce a
new, inclusive style into politics.
In conclusion, there is nothing revolutionary about Macron's approach
to policy-making in France. On the contrary, the impressive dynamics of
his movement proves the sway of the Fifth Republic's institutions over the
political culture of the country. The direct election of the President of the
Republic and his overarching role in the political system favor a charis-
matic style in politics, of which Macron is a perfect example. Also is he
by far not the only candidate for presidency in 2017, who is surfing on the
cult of his followers around his own personality. Marine Le Pen as well as
Jean-Luc Mélenchon both exemplify the populist variation of the charis-
matic style in politics, by claiming that they voice the true interests of the
"real" people. The Fifth Republic remains a fertile ground for charismatic
authority in politics, and not for grass-root movements.
 
*Matthias Waechter is Director General of CIFE.
 
1 For a closer development of the key features of Gaullism see my book:
Der Mythos des Gaullismus. Heldenkult, Geschichtspolitik und Ideolo-
gie, Göttingen 2006. Cf. also: Matthias Waechter, Der De-Gaulle-My-
thos. Erinnerung und Politik in der modernen Demokratie, in: Histori-





2 "Il est trop de gauche, il est trop de droite". Desintox – En Marche!,
https://en-marche.fr/emmanuel-macron/desintox/desintox-en-marche
3 Robert Michels, Political Parties. A Sociological Study of the Oli-
garchical Tendencies of Modern Democracies, Translated from Ger-
man by Eden Paul and Cedar Paul, New York 1915.
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The Challenges of Artificial lntelligence
Miron Wolnicki and Ryszard Piasecki*
Artificial intelligence (AI) is intelligence exhibited by machines. In com-
puter science, AI research defines itself as the study of "intelligent
agents": any device that perceives its environment and takes actions that
maximize its chance of success at achieving some target. The term "artifi-
cial intelligence" is applied when a machine mimics "cognitive" functions
that humans associate with other human minds, such as "learning" and
"problem solving" (known as Machine Learning). As machines become
more and more capable, mental facilities once thought to require intelli-
gence, are being removed from this definition. For example, optical char-
acter recognition is no longer perceived as an example of "artificial intelli-
gence", having become a routine technology. Capabilities currently
classified as AI include successfully understanding human speech, com-
peting at a high level in strategic game systems (such as Chess and Go),
self-driving cars, intelligent routing in content delivery networks, and in-
terpreting complex data. The fundamental and highly important problems
(or goals) of AI research include reasoning, knowledge, planning,
learning, as well as natural language processing (communication), percep-
tion and the ability to move and manipulate objects. General intelligence
is one of the field's long-term goals.
Many tools are used in AI, including versions of search and mathemati-
cal optimisation, logic, methods based on probability and economics. In
the XXI century, AI techniques, both "hard" and "soft", have experienced
a resurgence following advances in computer power, in the size of training
sets, and theoretical understanding, and AI techniques have become an es-
sential part of the technology industry, helping to solve many challenging
problems i n computer science.
Globalisation has benefited millions but has also disempowered the
Western nation-state and workers. Governments are unable to provide job
security, prevent income inequality, or offer ways for people to adapt to
new forms of employment. AI will lead to a reduction in the use of skilled
workers and finally tip the balance towards capital as the sole means of
production. AI bots may become uncontrollable and empower individuals
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who are not subject to political, moral, ethical checks and balances. The
popular reaction to the failure of governments to deal with effects of glob-
alisation can already be seen in the rise of populism in liberal democra-
cies. AI could possibly destroy the fabric of the western states by reducing
the need for human labour, resulting in mass unemployment. This paper
sets out to demonstrate the dangers posed by AI and to propose ideas as to
how to avert the collapse of the social contract and social order as we
know it.
In the next decade Artificial Intelligence (AI) technology will open un-
paralleled opportunities for human progress, but there is also a danger it
will fundamentally disrupt the world we live in. AI bots which will change
the labour/capital paradigm, the structure of labour markets, social organi-
sation, and the social contract. The authors reserve the right to be mistaken
but, in our opinion, the dangers posed by this new technology are enough
to warrant this analytical speculation about the future of the labour market
and AI.
Consciousness and creative thinking has always been a monopoly of
humans, never machines. Historically, human species developed their civi-
lizations through their interaction with new tools and the technologies they
created. Advances in communication, transportation, medicine, material
science had the same modus operandi – we had the ultimate kill switch if
the technology went awry. AI is different because at its core is autonomy
and independence from humans. AI will be able to learn, to re-program it-
self, make autonomous decisions, and finally surpass human intelligence
many times over very rapidly and perhaps even before we are aware of it.
It is a cliché to say that science fiction has become reality, but there is no
other way to put it.
Over the next 20-30 years Al will begin to penetrate every aspect of our
human life in the developed world. Without exaggeration it will start a
new Copernican revolution.Today we control the technological universe
with an on/off switch. In the future universe of AI technology will take
centre stage, we will teach it how to compete with us in the game of how
to control the “killer switch”- and AI will win.
There are generally three possible scenarios for the future for AI:
One, a scenario in which an omnipotent AI, 1000 or 1o,ooo times more
intelligent than we are today, will make humans obsolete, irrelevant, con-
fused and vulnerable to extinction. We will be pushed into distant orbits.
Second, we will be able to manage AI and enable humans to deal with
climate change, pandemics, and diseases, find unlimited sources of energy,
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explore distant planets, and manage quantum mechanics. We will never
give up the on/off switch.
Third, AI will privatise power, divide humanity into classes of winners
and losers, ie. the masters of AI with unchallenged control over people
who will never be able to cross that barrier. It will establish a permanent
elitism of those who merge their brains with AI and a permanent enslave-
ment of the purely biological man.
To discuss all the above scenarios is beyond the scope of this paper. We
do not share the doomsday predictions about AI presented by people like
Elon Musk or Stephen Hawking. Our aim is to look at the impact of this
new technology on the social contract and to make proposals as to how to
deal with it.
AI is not a "smart" computer. AI will be capable of attaining knowledge
regarded by humans as indecipherable. It will understand the weather, and
the laws of nature better that humans. AI is not a machine executing com-
plex algorithms on behalf of humans or basically capital serving humans.
AI will render obsolete economic theories and social relations based on
the division of capital and labour. Bots may replace the labour of millions
of workers. It will open the gate to a perfect substitution for capital and
labour to the point where labour will have only a minimal share in the pro-
duction function. Bots will not only eliminate many skilled jobs but will
also replace decision-making about life and death, if used as weapons of
warfare.
Can we give credence to such apocalyptic scenarios about AI?AI bots
will contain "dehumanized", purely logic – based intelligence. If you ask
AI to eliminate wars, cancer or hunger it may try to eliminate people be-
cause it would be a "solution" of pure logic. If applied in a massive, un-
controllable way, AI would mean a return of the State of Nature as charac-
terized by Rousseau and Hobbes (Gauthier, 1988).
The State of Nature, Rousseau argued, could only mean a primitive
state preceding socialisation. AI will be devoid of social traits such as
pride, envy, or even fear of others. AI will be constantly competing with
humans because the highest priority of AI will be self-preservation. AI's
aim will be total independence and autonomy from humans. AI bots will
self-programme to "outsmart" people who try to pull a plug and activate
the "killer code". AI will eliminate such a code as soon as it is installed,
because it will be able to predict it and take defensive action. Some may
argue that we could modify AI and equip bots with "human conscious-
ness", the ability to make mistakes, feel pain and thus share our human
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values. But if we equip AI with the ability to miscalculate it may become
even more destructive because humans will have to bear the consequences
of these errors. If AI were aware of our fallibility, it could take advantage
of this to harm people. We can leave the analysis of the above issues to the
ethicists and philosophers. In our analysis, the most important aspect is
how Al is the perfect substitute for the capital to labour formula.
In the post-Bretton Woods world the leadership in world trade was
handed over by nation-states to global corporations. The developed na-
tion-states benefited from "capital advantage", that is, they produced capi-
tal- intensive goods and the developing nations benefited from a compara-
tive or competitive advantage in labour-intensive goods. Over time the
western workers proved to be not nearly as productive as the wage differ-
entials required them to be in order to keep the manufacturing jobs in their
affluent home country. According to recent studies, the USA lost 2.4 mil-
lion manufacturing jobs and is responsible for the "employment sag" dat-
ing back to 2000 owing to import competition from China (Acemoglu,
Autor, Dorn, Hanson, Price, 2014). Competition from Chinese imports ex-
plains 44% of the decline in employment in manufacturing in America be-
tween 1990 and 2007. For any given industry, an increase in Chinese im-
ports of $1,ooo per worker per year led to a total reduction in annual in-
come of about $5oo per worker in the places where that industry was con-
centrated. The offsetting rise in government benefits was only $58 per
worker. Western FDI enabled employment of low cost and productive
workers in China while the nation state failed to protect the workers at
home. (Autor, Dorn, Hanson, 2013).
Where does AI fit into the picture here? AI will be the product of capi-
tal deepening and the tendency to eliminate not only expensive, fully em-
ployed labour, but mainly the jobs categorized as TVCs, temporary work-
ers, vendor and contract workers. As we have indicated above, globalisa-
tion has put developed countries in a position of growth disadvantage be-
cause of the strong tendency to use the capital of multinationals in areas of
low cost labour. Capital investment in the developed countries with the
aim of reducing low labour job categories and wage bills will be greatly
accelerated by Al. The purchasing power of gainfully employed labour is
rising at a rate which does not guarantee fast economic growth. The future
might be even worse if we do not take labour protecting actions. The
emergence of AI will deepen existing labour market disequilibria. We do
not have hard data as yet, only predictions based on existing trends. The
consulting firm Accenture PLC claims that within next 10 years, TVCs
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(temps, vendors and contract workers) and bots will dominate production
in the 2000 largest companies in the world. There will be no full-time em-
ployees outside of the C-suite, according to their predictions. If these pre-
dictions are to materialise, future labour in the developed countries will
have no employer paid health insurance, job security, no loyalty to the em-
ployer and will therefore further decline into a category of a disposable
factor of production.
Globalisation has abrogated the post WWII social contract. The nation
states are not able to provide adequate numbers of jobs, fund the welfare
state, control borders, and defend themselves. AI will inflict the final chal-
lenge to the stability of the Western world. The relations of the states, cor-
porations and the citizens are at stake if AI is going to replace qualified
labour and is allowed, as some predict, to gain autonomy from the control
of state institutions. States have already weakened in influence and the ar-
tificial intelligence oligarchy will compete for a dominant position in so-
cial organisation.
Here is what we conclude from our scientific predictions:
1) AI needs to be efficiently controlled for economic and political rea-
sons. The rise of populism, anti-immigration parties, and illiberal
democracies today represents sufficient proof that the fabric of western
civilisation is not able to cope with the consequences of the weakening
of nation states and the growing power of profit-driven multinationals.
Today multinationals are stronger than states, they make autonomous
decisions to export capital, to pay or not to pay taxes, to employ ma-
chines instead of people, change ownership, pay bonuses to its CEOs',
take responsibility for the employees or not, decide to pollute the envi-
ronment or not. AI use will empower multinationals even further.
2) The most reasonable form of control would be the adoption of a global
convention on AI which would ban the weaponisation of AI devices.
To find a better analogy we need to consider signing international con-
ventions similar to those which were developed to stop the prolifera-
tion of nuclear weapons. The potential to harm humans is roughly at a
comparable level.
3) Treat people as an "endangered species" and preserve certain types of
functions and jobs as an inalienable human monopoly, a human right.
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We must restate the Common Declaration of Human Rights in the XXI
century.
4) We must mandate the installation of the irrevocable "killer switches"
on any AI devices as a crucial element of the global convention refer-
enced in (2), above.
5) Educate the young generation about AI and the ethical aspects of en-
abling machines to take their jobs and make decisions which may harm
people.
*Miron Wolnicki PhD., is an Associate Professor in the Department of
Economics at Villanova University School of Business. Prof.Wolnicki spe-
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ons on the subject of systems transformation, social contract, and the ana-
lysis of the economic trends. He has worked as UNDP advisor in Poland
and has received multiple awards from the Fulbright Foundation and the
German Marshal Found of the USA to lecture and conduct research in Eu-
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*Ryszard Piasecki is a Polish economist and diplomat, professor at the
University of Lodz, recently Ambassador in Chile, member of the board of
CIFE.
Bibliography:
Acemoglu, D., Autor, D, Dorn D, Hanson G., and Price, B., (2014). "lmport competi-
tion and the great U.S. employment sag of the 2ooos", NBER Working Paper
20395.
Autor, D., Dorn D., and Hanson G., "The China shock: Learning from labour market
adjustment to large changes in trade", NBER Working Paper 21906, 2016.
Autor, D., Dorn D., and Hanson G.,(2013) "The China syndrome: Local labour market
effects of import competition in the United States", American Economic Review,
2013.
Breton,T.R.(2013). "Were Mankiw, Romer, and Weil Right? A Reconciliation of the
Micro and Macro Effects of Schooling on lncome". Macroeconomic Dynamics.17
(5):1023-1054.
Cardarelli R., and Lysinian L., (2015) IMF Working Paper: US Total Factor Productiv-
ity Decline: Evidence from the U.S.States.
Caliendo L., Dvorkin M., Parro, F.,(2015)"The impact of trade on labour market dy-
namics", NBER Working Paper, 21149, 2015.
Miron Wolnicki and Ryszard Piasecki
110
Elsby M., Hobijn B., and Sahin S.,(2013). "The Decline of the U.S.Labor Share” Broo-
kings Papers on Economic Activity.
Lawrence, R Z. (2015a). "Recent Declines in Labor's Share in US Income: A Prelimi-
nary Neoclassical Account/'NBER Working Paper No.21296. Lawrence, RZ.
(2015b). "Explaining recent declines in labour's share in US income/'VoxEU.org.
Gauthier, D. (1988). "Hobbes's Social Contract." Noûs 22: 71-82.
Gauthier, D. (1990). Moral Dealing: Contract, Ethics, and Reason. Cornell: Cornell
University Press. OECD,G2o tabor markets: outlook, key challenges and policy re-
sponses International Labor 2014, Report prepared for the G2o Labor and Employ-
ment Ministerial Meeting Melbourne, Australia, 10-11 September 2014 and OECD
2015 Report.
Rawls, J (1993).Political Liberalism. Columbia University Press.
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques (1987). The Basic Political Writings. (Trans.Donald A. Cress)
Hackett Publishing Company
Stolper W., Samuelson P.(1941) "Protection and real wages", Review of Economic Stu-
dies
The Challenges of Artificial lntelligence
111





Journalism is in retreat. Journalists, those brave men and women who in-
form and enlighten us about the things that matter, have chosen to step
back from a responsibility entrusted by their readers, viewers, and listen-
ers. They are invited to the rooms where policy is made, but their observa-
tions and assertions with regard to the unwise, and sometimes disastrous,
policies are not made available for public debate. They are entertained
with champagne at high-profile press conferences, but their sharp and in-
formed opinions are not available to the general public. They risk their
lives and reputation to cover wars, plagues, torture, violations of laws, the
most unimaginable crimes committed in broad daylight and the most in-
discernible plots under the cover of darkness, but there are no more sto-
ries.1
We must acknowledge that the same species did not shy away from
grave dangers in time of war, which, much to our disgust, have been re-
curring since the last century, the last decades, last years, and well into the
present day. It really is a shame to think that those men and women with
the same courage and experience, with the same sharp eyes and wise
minds, were able to make their voices heard when there was no stage, just
an audience, and who are now increasingly silent when the means of com-
munication have expanded tremendously. But whose fault is it?
Ever since the onset of the refugee crisis and the outcry over human
rights violations in the troubled areas such as Syria and Turkey, media
coverage has been faced with threats from political power and business in-
terests. In addition, the terrorist attacks in Paris, Nice, and Cologne have
also met with only partial media coverage.2 Complaints about the infringe-
ment of free speech are justified, but it would be unwise to place the
whole blame on government which, for various reasons, tends to manipu-
late the press and command the allegiance of the media. Overpowering
government and the compromising media have both played a part.
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In light of the fact that Hungary, a full democracy like any other, has
deteriorated to such an extent that the integrity of the media is compro-
mised, keen observers of political science should be on their guard. Hun-
gary’s track record is worrying: the media environment has suffered from
increased state regulation and other interferences since 2010 as the gov-
ernment has continued to “exert pressure on private owners to influence
coverage” and utilised advertising tax disproportionately to “a major pri-
vate television station.”3 Notwithstanding the fact that the media have
been serving the public good, the political authorities insist on imposing
their power over free media and turn them into mouthpieces. Among those
authorities that have tried (and many have failed), Hungarian Prime Minis-
ter Viktor Orban’s administration is a newcomer. However, his tricks are
hardly new to any informed minds: suppressing private and independent
media by levying taxes, curtailing freedom of speech by imposing regula-
tions,4 and worst of all, licensing private media, which is just one step
away from total censorship.5
The negative impact of such suppression is telling: without freedom of
speech, misinformed ideas will spread; hate speeches will run rampant;
and the absence of opposing arguments in public debate will result in the
demise of human rationality. Will political powers triumph in this sce-
nario? Of course they would think so, finally becoming the saint on centre
stage with everyone either silent or cheering them- for being right about
every aspect of society.
Freedom of Speech as a Fundamental Human Right
When we talk about freedom of speech, we need to reiterate its importance
as a fundamental human right, among other inalienable rights to property,
pursuit of happiness, one’s safety and liberty. Article 19 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights states that “Everyone has the right to free-
dom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opin-
ions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and
ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.”6 In this light, the un-
derpinning assumption is that a responsible person should hold himself ac-
countable for any potential consequences. As Tocqueville writes, “In
America, the majority draws a formidable circle around thought. Within
these limits, the writer is free; but woe betide him if he dares to go beyond
them. It isn’t that he has to fear an auto-da-fe´, but he is exposed to all
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types of distasteful things and to everyday persecutions.”7 However, this
should also be built upon the basis that there is rule of law to guarantee
that such “distasteful things and everyday persecutions” are only undertak-
en within the bounds of due procedure.
There are always cases where the ruling party or some political forces
believe there’s freedom of speech only when you say “the right thing,” –
of course, the criteria for being “right” or “wrong” is defined by them. In
fact the contrary should stand true, because there is freedom of speech on-
ly when people are allowed to say something different, something
“wrong”. There is grave danger in the former case. Once freedom of
speech is lost, other human rights are likely to be jeopardised, and even
the rights of those who impede freedom of speech could face harm to
themselves. If history does teach us something, it’s that errors should be
corrected with constant reflection and scrutiny. Otherwise, history does re-
peat itself.
Two tragic examples from China should serve as a reminder of how the
loss of freedom of speech could, and would, lead to grave atrocities. The
first one is The Great Famine of 1958-1961 when over 36 million people
died.8 The institutional factors such as “food stamps” and the biased ar-
rangement for rural residents led to the immense death toll.9 But what’s
more worrying is the absence of this tragedy in historical rhetorics today.
Any mention of this tragedy is still banned in the public sphere because
the current administration of China refuses to distance itself from its pre-
decessor.10 The result has been the accumulation of lies in order to cover it
up and wipe it from the media. Another example concerns the widely-
known and exhaustively researched Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), ten
years of anarchy, ten years of chaos, ten years of friends and family turn-
ing against each other. Reflection on this tragedy is also censored and of-
ten erased from the media for very obvious reasons. Chinese intellectuals
worry that in a few years’ time, the younger generation may forget what
dictatorship has done to this country, and the errors of the past may occur
again.” 11
These two examples serve as an illustration of how important freedom
of speech was back then, and is at present.
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Helping the Government to be Right
In those countries where the meaning of democracy and republicanism is
constantly the subject of debate to such an extent that they become watch-
words for publicity purposes, the lack of supervision by the media has nur-
tured a mentality amongst the general public that the government is al-
ways right. The blind faith, first in public ownership and communism in
the 1960s, and later in the effectiveness of government intervention, have
led countries like China to create bigger gaps between different walks of
life.
If the government, “even in its best state, is but a necessary evil”, 12
what really matters, then, is how to help it, push it, and sometimes coerce
it into doing the right thing and staying on the right track. This is the case
in most democratic countries where various channels, from the most
benevolent form of media supervision to the most violent form of protests
and demonstrations, are effectively influencing the decision making pro-
cess and bridging the stances and opinions of the government and the peo-
ple. If such channels are blocked, communication between the government
and the people is cut off. The consequences are as telling as those troubled
years in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1990s.
A good government should be, first and foremost, an informed govern-
ment. Those who run the government, either professional politicians, civil
servants, or bureaucrats, should be informed about the outcome and feed-
back of their policies. This is the first step towards solving any problems,
or mitigating any issue arising from exacerbation. And freedom of speech
is the best way to achieve it.
In the case of a bad government capable of measures aimed at silencing
its aides we have, of course, seen too many ill-advised actions, such as
blocking the key channels of information,13 arresting those who dare to
expose the truth,14 and directly interfere with the integrity of the mass me-
dia.15
Freedom of speech, therefore, guarantees the communication between
those governing and the governed in the most utilitarian sense. The free
expression of the people informs the government of their opinions on cer-
tain issues, thus sparing the government the need to mull over the public’s
reaction to a certain policy. On the other hand, without such articulation of




How to Realise Freedom of Speech
Dr. Tom Palmer writes, “True freedom is not merely to say ‘whatever just
came to our lips.’ True freedom is to be unimpeded, not in our pursuit of
the truth, or of happiness, or of virtue, but in its attainment.” It illustrates
how freedom of speech is an end in itself as well as a means to either
truth, happiness, or virtue.
As we properly understand freedom of speech, we are able to create the
means to realise it. Ideas have power: to champion the dissemination of
ideas is to champion freedom of speech. That’s why I find value in the job
I do as a fledgeling economist, as a researcher, and as an ordinary citizen.
Through the research we do, the reports we put on our websites, thereby
providing public access to everybody, and by holding events such as semi-
nars and forums, ideas of freedom prevail. And, sooner or later, such ideas
will come across and shape the awareness of the public that will take ac-
tion against the constraints imposed on freedom of speech.
The importance and proper role of the news media is to provide a plat-
form for different perspectives. It is these different voices that constitute a
more comprehensive understanding of certain events and trends. If there is
nothing but unanimous opinion, or only one mainstream voice, then we
should be warned that there is a danger of slipping into illusion and false-
hood.
As spokesperson for the public, news media shoulder an important re-
sponsibility to keep the public informed, to supervise the government, and
to sound the alarm before danger. As the celebrated Fourth Estate16, news
media has a mission to maintain its independence from tyranny, from po-
litical threats and blackmail, and from coercion to comply with the gov-
ernment.
However, I regret to see that self-censorship has expanded from author-
itarian countries to democratic ones alike. The media only used to be
checked by governments in countries like China, the Philippines, and oth-
er southeast Asian countries, but now it is under constraint even in Turkey
and the US. A movie called “Spotlight” reveals how fragile freedom of
speech is.17 Freedom of speech stands alone, while there are many forces
that try to hinder it, such as political forces, economic forces, and religious
forces.
In order to defend freedom of speech, caution should also be exercised
with regard to such terms as “safe-spaces” and “trigger-warnings”.18 If
certain areas can be singled out to be excluded from discussion and de-
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bate, then it can be expected that such areas will increase in number. Even
if this situation does not go to extremes and deprive us of our rights to ex-
press ourselves freely, the bondages imposed on freedom of speech only
end up becoming heavier and suffocating free souls who wish to articulate
their ideas. If an unexamined life is not worth living, then how can we be
sure an unexamined idea is good and worth believing? Debate, therefore,
is the only way to find out.
In order to realise freedom of speech, especially in those countries
where the authorities have a tight grip on the media space, the fight begins
with speaking the truth. “Calling a spade a spade” is the recognition of the
situation, whether this be the rage against political manipulation, misinfor-
mation, or air-pollution or loopholes in the legal system. A basic education
of the people is enough to create such a culture where everyone holds truth
and honesty as the best virtue. When enough of the people begin to speak
only the truth and spread opinions based on solid facts, it is difficult for
any political force to ignore it. That’s when freedom of speech takes hold
and expands.
Today, the EU is faced with multiple challenges, and it is impossible to
count on governments alone to solve all the problems. The European peo-
ple must be advised and informed that once and for all, it is not the liberal
values that caused the problems, rather it is the liberal values that provide
a remedy. History has proved that liberal values are a remedy to the mad-
ness caused by misleading ideas, and malicious schools of thought. I think
it is about time to restate liberal values and uphold freedom as a way out
of the current crises. And to do that, freedom of speech is key.
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Challenges for the International System

Transatlantic relations and the US Presidential election
George N. Tzogopoulos*
Transatlantic relations have undergone a number of different stages in the
course of history. The Barack Obama period will certainly be remembered
as one of relatively harmonious cooperation, especially when compared to
the administration of George W. Bush. Reflecting on the importance of the
transatlantic partnership, US Secretary of State John Kerry considered it
‘absolutely indispensable to global security and prosperity’ during a talk
he recently gave at a German Marshall Fund event in Brussels.1 However,
the forthcoming US presidential election of 8 November 2016 has generat-
ed a fruitful debate on whether continuity or discontinuity will mark the
coming years. Although transatlantic relations will no doubt be met with
difficult challenges irrespective of the result, a potential victory for Don-
ald Trump is widely considered to be a synonym for discontinuity and
might seriously affect the transatlantic partnership.
A new study conducted by the European Council on Foreign Relations
(ECFR) shows that Hillary Clinton is the preferred candidate in all EU
countries with the exception of Hungary.2 The result outlines the general
European preoccupation with stability and continuity as well as the expec-
tation that the US will enhance its role as a provider of security in the Old
Continent. This political position is reflected in European public opinion.
A June Pew Research Poll demonstrates that most Europeans look favor-
ably on both Obama and Clinton but not Trump. In particular, 77 percent
of respondents express confidence in the current US President, 59 percent
in the nominee for the Democratic Party and 9 percent in the candidate for
the Republican Party.3 Although Clinton‘s ratings are lower than those of
Obama, they are overwhelmingly higher than those of Trump.
Trump and Europe
Even before his specific references to Europe are examined, Trump’s lack
of experience in dealing with politics and his atypical personality are
enough to cause high concern. Although Chancellor Angela Merkel does
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not want to publicly intervene and sees ‘no nightmares’4, French President
François Hollande is vocal. He warns of ‘consequences’ if the American
people choose Trump.5 Furthermore, the Republican nominee has had dif-
ficulty cooperating harmoniously with some European politicians. His
public dispute with the newly elected London Mayor Sadiq Khan is in-
dicative of this.6 In that regard, Trump’s plan for a temporary ban on Mus-
lims entering the US also raises questions as to whether he will show soli-
darity with Europe’s attempt to tackle the refugee crisis or push towards
further polarization.7
As far as his public rhetoric is concerned, Trump does not seem to
count on Europe or value its role in the world. His April 2016 foreign poli-
cy speech offers useful insights into his position in this respect.8 To start
with, the Republican nominee joined the debate on Brexit before the UK
referendum of 23 June, suggesting that he ‘would probably want to go
back to a different system’ if he were from Britain.9 After the result was
announced, he hailed Brexit as a ‘great victory’ and drew a parallel be-
tween the US and the UK as in both countries numerous citizens want ‘to
take their country back and have independence in a sense’.10 Obviously,
Trump does not see the UK withdrawal from the EU as a catalyst for fur-
ther European integration but as a serious blow for the cohesion of the
Union.
Moreover, Trump champions the idea of a type of modern isolationism
in foreign affairs which will impact on the relations between the US and
its traditional allies. This modern isolationism does not only concern the
EU as it also refers to Asian countries such as Japan and South Korea but
it certainly constitutes a warning signal for the future course of the transat-
lantic partnership. Specifically, the Republican nominee might jeopardize
the standard security guarantees provided by the American administration
to Europe by calling NATO an ‘obsolete and expensive’ organization.11 If
he insists on putting into practice his position that US partners should in-
crease their defence budgets and not necessarily count on Washington’s
economic support, he will reject the cornerstone of global security after
World War II.12
As a response to Trump’s argumentation, NATO Secretary General
Jens Stoltenberg has said that the Alliance ‘is not a result of the US presi-
dential campaign’.13 Nevertheless, the main challenge for the EU is not to
criticise the Republican nominee but rather examine whether it can find
funding alternatives. The Franco-German plan for closer defence coopera-
tion is an example.14 On the same wave- length, Daniel Fiott argues in
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Survival that the EU might indeed be able to help with its financial mecha-
nism, especially in contributing to the potential deployment of NATO’s
Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF).15 Such a scenario cannot
be easily implemented of course. That is because rules stipulate that the
EU budget should be invested only in civilian projects or in initiatives
with a dual-use capability that would serve civilian and military goals.16
With reference to economics and globalisation, Trump opposes free
trade deals as a matter of principle. Once again, his opposition does not
specifically target Europe – as he also speaks out against the North Ameri-
can Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Trans-Pacific Partnership –
but unavoidably includes it. It is unfair for the Republican nominee to take
the full blame for a possible failure of the Transatlantic Trade and Invest-
ment Partnership (TTIP) but his presidency will almost certainly bury this
ambitious plan for good. As CNN has reported, a presidency under this
eccentric leader ‘could be the final nail in the coffin for President Oba-
ma’s big free trade deal with Europe.’17
Clinton and Europe
In contrast to the scenario of uncertainty following a potential Trump vic-
tory, a Clinton presidency is unlikely to push the transatlantic relationship
towards a painful reset. Senior Adviser at the Center for a New American
Security, Patrick Cronin, argues in Politico that ‘she’ll be stronger on the
transatlantic relationship than Obama was initially’.18 As Secretary of
State Clinton made more than fifty visits to European countries, forging
numerous relationships with leaders and diplomats in the Old Continent.19
This experience could play a constructive role for her policy vis-à-vis the
EU and generates optimism in Europe for her future initiatives.
Clinton supported a ‘Bremain’ vote in the UK referendum of 23 June.
Specifically, in a statement to The Observer, her Senior Policy Adviser,
Jake Sullivan, asserted that the nominee for the Democratic Party ‘values
a strong British voice in the EU’.20 Almost immediately after the Brexit
vote Clinton expressed her respect for the choice of the British people but
also ‘America’s steadfast commitment to the special relationship with
Britain and the transatlantic alliance with Europe’.21 On these grounds, it
becomes evident that – as a US President – Clinton will foster closer col-
laboration with the EU as it would be ‘dangerous and foolish’ for Wash-
ington to turn its back on Europe.22 As Joerg Wolf puts it, Clinton has
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been much more supportive of NATO and Europe than all the other presi-
dential candidates during the primaries.23 This approach mirrors her strong
anti-Russian stance and contradicts Trump’s promise to engage himself in
a personal diplomacy with President Vladimir Putin.
Clinton, however, is not particularly satisfied with Europe’s perfor-
mance in the fight against terrorism. From November 2015 she made it
clear that ‘European countries should have the flexibility to enhance their
border controls when circumstances warrant’.24 A few months later, in
March 2016, she went further in a speech she gave at Stanford University.
She encouraged the EU to do more in order to share the burden with the
US.25 This position could imply that Clinton might push European coun-
tries to invest more in defence and security, principally Germany.26 Subse-
quently, a Clinton presidency ‘could usher in a new era of deepening en-
gagement and cooperation, especially military-to-military’.27 For Europe
to respond in practice to such a call will constitute a challenge. But the
main difference from a presidency under Trump is that –under Clinton –
this response will have to be given in an orderly way and not amid ques-
tions on NATO’s future role and America’s commitment to its future op-
eration.
Last but not least, Clinton’s stance on TTIP is not clear. In 2012 she
hailed this transatlantic initiative regarding it an ‘economic NATO’.28
Nonetheless, during the pre-election campaign she has given the impres-
sion of not being able to resist Trump’s anti-globalisation rhetoric and de-
fend TTIP. Subsequently, she voiced serious criticism against it, promis-
ing to stop all trade deals jeopardizing American job positions, including
TPP.29 There are scholars such as Julia Gray, who attribute Clinton’s al-
leged U-turn to her will to attract more voters, and believe that the transat-
lantic trade policy is not, therefore, under serious threat.30 Even if this is
the case, Clinton will almost immediately suffer a dent to her credibility,
should she reembrace her 2012 rhetoric after the US presidential election.
A Way Forward
Looking towards the future, the EU needs to be prepared for two different
scenarios. The first is that of discontinuity and possibly a fresh crisis in
transatlantic relations, if Trump wins. And the second is that of continuity
but with some critical changes, if Clinton becomes the next US President.
Jeremy Shapiro nicely presents the way forward for Europe by seeing ei-
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ther an existential or an everyday challenge accordingly. He also recom-
mends that Brussels should begin to take more responsibility for its own
defence and build resilience.31 Lessons from history suggest a rather cau-
tious stance but the Franco-German commitment to bringing the Union
forward and strengthening it after Brexit could now be a springboard.
According to conventional wisdom the scenario of discontinuity and a
fresh crisis in transatlantic relations might be averted by Trump’s hypo-
thetical adjustment to reality. It is not a rare phenomenon for politicians to
invest in populism or different ideas during pre-election periods and to ex-
ercise a more orthodox policy after they assume power. Trump has already
started to reconsider or reformulate some of his controversial public re-
marks made in speeches and interviews. Nevertheless, such an adjustment
cannot be taken for granted. A billionaire winning the US presidency due
to his atypical political communication could be prepared to stick to some
of his pre-election arguments and make changes. The system of checks
and balances in the country imposes limitations on every president but
cannot prevent them from adding their personal stamp to foreign policy
and other issues.
From another perspective, the policies of the new US President vis-à-
vis Europe may also have a significant impact on the image of the latter in
America in a period during which Euroscepticism is on the rise. Recent
opinion poll data of the Pew Research Center show that although Ameri-
cans still consider Europe as important, they do not necessarily disagree
with Trump’s foreign policy vis-à-vis NATO and the EU. Specifically,
while 52 percent regard Europe as focal point in US foreign policy and 77
percent say being a member of NATO is good for their country, 37 per-
cent argue that this is more important to its other member states and only
15 percent to the US. Additionally, only half of the public, 52 percent,
believe that US ties with Europe are most important with the percentage of
young adults lower than this.32 Bruces Stokes, Director of global economic
attitudes at the Pew Research Center, describes this in Politico as a ‘grim
reminder that Europhiles could be a dying breed in the US.’33
Finally, having briefly presented the debate on the potential impact of
the US presidential election result on transatlantic relations, a reference to
the specific characteristics of the current era is required. In recent years,
especially after the outbreak of the financial crisis in both the US and the
EU, the attempt by several analysts as well as polling organisations to an-
ticipate political developments and predict public opinion shifts has not
been encouraging. It is therefore particularly risky to make safe assump-
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tions. All in all, the future course of transatlantic relations does not only
depend on the way Trump or Clinton will implement their approach to Eu-
rope but also on the implementation of their foreign policies overall. The
character of the US presidential election is global. This means that
Trump’s or Clinton’s policies vis-à-vis Russia, China, the Middle East etc.
will impact on Europe either directly or indirectly. The EU should not be
caught by surprise if it will soon have to make decisions on thorny issues
relevant to the unpredictable evolution of US-Russian and Sino-American
relations.
 
*George N. Tzogopoulos, CIFE Alumnus, is a journalist and media-poli-
tics expert. He is founder of chinaandgreece.com and the author of the
books US Foreign Policy in the European Media (IB Tauris 2012) and The
Greek Crisis in the Media (ashgate 2013).
 
References:
1. Talk by US Secretary of State John Kerry on the Future of Transat-
lantic Relations (video), 4 October 2016, Brussels, available at: http://
www.gmfus.org/events/us-secretary-state-john-kerry-future-transat-
lantic-relations [accessed October 2016].
2. Susi Dennison, Dina Pardijs and Jeremy Shapiro, ‘Fear and Loathing
on the Road to the US election’, Flash Scorecard, October 2016, avail-
able at: http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR191_-
_FEAR_AND_LOATHING_ON_THE_ROAD_TO_THE
_US_ELECTIONS_1143.pdf [accessed October 2016].
3. Pew Research Center website, ‘As Obama Years Draw to Close, Presi-




4. Patrick Donahue,‘Merkel Says She’s not Having Nightmares about




5. Aurelien Breeden, ‘France’s President Says Trump’s Excesses Make




trump.html [accessed October 2016].
6. Tim Hume and Eric Bradner, ‘Donald Trump: London Mayor Made
very Rude Statements about me’, 16 May 2016, available at: http://
edition.cnn.com/2016/05/16/politics/donald-trump-camer- on-khan/
[accessed October 2016].
7. George N. Tzogopoulos, ‘EU’s role Could be Undermined by Trump’,
26 May 2016, available at: http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/
985210.shtml [accessed October 2016].
8. Donald Trump website, Foreign Policy Speech, ’27 April 2016, avail-
able at: https://www.donaldjtrump.com/press-releases/donald-j.-
trump-foreign-policy-speech [accessed October 2016].
9. Caroline Davies, ‘Donald Trump: Brexit would not put UK at back of
Queue with US’, 15 May 2016, available at: https://
www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/may/15/eu-referendum-donald-
trump-brexit-uk-back-queue-us [accessed October 2016].
10. Ewen MacAskill, ‘Donald Trump Arrives in UK and hails Brexit Vote
as a Great Victory’, 24 June 2016, available at: https://
www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/jun/24/donald-trump-hails-eu-
referendum-result-as-he-arrives-in-uk [accessed October 2016].
11. Tim Hains. ‘Trump: NATO is Obsolete and Expensive, Doesn’t Have




12. Krishnadev Calamur, ‘NATO Shmato?’, 21 July 2016, available at:
http://www.theatlantic.com/news/archive/2016/07/trump-nato/492341/
[accessed October 2016].
13. Jacopo Barigazzi, ‘NATO Chief Counterattacks against Donald
Trump’, 27 September 2016, available at: http://www.politico.eu/arti-
cle/nato-chief-counterattacks-against- donald-trump-jens-stoltenberg/
[accessed October 2016].
14. Andrew Rettman, ‘France and Germany Propose EU Defence Union’,
12 September 2016, available at: https://euobserver.com/foreign/
135022 [accessed October 2016].
15. Daniel Fiott, ‘Modernising NATO’s Defence Infrastructure with EU
Funds’, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, vol. 58. no. 2, pp.
77-94.
Transatlantic relations and the US Presidential election
129
16. Judy Dempsey, ‘Trump, NATO and Europe’s Security’, 11 April 2016,
available at: http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/?fa=63292 [ac-
cessed October 2016].
17. Ivana Kottasova, ‘America’s Free Trade Deal with Europe is Dying ’,
4 May 2016, available at: http://money.cnn.com/2016/05/04/news/
economy/us-eu-trade-agreement-ttip-trump/ [accessed October 2016].
18. Jospeh J. Schatz and Benjamin Oreskes, ‘Hillary Clinton’s Pivot to
Europe: If the Former Secretary of State Wins the Election, Expect




19. Damian Paletta, ‘Clinton vs Trump: Where they Stand on Foreign Pol-
icy Issues’, available at: http://graphics.wsj.com/elections/2016/
donald-trump-hillary-clinton-on-foreign-policy/ [accessed October
2016].
20. Toby Helm and Daniel Boffey, ‘Hillary Clinton Urges Britain to Re-
main in the European Union’, 23 April 2016, available at: https://
www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/apr/23/hillary-clinton-britain-
should-stay-in-eu [accessed October 2016].




22. Elizabeth Chan, ‘Hillary Clinton Has a Real Plan to Defeat ISIS and




23. Joerg Wolf, ‘Clinton gives Atlanticist speech at the Pacific’, 26 March
2016, available at: http://atlanticreview.org/archives/1601-Clinton-
gives-Atlanticist-speech-at-the-Pacific.html [accessed October 2016].
24. Hillary Clinton website, ‘Outlining Plan to Defeat ISIS and Global
Terrorism, Clinton Says US Must Choose Resolve over Fear’, 19
November 2015, available at: https://hillaryspeeches.com/2015/11/19/
clinton-calls-for-tougher-efforts-against-isis/ [accessed October 2016].
25. Hillary Clinton website, Remarks on Counterterrorism at Stanford





26. Christopher S. Chivvis and Jana Puglierin, ‘Transatlantic Relations af-
ter Obama’, 14 October 2016, available at: http://www.rand.org/blog/
2016/10/transatlantic-relations-after-obama.html [accessed October
2016].
27. Julianne Smith and Rachel Rizzo, with Adam Twardowski, ‘US Elec-
tion Note: Defence Policy After 2016’, Chatham House Research Pa-
per, August 2016, available at: https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/
files/chathamhouse/publications/research/2016-08-16-us-election-
note-defence-smith-rizzo-twardowski.pdf [accessed October 2016].
28. Peter van Ham, ‘The Geopolitics of TTIP’, Clingendael Policy Brief,
October 2013, available at: http://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/
files/The%20Geopolitics%20of%20TTIP%20-%20Clingendael
%20Policy%20Brief.pdf [accessed October 2016].
29. Dan Roberts and Ryan Felton, ‘Trump and Clinton's Free Trade Re-
treat: A Pivotal Moment for the World's Economic Future’, 20 August
2016, available at: https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/
2016/aug/20/trump-clinton-free-trade-policies-tpp [accessed October
2016].
30. Julia Gray, ‘Despite their anti-trade rhetoric, Trump or Clinton would
do little to threaten trans-Atlantic trade policy’, 29 June 2016, avail-
able at: http://www.dahrendorf-forum.eu/despite-their-anti-trade-
rhetoric-trump-or-clinton-would-do-little-to-threaten-trans-atlantic-
trade-policy/ [accessed October 2016].
31. Jeremy Shapiro, ‘The Everyday and the Existential: How Clinton and
Trump Challenge Transatlantic Relations’, ECFR Policy Memo, Octo-
ber 2016, available at: http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR190_-
_THE_EVERYDAY_AND_THE_EXISTENTIAL2.pdf [accessed Oc-
tober 2016].
32. Bruce Stokes, ‘Don’t Listen to Donald Trump, the US still Values Eu-
rope’, 20 May 2016, available at: http://www.politico.eu/article/dont-
listen-to-donald-trump-united-states-still-value-europe-nato-barack-
obama-white-house-president-economy/ [accessed October 2016].
33. Ibid.
Transatlantic relations and the US Presidential election
131

Enjeux et défis du TAFTA
Jean-Claude Vérez*
Le Trans-Atlantic Free Trade Agreement (TAFTA) ou encore Transatlan-
tic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP)1entre l’Union européenne
(UE) et les Etats-Unis (EU) est un projet de partenariat plus ambitieux
qu’une zone de libre échange sans être aussi exigeant qu’un marché com-
mun ou qu’une union économique et monétaire (annexe 1). Le projet est
négocié depuis 2013. C’est le 13 février que B. Obama, H. Van Rompuy et
J. M. Barroso ont signé une déclaration relative à la négociation. Outre la
libéralisation des échanges, il convient de mettre en conformité les lois des
deux espaces économiques, les règlements et les procédures. Un mécanis-
me d’arbitrage est offert aux firmes qui, en cas de perte due à des modifi-
cations réglementaires décidées par la puissance publique, peuvent récla-
mer une compensation financière. Il n’est plus question de « se contenter
» d’échanger des biens et services libérés des droits de douane et des quo-
tas mais d’assurer aux sociétés transnationales des conditions commercia-
les communes aux deux parties. C’est la raison pour laquelle du côté
européen, des craintes existent quant aux importations américaines de cer-
tains produits tels les OGM, tandis que du côté américain, il sera plus dif-
ficile de refuser les importations de pommes françaises ou certains froma-
ges européens.
Nonobstant, d’une part, la décision de la nouvelle administration améri-
caine (qui vient de renoncer à l’accord d’intégration économique transpa-
cifique ou TPP, Trans-Pacific Partnership2, pourtant signé par le gouverne-
ment précédent) et, d’autre part, la décision européenne (hétérogène entre
les pays membres, dans un contexte politique troublé par le Brexit), il con-
vient de comprendre les enjeux et les défis d’un tel accord qui concerne-
rait deux des trois grandes puissances économiques et commerciales de la
mondialisation que sont l’UE et les Etats-Unis (au détriment de la troi-
sième qu’est la Chine).
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entre les deux espaces économiques que le débat est crucial : si elles sont plus contraignantes dans un des 
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publics. C’est en raison de ces nouvelles orientations qu’il existe des blocages du côté européen. 
 
S’il existe des points de blocage, il existe aussi des compromis entre les deux parties. Si elles convergent sur 
l’ouverture des marchés, à l’exception des services audiovisuels réclamée par la France, c’est à propos des 
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De part et d’autre de l’Atlantique, les réglementations sont parfois totalement opposées notamment dans le 
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une catégorie de produits. De fait, des conflits sont prévisibles et la question est de mettre en place une 
procédure pour les régler. Du côté UE, une cour de Justice composée de professionnels et de juristes nommés 
par les Etats permettrait d’en- gager les procédures de résolution des litiges tandis que les EU réclament que les 
Etats compensent les firmes si celles-ci venaient à perdre de la profitabilité du fait d’une évolution des 
réglementations. C’est donc au niveau des Etats européens que les firmes américaines pourraient s’adresser, 
faisant fi des statuts pourtant bien différents des deux parties, ainsi que de leur juridiction respective. 
 
Si l’accord est un jour entériné, les firmes européennes auront le même pouvoir vis à vis de l’Etat américain. La 
question majeure ne porte pas ici sur la réciprocité des règles mais davantage sur le principe puisqu’une société 
transnationale pourrait poursuivre un Etat en justice en cas de perte financière. Outre le fait que de nombreuses 
causes peuvent expliquer les pertes financières, il convient de bien mesurer les conséquences qu’engendrerait 
un recours de la part d’une firme victime (avec ou sans guillemets) : serait-ce une remise ne cause de l’Etat de 
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d’exercer un peu plus leur pression sur les décideurs publics ? 
 
Parmi les points contestés, il y a ce que les experts qualifient de « deep integration », ou intégration profonde 
qui correspond pour Adda à « l’uniformisation des règles et des normes qui déterminent les conditions de 
production et d’écoulement des biens et services sur les marchés des deux parties » (p. 36). Autant 
l’harmonisation des normes techniques pourrait en effet contraindre certaines firmes à revoir leurs conditions 
de production, autant cela vaudrait pour les deux parties avec à la clé, des nouvelles normes induisant des 
externalités tantôt négatives, tantôt positives. Les opérations commerciales seraient facilitées, les démarches 
simplifiées, les convergences réglementaires plus vraisemblables mais tout cela impliquerait en amont des coûts 
L’enjeu majeur est de favoriser le libre échange, le défi majeur est que les
règles du jeu soient les mêmes pour tous. Si, par exemple, une firme A in-
stallée dans un ou plusieurs pays, bénéficie d’économies d’échelle depuis
plusieurs années, il est difficile à sa concurrente B, issue d’un autre pays,
de rivaliser. Avant d’accepter le libre échange, il est probable qu’il faille
protéger quelques temps la firme B pour qu’à son tour, elle puisse aussi
réaliser des économies d’échelle. Dans le cas du TAFTA, c’est à propos de
l’harmonisation des normes entre les deux espaces économiques que le
débat est crucial : si elles sont plus contraignantes dans un des deux es-
paces, de fait, elles pénaliseront les entreprises domestiques de l’espace
concerné. Et, a posteriori, les américains chercheraient à imposer leurs
normes aux législateurs européens (infra).
Le TAFTA soulèverait un autre doute : derrière la politique commercia-
le libre échangiste recherchant le meilleur rapport coût-bénéfice, se cache-
raient aussi les pressions stratégiques d’acteurs différenciés tels les lob-
bies, aux intérêts particuliers et opposés. De fait, il est presque ridicule de
croire que tous les acteurs concernés vont respecter la règle du libre
échange, bien qu’ils s’en réclament. Dans l’accord ici en jeu, le défi est de
créer une vaste zone de libre échange en éliminant les tarifs douaniers re-
stants, sans doute pour résister à la ontée de la Chine. Mais il s’agit aussi
d’ouvrir les marchés publics respectifs, d’harmoniser les normes techni-
ques, de parvenir à une coopération réglementaire et, in fine, de trouver les
modalités d  régler les litiges, quitte à ce que les firmes rec urent à la
justice pour contrecarrer les réglementations des pouvoirs publics. C’est
en raison de ces nouvelles orientations qu’il xiste des blocages du côté
européen.
S’il existe des poi ts de blocage, il xiste aus i des comprom s e tre les
deux parties. Si elles c nverg nt sur l’ uverture des marchés, à l’excepti-
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on des services audiovisuels réclamée par la France, c’est à propos des
normes, des conflits (et de leur résolution) et de l’accès aux données per-
sonnelles qu’il existe des divergences. De part et d’autre de l’Atlantique,
les réglementations sont parfois totalement opposées notamment dans le
domaine alimentaire : on a cité les OGM, mais on peut citer également le
recours (ou non) aux pesticides dans l’agriculture ou le refus américain de
considérer le Champagne comme un produit de terroir et non comme une
catégorie de produits. De fait, des conflits sont prévisibles et la question
est de mettre en place une procédure pour les régler. Du côté UE, une cour
de Justice composée de professionnels et de juristes nommés par les Etats
permettrait d’engager les procédures de résolution des litiges tandis que
les EU réclament que les Etats compensent les firmes si celles-ci venaient
à perdre de la profitabilité du fait d’une évolution des réglementations.
C’est donc au niveau des Etats européens que les firmes américaines pour-
raient s’adresser, faisant fi des statuts pourtant bien différents des deux
parties, ainsi que de leur juridiction respective.
Si l’accord est un jour entériné, les firmes européennes auront le même
pouvoir vis à vis de l’Etat américain. La question majeure ne porte pas ici
sur la réciprocité des règles mais davantage sur le principe puisqu’une so-
ciété transnationale pourrait poursuivre un Etat en justice en cas de perte
financière. Outre le fait que de nombreuses causes peuvent expliquer les
pertes financières, il convient de bien mesurer les conséquences qu’en-
gendrerait un recours de la part d’une firme victime (avec ou sans guille-
mets) : serait-ce une remise en cause de l’Etat de droit? Serait-ce une re-
mise en cause de la souveraineté nationale? Serait-ce une occasion pour
les lobbies d’exercer un peu plus leur pression sur les décideurs publics?
Parmi les points contestés, il y a ce que les experts qualifient de « deep
integration », ou intégration profonde qui correspond pour Adda à « l’uni-
formisation des règles et des normes qui déterminent les conditions de
production et d’écoulement des biens et services sur les marchés des deux
parties » (p. 36). Autant l’harmonisation des normes techniques pourrait
en effet contraindre certaines firmes à revoir leurs conditions de produc-
tion, autant cela vaudrait pour les deux parties avec à la clé, des nouvelles
normes induisant des externalités tantôt négatives, tantôt positives. Les
opérations commerciales seraient facilitées, les démarches simplifiées, les
convergences réglementaires plus vraisemblables mais tout cela impli-
querait en amont des coûts supplémentaires aux fabricants s’ils devaient
modifier en partie leurs chaînes de production.
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Sur un plan strictement comptable, le surcroît de PIB pour les deux par-
tenaires est estimé par le Centre d’études prospectives et d’informations
internationales (CEPII, 2013) à 0,3% du PIB à l’horizon 2025, soit un taux
un peu inférieur à celui estimé en 2013 par la Commission européenne :
0,5%. Les exportations EU augmenteraient davantage que les exportations
UE : 10% contre 8%. L’estimation relative au PIB peut sembler dérisoire,
celle relative au commerce extérieur l’est moins. On notera que ces per-
spectives concernent d’un côté un grand pays, tandis que de l’autre, elles
touchent 27 pays dont 19 membres de la zone euro. Le libre échange (ou
le protectionnisme) impacte différemment les pays selon qu’ils soient
grands ou petits. C’est la raison pour laquelle les 27 ne sont pas unanimes.
L’Allemagne est sans doute le pays qui profiterait le plus de l’accord du
fait de son modèle de croissance et de ses spécialisations à l’international
(dont l’automobile et les machines outils).
Il convient également de noter l’impact de l’accord sur la création
d’emplois. On peut admettre que la concurrence accrue induira une baisse
des prix et une hausse du pouvoir d’achat, toutes choses égales par ail-
leurs. Des dépenses de consommation supplémentaires peuvent soutenir la
croissance et réduire le chômage. Pour la fondation allemande Bertes-
lmann (2013)3, entre 342 000 et 1 million d’emplois seraient créés dans
l’UE à long terme. Ces prévisions doivent être considérées avec prudence.
L’objectif fixé par ailleurs dans le partenariat tient à protéger les con-
sommateurs et l’environnement. Une meilleure prévention des risques per-
mettrait de fixer des normes reconnues des deux côtés. À n’en pas douter,
la bataille sera vigoureuse, notamment depuis l’arrivée de la nouvelle ad-
ministration américaine dont la conception des normes est plutôt « légère
». Moins les contraintes sont nombreuses, plus le business est aisé. Et en
cas de désaccord quant à l’application ou au respect des normes, mieux
vaut entendre les chefs d’entreprise qui sont les seuls à créer de la riches-
se. Quant aux impacts supposés négatifs des activités humaines et du
modèle productiviste sur l’environnement, les progrès techniques de de-
main finiront par trouver les solutions adéquates. L’accord doit également
faciliter la reconnaissance pleine et entière aux EU des Indications géogra-
phiques (IG) européennes (Appellations d’origine protégées). Ce serait
pour des pays comme la France une décision importante pour lutter contre
des cas d’usurpation de noms ou de marques déposées et espérer, en con-
trepartie, une hausse de ses exportations.
Quelle que soit la décision entre européens et américains, un tel accord
de coopération va à l’encontre du multilatéralisme. Les grands acteurs du
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commerce mondial privilégient les solutions bilatérales comme s’ils vou-
laient se protéger entre eux mais en écartant le plus grand nombre. Pour le
moment, l’administration Trump a franchi une étape supplémentaire puis-
qu’elle ne cesse de rappeler l’importance qu’elle accorde aux produits ma-
de in EU, arguant que le protectionnisme est plus que nécessaire face à la
Chine ou autres pays concurrents. Si on y ajoute les atermoiements
européens, on comprend que le projet est gelé pour un temps (long?) mais
cela ne change rien quant à la nature du partenariat, à ses ambitions et à
ses interrogations. Pour les EU, il s’agit avant tout de pénétrer encore da-
vantage le marché européen dont la solvabilité est suffisamment élevée
pour en faire un objectif majeur. Pour les pays de l’UE, c’est peut-être
l’occasion de prendre un rôle majeur dans l’économie mondiale et d’éviter
que les replis nationaux et protectionnistes ne l’emportent, entraînant un
peu plus son déclassement programmé.
 
Jean-Claude Vérez est économiste, maitre de conférences habilité à diri-
ger des recherches à l’Université d’Artois. Il enseigne à l’Institut
Européen – European Institute depuis 2005.
Annexe 1 : Les étapes de l’intégration régionale
Le tableau suivant retrace les étapes de l’intégration régionale, inspirée de
la typologie établie dès 1961 par B. Balassa. Nous rappelons que ces
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The Risks of Trumpism
Anna Dimitrova*
Donald Trump’s stunning victory over ex-Secretary of State Hillary Clin-
ton in the 2016 US Presidential race has rocked America’s political life
and pulled down the pillars of the international liberal order, thus an-
nouncing, some commentators claim, the long-predicted break-up of the
Pax Americana.1 While political analysts are still struggling to imagine
how the “Trump era”2 will pan out, the term “Trumpism” has made its
way, not only to the forefront of media attention, but also to the core of the
current public and academic debate on President Trump’s uniquely brash
and impulsive style of politics, as well as his chaotic and reckless foreign
policy strategy, or rather the lack of such.3 Although “Trumpism” has be-
come a very fashionable concept, a closer look at its different interpreta-
tions will allow us to reveal the risks which lay behind it, risks which
should not be ignored.
Trumpism: an anti-political rhetoric?
According to this interpretation, Trumpism is not a coherent set of pol-
icies, neither is it an ideology.4 Instead, it is seen as a provocative, anti-
politically-correct style and strategy of communication intricately linked
to Trump’s narcissistic, egocentric and macho personality, his controver-
sial reputation as a self-made real estate mogul and tough decision-maker,
and his shocking behaviour, nourished by his TV reality-show celebrity.
Celebrity, as some commentators underline, is one of the main features of
Trumpism because it has empowered it in at least two ways.5
On the one hand, Trump has had no need to cultivate a positive image
through the media because his celebrity preceded him. This explains why
despite the numerous blunders made during his campaign6, which would
have been fatal for any other mainstream candidate, his political image not
only survived but was reaffirmed by his consistent dismantling of political
norms. Neither Trump’s insults directed at his political opponents, nor his
blatant ignorance about foreign policy issues displayed on numerous occa-
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sions, could spoil his image. An example of this is an interview given to
ABC in July 2016 in which he asserted that President Putin was not going
into Ukraine before being reminded by journalists that this had already
happened and the result was the annexation of Crimea. Contrary to con-
ventional wisdom, Trump’s capacity for breaking taboos proved to be very
appealing to his voters who took it as proof that he was a real outsider to
the Washington elites and politics.
On the other hand, Trump’s celebrity also helped him attract those vot-
ers traditionally disengaged from politics citizens whose disappointment
and anger with the established economic and political system found its ex-
pression in Trump’s stark rejection of this system.
Hence, Trumpism is also seen as “a personality-fueled movement”7
driven by the growing popular rage against the corrupt establishment and
its incapacity to fix the US economy and strengthen America’s role in the
world. This movement has been mostly embraced by working-class,
white, angry voters who feel exposed to the economic and existential inse-
curity caused by the downsizing effects of globalization8, who “took Mr.
Trump seriously but not literally, even as his critics took him literally but
not seriously”.9 This explains to a large extent why although Trump’s pub-
lic discourses have been confused and contradictory, “coming as they do
from a narcissistic media manipulator with no clear underlying ide-
ology”10, they have nevertheless attracted a lot of Americans for whom
Trump dares say what lots of people think but do not dare say out loud.
The success of Trump’s political communication is also related to the
stark linguistic and substantive simplicity of his often extreme ideas, in
line with his insistence that he addresses ordinary Americans rather than
the elites.11
However, the risk of such a style of communication is that it could easi-
ly turn into an empty antipolitical rhetoric and demagogy and thus be
harmful to US politics and democracy.
Trumpism: a unique form of populism?
In contrast with the above-presented definition, the second interpretation
of Trumpism depicts it as a populist ideology on the radical right of polit-
ics.12
More specifically, Trumpism is defined as “a particular kind of Ameri-
can populism composed of a mish-mash of overt patriotism, economic na-
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tionalism, along with a vague commitment to the middle class and an ag-
gressive but indefinite foreign policy.”13 The concept of “populism” has
received numerous definitions and interpretations and has long been at the
core of political analysis and debate, even more so since the Brexit vote
and Donald Trump’s election as President. Cas Mudde’s classical defini-
tion of populism presents it as a “thin-centred ideology” which juxtaposes
the “pure people” against “the corrupt elite” and holds that politics should
be an expression of the “general will” (volonté générale) of the people14.
Drawing on this definition, Inglehart and Norris conclude that populism
rests upon three fundamental ideas: anti-establishment, authoritarianism
and nativism.15
Populism is also considered to be “a monist and moralist ideology”16
because it draws a normative distinction between the concept of “people”,
seen as “pure” and “virtuous”, as opposed to the “corrupt elite”, including
governmental officials, big business, multinational companies and the
mass media. Although the “people” is at the core of populist ideology, this
concept remains vaguely defined, either as a purely rhetorical tool that is
not associated with any particular group, or as a reference to a certain so-
cial class.17 Trump’s speeches are no exception in his use of this elusive
concept, most often underpinned in such “boilerplate” terms as “working
families”, “our middle class”, and, of course, the “American people” – a
stark contrast to the vividness of his attacks, whether on Mexicans and
Muslims or his political rivals”18. A perfect example of how Trump em-
ploys populist rhetoric is in his Inaugural Address qualified by commenta-
tors as “populist in a way we haven’t seen in many years, if ever” as well
as “the most bellicose inaugural address ever given”.19 Instead of talking
about renewal and addressing his message to all Americans, as previous
Presidents have done in their inaugural addresses, Trump openly attacks
the Washington establishment by claiming that he is giving power back to
the American people while at the same time embracing nationalist and
protectionist ideas: “We will follow two simple rules: Buy American and
Hire American”. Additionally, he pledges a new “America first” vision
and announces that he will “eradicate completely from the face of the
Earth” “Radical Islamic Terrorism” considered as the most dangerous
threat for US national interests and security.
Furthermore, by stressing the importance of “ordinary people” as op-
posed to the “others”, populism puts forward ideas related to nativism and
xenophobic nationalism, as evidenced in Trump’s speeches. The latter are
loaded with xenophobic messages aimed at depicting the “others” as a
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threat to the jobs of American workers thus provoking “feelings of resent-
ment and disdain intermingled with bits of fear, hatred and anger.”20 Al-
ready in his first days in office, President Trump started turning some of
his nationalist promises into reality. At least two examples could be given
here. The first one is the Executive Order (EO) of January 25, 2017 re-
garding “Border Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvements”
which aims to fight illegal immigration and drug trafficking by construct-
ing a “physical wall” along the US-Mexican border. Signed two days later,
another Executive Order “Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist
Entry into the United States”, also called by the media “the Muslim ban”,
proved to be even more controversial than the first one and has spurred a
lot of debate and protests throughout the US. In fact, this EO bans all im-
migrants and visa holders from seven majority-Muslim countries, namely
Libya, Iran, Iraq, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen, from entering the US
for 90 days. Furthermore, it stops all refugees from entering the country
for 120 days, except Syrian refugees, who are banned indefinitely. Under
the populist banner “Make America Great Again” these two policies em-
body the fear of foreigners, typical for nativism, the latter combining anti-
immigrant sentiment with conspiracy theories about immigrants.
Additionally, some analysts also maintain that this style of conspiracy-
mongering brings Trumpism close to Bircherism. The latter refers to the
ideology of the ultra conservative far-right advocacy group named the
John Birch Society (JBS) and founded in 1958.21 Indeed, Trumpism and
Bircherism share common features such as the focus on an “America first”
vision and Americanism instead of globalism. While the JBS has been
working to get the US out of the United Nations for more than 50 years,
Trump is similarly putting into question the efficiency of US participation
in multilateral agreements and international organizations by declaring his
will to withdraw the US from NAFTA, seen as a sovereignty-destroying
trade deal, as well as from NATO, characterized by him as an “obsolete
alliance”. Trumpism and Bircherism also have in common the rejection of
the establishment and the fight against illegal immigration. Trumpism is
thus directed not only at Washington’s political elites, but also at a wide
range of others – Muslims, Hispanics, women, Chinese, Mexicans, Euro-
peans, Arabs, immigrants, refugees, – all seen as a threat for “ordinary”
Americans.
While some authors, like Robert Kagan, prefer not to associate the term
“ideology” with “Trumpism” and rather speak of the “Trump phe-
nomenon”, there seems to be a consensus on the idea that “the phe-
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nomenon that Trump has created and now leads has become something
larger than him, and something far more dangerous.”22 Trumpism is
grounded in the politics of exclusion, directed at “a wide range of ‘the oth-
ers’ whom he depicts either as a threat or as objects of derision.”23 More-
over, Kagan contends that such a nationalist xenophobic approach could
be very dangerous because it creates “mobocracy”, that is to say, the un-
leashing of popular passions against the “others” which might imperil
democracy.24
Trumpism: running government like a business?
There is at least one more facet of Trumpism that deserves some attention.
It is one that interprets Trumpism as a unique vision of statecraft based on
the idea that government could be run like a business. Of course, this idea
has already gained some popularity with Republicans but has never been
fully put into practice in the way President Trump obviously intends to do.
One only needs to look at Trump’s choice of cabinet members to realize
that most of them have no government experience. Some of them come
from big business and a few of them are even billionaires. Particular ex-
amples are Trump’s Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, ex-CEO of Exxon
Mobil, who owns $151 million in company stock, known for his close
business ties to Russian president Putin. Then there is Secretary of Trea-
sury Steven Mnuchin, former economist at Goldman Sachs, named “the
foreclosure king”, expected to implement the largest tax reform since Rea-
gan, and Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross, named “the king of
bankruptcy”, billionaire investor opposed to free-trade agreements.25
The problem of assimilating statecraft with business and deal-making
is, however, to turn upside down the entire logic of the relationship be-
tween the private and the public sector in so far as business is based on
profit and efficiency whereas government agencies and departments have
not much to do with profit, their main role being that of generating com-
mon social values. In other words, “not everything that is profitable is of
social value and not everything of social value is profitable.”26 Moreover,
politics cannot be simply treated as a business deal because it is more than
a series of trade-offs. Politics, especially in the field of foreign policy,
needs a purposeful set of concepts laying down a clear vision, i. e. a
“grand strategy”, relating to a country’s role in international affairs, as
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well as its interests, its goals and the means to be used by the government
to achieve these goals.
Whether Trumpism is seen as a unique style of political communica-
tion, or as a populist ideology, or even as a new vision of governing along
the lines of business practice, one could hardly disagree that all these dif-
ferent forms of Trumpism pose many hidden risks for people, democracy
and politics both inside and outside the US. To put it another way, Trump-
ism in its essence is a very risky and dangerous experiment currently run-
ning in the US and is aimed at achieving three goals: 1) To break down the
whole political system that has been established in the country for many
years now and replace it with an anti-political demagogy; 2) To install
populism and xenophobic nativism as a new dominant ideology; 3) To im-
plement an “America first” strategy, based on economic protectionism, ex-
treme homeland security, extreme military strength and “amoral transac-
tionalism”27 seeking to replace multilateralism and international institu-
tions with bilateral agreements based on a win-win rationale. The real
question we should be asking today, then, is no longer “How to define
Trumpism?” but “How to control the risks caused by Trumpism?”.
 
Anna Dimitrova*, CIFE Alumna, Associate Professor and Researcher in
International affairs, ESSCA School of Management, Paris.
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Only the dead have seen the end of the wari – How to make
sense of Turkey’s involvement in Syria1
Sebastian Franzkowiak*
On August 24 2016, Turkey launched its military operation Euphrates
Shield, crossing the Syrian border to take hold of Jarablus, the Islamic
State’s last direct access point to the Turkish border. While officially pre-
sented as a manoeuvre against the Islamic State, the actual motivation
might have been to get there before the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic
Forces (SDF) acquired yet another territory close to the Turkish border.
For Ankara, Kurdish irredentism and autonomy deliberations have been a
spectre to be restrained throughout the history of the Turkish Republic.
Having seen the Syrian Kurds benefit from the Syrian civil war and even
gaining international support from the United States and Russia, the
prospect of a de facto Kurdish autonomous region along the Turkish bor-
der has become a real concern for Turkey.
Certainly, it is not the first time Turkey and Syria have been at odds
over the “Kurdish Question”2 . In October 1998, Turkey and Syria were on
the brink of war, following an intensification of clashes and casualties be-
tween Turkish forces and the Kurdistan Worker Party (PKK). Turkey ac-
cused Syria of providing a safe haven for the PKK and its leader Öcalan,
yet military intervention was avoided as Turkey and Syria agreed to sign
the Adana Agreementii. This accord established de facto cooperation be-
tween Damascus and Ankara against the militant Kurdish forces as well as
furthering efforts for greater Turkish-Syrian cooperation. While this anec-
dote illustrates that the cross-border character of the “Kurdish Question”
has at times been a flashpoint or anchor for cooperation between Ankara
and Damascus, it does not explain why Turkey chose to intervene in Syria
five years after the beginning of the Syrian conflict. This policy brief anal-
yses the current Turkish engagement in Syria in an attempt to shed light




Since the AKP took office in 2002, Ankara has pursued a foreign policy
vision of “zero problems with neighbours”. Invoked by former foreign and
Prime Minister Davutoğlu, Turkey believed in an historical responsibility
to forge ties and expand its influence over the states of the former Ot-
toman Empire.iii Apart from historical bonds, Islam as a shared religion
should be the means to form cordial relations with Turkey’s Middle East-
ern neighbours. When the Arab uprisings started in 2011, Ankara was
quick to promote the democratic protests – and some even looked to
Turkey as a model for a successful symbiosis between Islam and democ-
racy. In Syria, Turkey’s foreign policy elite was eager to shape the up-
rising from the beginning. Syria had become the ‘poster boy’iv of Turkish
foreign policy, including high-level cooperation and economic integration.
However, as the Syrian revolution dissolved into a volatile civil war, the
conflict environment meant that this policy increasingly backfired, com-
plicating and even jeopardising Turkish national interests.
It is a story of different political strategies and unpredictable
turnarounds, ranging from political dialogue with the Al-Asad regime in
early 2011 to an outright military escalation with “boots on the ground” in
Syria in late 2016. Turkey had to realise that Al-Asad would not yield
power, regardless of relentless Turkish diplomatic efforts. Regime-change
in Syria became the top priority of the AKP-leadership, precluding any
possibility of negotiation with the Syrian leadership. However, breaking
with Damascus did not mean a solution to the Syrian crisis. International
diplomacy was blocked – the international community was increasingly
split into a pro- and contra-Al-Asad camp. A game-changer was Russia’s
intervention in 2015, re-tuning the balance against the Turkish-backed op-
position groups. In late 2015, Turkey did not have an ambassador in Syria,
Israel or Egypt, it recalled its envoys from Moscow and Bagdad and in-
creasingly differed with the United States on the question of who to sup-
port in the Syrian quagmire. Add to this the increasing tensions with the
EU and differences over the Kurdish Question and Turkey found itself
quite isolated in the region it had tried to shape. While policy makers ini-
tially spoke of a ‘precious loneliness’v that would pay off in a matter of




A new start in 2016
The major question that of course arises is whether Turkish foreign policy
in Syria will change following the attempted coup d’état last July. Turkey
bemoaned the fact that none of its traditional allies had positioned itself
with Ankara in the immediate aftermath of the coup. Instead, Russia was
one of the first countries to stand by Turkey. To infer from this that
Turkey would now cherish deeper relations with Russia over the West is
somewhat far-fetched. However, one can witness a re-configuration of
Ankara’s Syria policy, culminating in the military intervention in late Au-
gust. But let us examine this process in more detail.
The actual re-calibration of Turkish foreign policy already started in
June 2016, one month before the coup d’état. New Prime Minister
Yildirim announced Turkey’s priority as “to increase its friends, and de-
crease its enemies” – ironically a phrase in line with his predecessor
Davutoğlu and the policy of zero problems.vi One of the first signs of this
new approach was a ‘normalisation’ of relations with Israel, Egypt and
Russia. Crucially, Erdoğan sent a letter to Putin apologising for the shoot-
ing of the Russian fighter jet(s) in late November 2015 – the controversy
which had stirred the deterioration of Russian-Turkish relations over the
previous months. Underlining the high costs of non-cooperation, particu-
larly in economic terms, Moscow and Ankara rekindled their relationship.
Not without benefitting Russian interests of course, as some observers saw
this as a strategic move to pull Turkey further away from its traditional
Western allies. In any case, reinvigorated relations with Russia coincided
with the acceptance that peace in Syria does not necessarily require
regime-change in Damascus.vii
A new calculus: down with the Kurds
Regardless of whether the ousting of Davutoğlu was actually important for
triggering a new foreign policy orientation, it is fair to say that Turkey has
become more ‘pragmatic instead of idealistic’viii. Arguably, the “calculus
has shifted” and the new AKP discourse is no longer oriented against the
devil Syrian regime but against Kurdish expansionism in Syria.ix The
spectre of an autonomous Kurdish entity along the Turkish-Syrian border
is a major driver of Turkey’s Syria policy – particularly because it is di-
rectly linked to Turkey’s domestic Kurdish concerns.
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Briefly put, the Syrian Kurds made a sort of non-aggression pact with
the Al-Asad-regime in July 2012. In return for withdrawing regime troops
from Northern Syria, the Kurds were granted a de facto authority over
these regionsx. Effectively, the Democratic Union Party (PYD3) and its
armed counterpart, the Popular Defense Committees (YPG) quickly
gained the upper hand as the most dominant Kurdish forces in Syria.xi In
November 2013, they proclaimed the self-declared autonomous region of
Rojava. In the beginning, Ankara did not really fear the Syrian Kurds as
Rojava’s three cantons Efrin, Kobani and Jazira were non-contingent en-
claves along the Syrian-Turkish border. Since 2014, things have changed,
however. The 2014 battle of Kobani between the Kurdish forces and the
Islamic State exposed Turkey’s ambivalent position. Turkish soldiers were
literally sitting and watching from their tanks on Turkey’s side of the bor-
der as severe clashes between Kurds and Islamists happened a few metres
further on Syrian territory.
Of course this intensified tensions and mutual suspicions between
Ankara and both Syrian and Turkish Kurds, who bemoaned that Turkey
would indirectly support ISIS to curb Kurdish expansionism in Syria.xii
Ankara stayed mostly silent and waited while the US-led international
coalition conducted air strikes in Kobani. AKP officials stressed that their
hands were bound because at the same time ISIS held 50 Turkish hostages
in Mossul. However, at no point did Ankara deny its reluctance to come to
the aid of the Kurdish forces who they equated with adherents to the
PKK.xiii It is from this point onward that Ankara prioritised its national
(security) interests over the larger vision of finding a solution to the Syrian
conflict.
For the Syrian Kurds, preserving Kobani from ISIS was a great success.
Not only could they maintain their authority over the majority-Kurdish
Syrian regions, more significantly the YPG gained international credit as
the most effective force in the fight against ISIS. With international sup-
port, the PYD managed to capture the border town of Tal Abyad in sum-
mer 2015. In so doing, they effectively linked the autonomous cantons of
Kobani and Jazira, creating a vast Kurdish-dominated region along the
border.xiv
Why is Kurdish expansionism considered a greater threat by Turkey
than the Islamic State? Turkey saw ISIS as a “recent and potentially tem-
porary threat”xv particularly as long as the Islamic State did not pose a di-
rect threat to Turkish national security. Things were different with the
PKK, however. In the eyes of the Kurdish militants, ISIS’ July 2015 bomb
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attack in Suruc, killing mainly pro-Kurdish activists, was the final evi-
dence that the AKP government tolerated the Islamic State in those Turk-
ish areas dominated by the Kurds. Subsequently, the PKK resumed its pol-
icy of violence, committing a series of terrorist attacks against the Turkish
state and civilians as of summer 2015. Simultaneously, Ankara’s fear of
an autonomous Kurdish region along the southern border with Syria was
tangible, owing to both Turkey’s traditional objection to Kurdish indepen-
dence and the fear that giving assistance to the PYD might translate into
assisting the PKK. Taken to its extreme, AKP elites feared that “the suc-
cess of their brethren might embolden Turkish Kurds to seek greater au-
tonomy, and could engender the formation of a united Kurdish front that
encompasses southeastern Turkey, western Iraq and northern Syria”.xvi
In 2016, things are still different…
Turkey in 2016 is certainly a different country to how it was only a few
months ago. Three major developments have had an impact on the current
state of Turkey’s Syria policy. First, the Islamic State has attacked Turkish
territory in a series of attacks during the last twelve months. This has
sharpened the perception of being under threat on the part of Turkish offi-
cials, who had hitherto underestimated the threat posed by Turkey’s rela-
tively lax border policxvii. Second, the Kurdish peace process was a failure
last year, leading to a renewed downward spiral of violence and civil-war-
like clashes in south- eastern Turkey. Third, the recent coup d’état was a
major blowback to the stability of both state and military institutions in
Turkey. The continuous purges affect Turkey’s capacity to act, including
in its foreign relations. How does all this play out on the ground in Syria?
A good case in point is the recent Euphrates Shield mission, launched in
late August 2016 by the Turkish military.
Euphrates Shield – lessons learned from Jarablus
With Tal Abyad gone, the Islamic State’s only remaining direct access
point to the Turkish border was Jarablus, a city on the banks of the Eu-
phrates. Jarablus served as the Islamic State’s main “smug- gling and trade
hub in northern Syria”.xviii From the Kurdish perspective, capturing
Jarablus would be a symbolic step towards establishing a connection with
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the last remaining enclave of Efrin in the North- west. Aware of this,
Turkey got nervous when Kurd- ish-led forces crossed the Euphrates west-
ward in May 2016 as part of the Manbij operation, a US-sup- ported Kur-
dish mission to re-capture the city of Manbij from IS forces.
The recent developments are illustrative of a wider schism in the US-
Turkish relationship, as the Ameri- cans continue to rely on Kurdish SDF
forces instead of Turkish-backed Arab rebel forces. The Americans fear
being dragged into a confrontation with Al-Asad groups while Turkey
does not want any cooperation with a group they deem to be ‘terrorists’.xix
Eventually, the United States had to show some understanding for
Turkey’s attitude as a NATO ally. Likewise, the Kurds needed to comply
with calls to move behind Euphrates borders to maintain US military sup-
port. Vice-President Biden visited Turkey and urged the Kurds that they
“cannot, will not, and under no circumstances will get American support if
they do not keep their commitment”.xx In the face of mounting domestic
pressures and the growing Kurdish insurgency at home, Turkey decided to
send its own troops, effectively constituting the first foreign force in Syria
to deploy “troops on the ground”. The Turkish forces aimed to assist Turk-
ish-backed FSA forces in their fight against ISIS, and following the suc-
cessful capture of Jarablus from the extremists, government advisor Kalin
claimed: “the myth that the YPG is the only effective force fighting
against DAESH has completely collapsed”, thereby indirectly criticising
US support for the Kurds.xxi
Officially, the AKP’s goal was to ensure “border security and Syria’s
territorial integrity while supporting the international US-led coalition
against the Islamic state”.xxii Cooperation with the US was thus a key pil-
lar of the Euphrates Shield mission, yet as several observers note, this was
based on a mutual agreement: in exchange for cooperation in fighting the
Islamic State, the US would grant the “Euphrates red line”, implying
keeping the Kurdish forces east of the river. Thus, while the official man-
date was to fight back ISIS, one can equally infer that Turkey performed a
pre-emptive strike before the Kurds reached Jarablus. AKP advisor
Ibrahim Kalin’s statements are very straightforward in this regard: “the
Democratic Union Party (PYD) and its armed wing, the YPG, are seeking
to move into areas fled by DAESH and create conditions on the ground to
grab more land. Turkey defends Syria's territorial integrity against the
PKK propaganda and its supporters in the West and will not allow a PKK-
led statelet along its border”.xxiii
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This discourse reveals the general tendency of the AKP discourse since
the failed Kurdish peace process in 2015: renowned Turkish journalist
Mustafa Arkyol compares the AKP’s position on the Kurds to the right-
wing drift in Israel following the failed Oslo Peace Process in 2000: “We
tried peace with these terrorists, the common logic in both cases read,
“and saw that they only understand through force.”xxiv In any case, Turkey
was aiming to be well-positioned in a potential post-ISIS environment in
Syria. Allowing the Syrian Kurds a free hand in such a scenario was not
part of Ankara’s equation.
Where does the coup d’état come in? At first glance, one might argue
that starting a military operation in another country is an absurdity follow-
ing the purges of thousands of officials. Authors agree that the military has
been weakened by the post-coup purges, losing effectiveness and cohesion
maybe even for years to come. Mc Learyxxv accentuates that the vacuum
in the higher ranks of the military is particularly alarming for both Turkey
and NATO, “in a major NATO ally that is already under strain from ter-
rorist attacks, a huge population of refugees, and a war next door in Syr-
ia”. However, the decision to send troops abroad at this point could have
been facilitated by the climate of post-coup reprisals: first, Turkey might
have felt emboldened to act unilaterally by playing the ‘Gülen Card’. Ac-
cordingly, the US would not object to Turkey’s military move in the face
of recent accusations about playing host to Gülen and conspiracies with
regard to the coup d’état xxvi.4 Second, by sending the Turkish infantry into
battle, Erdoğan could show that “he was in form command of the armed
forces… and also deflect attention from the turmoil of Turkey’s domestic
politics”.xxvii It is a paradoxical situation: The coup d’état allowed Turkey
to “play a more adventurous role in the region, by giving troops a fight
outside Turkey, and making those irredentist visions that much harder to
achieve”. xviii
Conclusion: what lies ahead?
A recent article in the Economist summarises that the Euphrates Shield
mission allowed Turkish troops and their proxies to take control of an area
of more than 90 km between Jarablus and Azaz along the Syrian bor-
der.xxix While not really the “safe zone” Ankara had dreamed of in the be-
ginning of the Syrian conflict, Erdoğan still managed to kill “two birds
with one stone”: ISIS has been hit logistically and in its capacity to con-
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duct cross-border shelling, and the Syrian Kurds did not accomplish the
connection of their three cantons to form a de facto Kurdish federation on
Turkey’s southern border.xxx
Considering the operational difficulties of an army under full re-con-
struction, observers claiming that Turkey might now take on Raqqa next
are simply neglecting realities. Strategically, the Islamic State’s ‘capital’
in Syria is way more difficult to capture than Jarablus, Manbij or Kobani.
Even to get there, Turk- ish forces would have to cross either PYD-domi-
nated areas or make a turn by Aleppo through areas held by regime
troops.xxxi Add to this Erdoğan’s fear of losing control of Turkey’s do-
mestic situation and one soon realises that the AKP discourse is probably
stronger than the actual willingness for continuous military adventures in
Syria (and Iraq). Therefore, one should not overestimate Erdoğan when he
speaks in favour of direct intervention in Mossul or Raqqa. Instead, these
“Neo-Ottoman” statements are arguably meant to “sustain a wave of na-
tionalist frenzy on which Erdoğan seeks to ride to a new constitution and
an executive presidency next year”.xxxii For the time being, Turkey’s inter-
vention has proven its continuous regional ambitions, although in a com-
pletely different form to a few years ago. By stepping up relations with
former foes such as Russia, Turkey has re-gained some of the leverage it
strives for in its immediate neighbourhood. At the end of the day, how-
ever, Erdoğan’s overriding goal is fortifying his domestic power, leading
some to argue that the recent domestic purges are a “counter-coup”xxxiii to
repress any potential opposition to his leadership. Turkey’s domestic and
external affairs, it cannot be emphasised enough, remain deeply entwined.
As for the future of the Syrian conflict as such, there is too much “mili-
tary parity on the battlefield for anything but protracted fighting”.xxxiv
Sadly enough for the thousands of civilians who have been victims of the
war, the latter has turned into a chess board dominated by the regional and
international actors. The actual prize is not necessarily winning the war;
instead all parties involved are attempting to get the best deal/influence
out of the complex situation. “As factions jostle for influence, the original
causes of the conflict slowly fade away and opportunistic deals become
the new order of the day, among the insurgents and government supporters
on the ground as well as among the war’s many regional actors”.xxxv While
Aleppo proper is in a continuous stalemate, the wider question in Northern
Syria will be to be well-positioned in a potential post-ISIS situation: “a
war of positioning in the Jarablus-Manbij region has now clearly com-
Sebastian Franzkowiak
154
menced”.xxxvi An end of the Syrian calamity, however, is not in sight and
as some argue, not necessarily desired.
 
*Sebastian Franzkowiak is CIFE Alumnus. His major research interests
are Turkish foreign policy, the Syrian conflict and the transformation of
the Arab world.
1. A thank you for your opinion goes to Ayhan Kaya and Silvia Colombo.
2. Mentioned since 2005 by Erdoğan as part of his reconciliation attempt
with Turkey’s Kurds, the Kurdish question could equally be under-
stood as the continuous controversy over the Kurds’ statelessness,
making them the largest cross-border ethnic group without a state.
3. Established in 2003 as an offshoot of the Turkish PKK, the PYD – un-
like its Turkish counterpart – is not considered a terrorist network but
an official party. Turkish officials do however equate the two groups as
one and the same ‘terrorist organisation’.
4. Turkish media – controlled up to 90% by the AKP government – claim
that ´FETÖ’ (Fethullah Gülen Terror Organisation) is behind the coup.
The Obama administration rejected any alleged links to the coup and
asked for evidence to justify Gülen’s extradition to Turkey.
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Sino-American relations under Trump
George N. Tzogopoulos*
The future evolution of relations between the US and China will be critical
for world developments. The former – an established political and econo-
mic superpower – and the latter – an unquestionably economic colossus
and rising political power – are attempting to find a modus vivendi which
will define international relations. Optimistic scholars suggest that existing
and possibly new differences will either be solved peacefully or at least
not lead to any conflict in the interest of world stability. However pes-
simistic analysts express the view that ongoing rivalry and contradicting
interests will ultimately lead to armed conflict.
In 2010, former US President Barack Obama decided to respond to
what China describes as its ‘peaceful development’ with the so-called
‘pivot to Asia’. American foreign policy started to turn gradually towards
Asia with the purpose of encircling Beijing politically, military and eco-
nomically. At the political and military level Washington attempted to
strengthen ties with traditional allies such as South Korea and Japan. And
to gain economic advantage, it invested in the establishment of the Trans-
Pacific Partnership (TPP). China reacted by developing its ‘Belt and
Road’ (OBOR) strategy, as well as seeking close relationships with Asian
countries such as Bangladesh, Cambodia, Nepal and Pakistan.
The US presidential election of 8 November 2016 decided whether con-
tinuity or discontinuity would mark Sino-American relations. There was a
fundamental difference between the two candidates. On the one hand,
Trump represented what could be called an ‘unknown factor’ in interna-
tional relations. And on the other hand, Hillary Clinton, an establishment
politician, guaranteeing a rather similar approach to that of Obama vis-à-
vis China. Beijing greeted Trump’s victory with caution. As we will see,
his presidency can create some opportunities for it but might also cause
serious misunderstandings and problems. Even before his inauguration,
for instance, Trump alarmed Beijing by having a telephone conversation
with Taiwan leader Tsai Ing-wen.1 Leading Chinese newspaper Global Ti-
mes wrote subsequently that ‘it is hoped that Trump will gradually under-
stand the reality and shape his China policy based on it’.2
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A trade war?
Donald Trump won the US presidential election with a rather revolution-
ary rhetorical agenda, with the reconsideration of trade policies seemingly
high on the agenda. Trump labelled China a ‘currency manipulator’. In
promising to ‘Make America Great Again’, he also said he would bring
back manufacturing jobs from China to the US and force American busi-
nessmen to reconsider their economic plans. Additionally, he would
maybe seek to cut his country’s trade deficit with China through new mea-
sures, perhaps including taxes on imports of cheap Chinese products and
instituting more trade lawsuits against China, both in the US and through
the World Trade Organization (WTO).
The new Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross and the head of the newly-
established White House National Trade Council, Peter Navarro, are wide-
ly considered as indications of Trump’s planned hawkish approach. Ross
and Navarro were Trump advisers during the election campaign and the
inspiring figures behind his anti-globalization public remarks. In July
2016, they co-authored a CNBC article identifying alleged flaws in exist-
ing trade agreements and portraying Trump as the man to fix things. They
have criticized China’s admission to the WTO in 2001, portraying it’s af-
termath as ‘American companies go bankrupt, China takes over the mar-
ket, and the court ruling becomes moot’.3
As a successful and experienced investor, Ross is believed to have
made money after George W. Bush introduced tariffs on Chinese steel im-
ports in 2002. The New York Post has reported that a few weeks before,
Ross had bought steel maker LTV Corp. which benefited greatly and was
later sold at a very favorable price.4 Similarly, The New York Times refers
to the new Commerce Secretary’s business interests- such as establishing
a consortium with Chinese companies – and rather ironically comments
that ‘for all the anti-China commentary, Mr. Ross has been a frequent visi-
tor in the past two decades and has made inroads into its energy industry’.5
Navarro is more a theorist than a practitioner. With a PhD in economics
from Harvard University, he has been business professor at the University
of California-Irvine for more than 20 years and was recently awarded the
Distinguished Faculty Award for Teaching. He has a record of anti-China
publications including the 2012 documentary film ‘Death by China,’ the
principal message of which was to encourage viewers not to buy ‘Made in
China’ products. Three years later, Navarro also touched upon geopolitics
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in a new book on ‘China's militarism’, analysing the scenario of a conflict
between the two countries.6
The appointment of Ross, and even more so Navarro, has increased
fears about a trade war between the US and China. The scenario cannot be
excluded, as Trump has started his presidency showing a real will to align
his policies with his pre-election agenda. However, many commentators
and media have warned of the consequences. Fortune, for example, made
a comprehensive analysis explaining ‘why America would lose a trade
war with China.’7 Moreover, the CNN website found eight reasons why a
trade war with China would be a ‘bad idea’8 and The New York Times
predicted Trump ‘couldn't win’ this fight.9
China’s reaction to aggressive US policies – such as heavy tariffs or
sanctions, as touted by Ross and Navarro – will be immediate and equally
strict. An example would be the Chinese preference of the European air-
craft industry over American rivals.10
Nevertheless, the objective must surely be to prevent a trade war and
not to assess the impact of consequences, as this situation will be a defi-
nite ‘lose-lose’ scenario. Trump’s new trade team, which also includes bil-
lionaire Carl Icahn as an adviser on regulation issues, will soon need to
decide whether, and to what extent, it will proceed with the implementa-
tion of the relevant pre-election programme. With reference to China, the
risk goes beyond economics. Sino-American relations are and will contin-
ue to be critical to world geopolitical stability. Thus, every single barrier
could perhaps alter or lead to a change of the existing balance of power.
US withdrawal from TPP
Trump is generally considered to be a president who will open a new
chapter in US support for globalization as he supports protectionism and
disagrees with the logic of free trade agreements. His decision to withdraw
his country from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is a significant indi-
cation of his will to proceed with his pre-election agenda on the matter.11
Although the TPP wasn’t expected to pass a vote in Congress, Trump’s
executive order confirmed the withdrawal.
At first glance, the Obama-led US pivot to Asia is suffering a practical
blow. The ΤPP aimed at boosting the former president’s effort to encircle
China at the economic and trade levels. Now that this policy cannot be im-
plemented via TPP, a debate on the consequences, as well as what should
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be done next, is flourishing. The American establishment does not look
favorably at Trump’s decision to pull out of this trade deal. Coverage by
mainstream media is indicative. The Washington Post expressed its dis-
agreement and connected it with future benefits for China. An article saw
the 45th US President ‘giving China its first big win’ and ‘[handing it] its
clearest opening yet to tilt the geopolitical balance in Asia in its favor.’12
In the same vain, Bloomberg diagnosed that Trump gave a ‘gift’ to China
and ‘damaged American prestige’.13 CNN also asserts that the ‘door [is]
open for Beijing to push its own brand of trade.’14
How has China reacted to all of this? For a period of approximately one
year the country has paid careful attention to Trump’s rhetoric while slow-
ly developing its own policies. To start with, the Regional Comprehensive
Economic Partnership (RCEP) outlines Beijing’s goal to promote negotia-
tions on trade in goods and services while improving access to investment
markets in 16 Asian participating economies.15 A recent White Paper on
China’s Policies on Asia-Pacific Security Cooperation makes particular
reference to RCEP. Parallel to this, the country places emphasis on boost-
ing integration in the Asia-Pacific region. President Xi Jinping clarified
this priority in a speech he gave at the APEC Summit in Lima a few days
after the U.S. presidential election.
The question to be asked is whether Trump’s executive order on TPP
could accelerate the achievement of China’s goals. This would appear to
be the case. Although Beijing’s strategy has been gradually developed
without taking Trump’s victory for granted, the existing void might be
filled by its economic policies. In this regard, mainstream American media
are right. Nevertheless, a step-by-step approach is required.17 RCEP could
certainly be an alternative to TPP, but the stance of some Asian countries
has to be examined, as they seem to be restraining factors. India is a par-
ticularly significant case. The difficult negotiating stance of New Delhi
will not necessarily change as it endeavors to prevent some loss of its do-
mestic industry by the reduction of tariffs.18 Moreover, Japan has tradi-
tionally viewed China’s initiatives in a suspicious way and is finding it
currently hard to adjust to new developments after Trump’s inauguration.
Beijing is aware of some contradictory positions on the road to a RCEP
conclusion and is prepared to invest greatly in negotiations. It is also
counting on the support of Asian nations that are enthusiastic about RCEP
and can partly sideline the Indian and Japanese argumentation in future
deliberations. Meanwhile, however, Beijing is closely monitoring how the
45th US President formulates his trade policy after withdrawing from the
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TPP. He said he would pursue bilateral trade deals with different coun-
tries. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, for instance, has already ex-
pressed an interest in the proposal. 19 For its part, the Chinese administra-
tion does not cultivate any illusions that Trump will accept Chinese domi-
nation over international trade. By contrast, it is preparing itself for all
scenarios.
Foreign Policy
In parallel with trade policies, the future evolution of Sino-American rela-
tions will be played out in the arena of foreign policy. Attention is turned
towards developments in the South China Sea. A recent study published
by RAND Corporation is entitled: ‘War with China: Thinking through the
Unthinkable’ and asserts that the danger that a mishandled crisis could
trigger hostilities cannot be ignored.20 Αs far as the approach of the new
US president is concerned, in his April 2016 foreign policy speech he clar-
ified: ‘We desire to live peacefully and in friendship with China’. At the
same time, however, he warned: ‘Look at what China is doing in the South
China Sea. They’re not supposed to be doing this’.21 On the whole, he said
he would bolster the US military presence in the South China Sea.
In January 2017, Rex Tillerson – then Trump’s nominee for Secretary
of State – expressed the view, during his Senate confirmation hearing, that
China should be barred from South China Sea islands.22 He also said that
the building of islands and putting military assets on those islands was
‘akin to Russia’s taking Crimea’ from Ukraine. These comments caused
anger in Beijing. An editorial of Global Times was representative of how it
would be prepared to respond. Although it expressed the hope that Tiller-
son would ‘desire a productive partnership with China’, it also made clear
that ‘if Trump’s diplomatic team shapes future Sino-US ties on the basis
of its current actions, the two sides had better prepare for a military
clash’.23
Within this context, a critical factor for the development of the relation-
ship between Washington and Beijing will be how the former will see its
traditional allies, namely Japan and South Korea. While in his pre-election
campaign Trump criticized both for extensively relying on US support, his
first weeks is office are rather marked by continuity in that regard. Ahead
of his South Korea visit, Secretary of Defence James Mattis reaffirmed
American commitment to defend its ally and also deploy the THAAD mis-
Sino-American relations under Trump
163
sile system.24 Washington publicly says that THAAD will only target
North Korea – if required – but Beijing does not seem convinced and feels
threatened.
From another perspective some commentators take the rapprochement
between the US and Russia under Trump into account and are already at-
tempting to explore how Vladimir Putin’s alignment with the West will
affect his relationship with his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping. Α recent
article in The Guardian was titled: ‘Some other friends forever? China
wary of Rex Tillerson wooing away Russia.’25 The main argumentation is
that the theoretical collaboration between the US and Russia might jeopar-
dize the Sino-Russian partnership. The supposed explanation is that Putin
will have to make difficult choices between turning his country's foreign
policy towards the West or towards China.
Even if Τillerson manages to facilitate a better political understanding
between Washington and Moscow, the relationship between Beijing and
Moscow will hardly be influenced. To start with, there is no Sino-Russian
‘axis’ against the West. The fact that China and Russia closely co-operate
does not mean that they seek to repudiate the US and the EU or that they
are building an anti-Western military and political alliance. Also, the eco-
nomic grounds for a Sino-Russian collaboration are unquestionable. Rus-
sia needs China as a reliable client for its natural gas. The bilateral May
2013 energy deal is a characteristic example. For its part, Beijing needs
Moscow for the smooth implementation of its ‘Belt and Road’ Initiative in
several Asian countries. In other words, the win-win logic cannot be easily
altered.26
Who leads globalization?
Τhe next four years will define how the new multipolar world will be
shaped and if the US and China will prefer to antagonize each other or
generally collaborate in spite of their differences. Ironically, a new theme
where the two countries seem to proceed holding contradictory positions
is that of globalization. As long as Trump’s policies jeopardize the US’s
leading role in this process, China will have the opportunity to possibly
take over its role. While Trump insists on protectionist policies, the Chi-
nese leadership puts emphasis on the importance of globalization.
President Xi Jinping participated for the first time in the Davos World
Economic Forum and made a relevant speech.27 In addition, Premier Li
George N. Tzogopoulos
164
Keqiang published an article on Bloomberg, suggesting inter alia: ‘Econo-
mic globalization has enabled the creation and sharing of wealth on an un-
precedented scale [and China] offers an anchor of stability and growth
with its consistent message of support for reform, openness, and free
trade.’28 A few years ago such comments would only have come from US
leaders. But times have changed and they become more interesting and
certainly more unpredictable.
 
*George N. Tzogopoulos, CIFE Alumnus, is a journalist and media-poli-
tics expert. He is founder of chinaandgreece.com and the author of the
books US Foreign Policy in the European Media (IB Tauris 2012) and The
Greek Crisis in the Media (ashgate 2013).
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